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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In most developed countries, policy makers have made significant efforts over the past
decade to liberalize energy markets. The objective underlying the liberalization is to
achieve gains in social welfare via an increase in competition and economic efficiency of
the products and services provided (Aune et al., 2008). Within the European Union, the
liberalization of both the electricity and the natural gas market has been enforced by
directives of the European Parliament and the European Council (EU, 2003a,b, 2009a,b).
In turn, the liberalization induced a change in paradigm since both markets have been
historically dominated by protected regional monopolies in most member states. While
the potential economic benefit of liberalized energy markets is considerable, it also brings
about new challenges and raises new economic questions. The essays in this thesis thus
seek to improve the understanding of some of these problems as they each address a
specific economic question related to liberalized energy markets.
The liberalization of the European natural gas wholesale market has significantly changed
pricing and business strategies in the natural gas industry. Historically, pricing of nat-
ural gas imports to continental Europe were based on crude oil prices or prices of crude
oil derivatives, with long-term contracts (LTCs) being the prevalent institutional design
between producers and wholesale market participants. LTCs were used by market par-
ticipants because they allowed for a decrease in the risks implied in investments for gas
producers in the development of gas fields and network infrastructure. The underlying
economic rationale for the application of oil price indexation of natural gas prices within
these LTCs was to ensure the competitiveness of natural gas as a fuel in the respective
consumer market.
1
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However, the traditional pricing model has been challenged by the liberalization that
fostered competition in wholesale natural gas markets. The introduced third party access
to natural gas infrastructure has spurred the emergence of trading hubs for natural
gas in continental Europe. These hubs represent a virtual or physical area within the
natural gas network where volumes are traded on a short-term (spot market) or long-
term (futures market) basis. Prices of natural gas at these hubs are expected to reflect
gas market-specific fundamentals such as weather conditions or infrastructure availability
rather than exclusively the price of crude oil or crude oil derivatives.
Thus far, price determinants in liberalized natural gas markets have received limited
attention, and existing research has focused on the US market (see, e.g., Brown and
Yu¨cel, 2008). However, knowledge of natural gas price determinants in liberalized mar-
kets is of high value for consumers and producers because it facilitates economic decision
making and hedging. In order to improve the understanding of price determinants in
the liberalized European natural gas market, the essay in Chapter 2 empirically investi-
gates the effects of various fundamental variables on natural gas wholesale prices using
econometric methods.
While the oil price indexation of natural gas prices has come under pressure, the need
for LTCs may persist for the purpose of long-term risk sharing among gas producers
and wholesale market participants. As a consequence, various market participants have
proposed switching the price indexation of LTCs from crude oil prices to natural gas hub
prices because they consider the latter to more adequately reflect the relevant demand
and supply conditions. From an economic point of view, this proposal seems appealing
at first glance since hub-based prices are expected to mirror a broader set of relevant
market fundamentals. However, although the economic significance of the continental
European hubs has grown steadily during the last years with rising trading volumes,
liquidity at these hubs is still low and far below the British hub. Since sufficient trading
liquidity is considered to be an important element in an efficient price formation process,
the economic validity of prices at the rather illiquid continental European hubs has been
recently questioned (see, e.g., Komlev, 2013). Within this context, the essay in Chapter 3
empirically analyzes the informational efficiency of spot and futures markets at European
natural gas hubs. In specific, the essay compares price formation and intertemporal
arbitrage dynamics between the rather illiquid trading hubs in continental Europe and
the more mature British hub and therefore allows for an assessment of the informational
efficiency of these markets and the role of liquidity.
Enforcing competition via an increased number of market participants as a core element
of liberalization does not work for all market segments in the energy sector. Most
importantly, the construction and the operation of energy transmission and distribution
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networks are characterized by high fixed costs and limited market size. Within this
market segment, one supplier may thus provide the services at lower costs than multiple
suppliers operating their own networks. The transmission and distribution of energy
can therefore be classified as a natural monopoly, creating the need for regulation to
ensure cost-efficient behavior of the system operator and the sharing of productivity
gains between the supplier and customers (see, e.g., Joskow, 2008, Leland, 1974).
Historically, “rate of return regulation” has been applied by regulators to limit the eco-
nomic rents that can be obtained by the network operator. However, this regulatory
approach lacks cost efficiency incentives and may result in excessive investment behavior
of the regulated firms (Averch and Johnson, 1962). In order to ensure a more cost-
efficient behavior of natural monopolies, incentive-based regulation schemes that rely on
so-called “yardstick competition” have been established by regulators in recent years.
Yardstick competition is based on cost comparisons among the regulated firms and pro-
vides financial incentives for them to approach the best practice frontier (Shleifer, 1985).
For the purpose of cost comparison, regulators frequently use empirical benchmarking
techniques to assess the inefficiency of the regulated firms. Based on the outcome of the
inefficiency assessment, firm-specific cost saving targets are derived by the regulator.
However, concerns have been raised that the current implementation, with a focus on op-
erational performance, may negatively affect investments into the network and thus the
quality of services provided by the system operator (Guthrie, 2006, Kwoka, 2009). Un-
fortunately, the impact of incentive-based regulation schemes on investment behavior is
complex and empirical evidence is mixed (see, e.g., Cambini and Rondi, 2010, Nagel and
Rammerstorfer, 2009, Roques and Savva, 2009, Vogelsang, 2010). The essay in Chapter
4 seeks to improve the understanding in this research area by incorporating dynamic as-
pects into benchmarking models applied by regulators within incentive-based regulation
schemes and illustrates the impact of using dynamic versus static benchmarking models
in an empirical application.
In contrast to the transmission and distribution sector, the European wholesale mar-
ket for electricity is based on competitive elements as a result of market liberalization.
Particularly in Germany, the induced competitive pressure combined with the political
decision to prioritize the feed-in of power generation from renewable energy has weak-
ened the economic viability of existing conventional power plants. This development has
driven significant conventional generation capacity out of the market since these facilities
have been unable to cover their variable cost of operation by revenue. The decline in
reliable, i.e., non-intermittent, generation capacity in turn has aggravated the network
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stability in Germany (Bundeskartellamt and Federal Network Agency, 2012). Differ-
ent measures to improve or maintain the reliability of electricity supply are currently
intensively discussed, such as network extension or capacity remuneration mechanisms.
An economic assessment of such measures should be based on a comparison of the
respective costs and benefits. While the costs of the different measures may be quantified
despite significant uncertainties, the economic benefits of a reliable electricity supply
seems less clear in the public debate. From an economic perspective, the value of an
increase in the security of supply should equal the expected outage costs avoided by
the respective measure. Thus, outage costs are of high relevance for the evaluation of
security of supply measures. Surprisingly, this aspect has yet to receive attention in
Germany despite security of supply measures being an important part of the national
public debate. In this context, the essay in Chapter 5 quantifies sectoral and regional
power interruption costs in Germany using a macroeconomic approach.
1.2 The Application of Econometrics in Economics - A
Critical Discussion
Three out of the four essays in this thesis apply econometric methods to economic
problems. Econometrics has emerged as a popular and frequently used tool in economic
research but has also received significant criticism. The following paragraphs intend to
provide a brief overview on the critical aspects as well as on the merits of the application
of econometrics in economic research.
Econometrics can be defined as the quantitative analysis of economic variables such as
quantities, prices or interest rates (Hendry, 1980). According to the Econometric Society,
econometrics pursues the objective to advance economic theory in its relation to statistics
and mathematics (Econometric Society, 1933). In current economic research, economet-
ric methodology is mainly used for three purposes. First, econometric approaches are
applied to empirically test established economic theory. Second, econometric models
are specified for explorative studies, i.e., to investigate the relationship among economic
variables without relying on established economic theory. Third, econometric methods
are used to forecast economic variables.
The different application fields outlined above differ significantly with regard to the re-
lationship between econometrics and economic theory. In the first field of application,
there is a direct link between economic theory and the application of econometric meth-
ods as the quantitative analysis seeks to test an established economic theory. In contrast,
explorative usage of econometric models is not directly backed by economic theory but
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rather based on economic intuition. However, explorative studies may be helpful in
generating new economic insights and thus foster the advancement of economic theory,
whereas the application of econometrics for forecasts usually neither relies on economic
theory nor seeks to enrich it explicitly.
The adequacy of econometric models to investigate economic questions has been contro-
versially discussed among economists. The seminal work of Tinbergen (1939) investigat-
ing fluctuations in the business cycle represents one of the first econometric applications
that received significant attention but also raised a controversial debate on the role of
econometrics in economic research. In response to Tinbergen’s study, Keynes (1939)
argues that some economic problems may not be properly addressed by econometric
methods. In specific, Keynes had already begun to touch on some technical caveats
in the application of time series econometrics that would receive increased attention
in more recent research, for example the structural stability of estimated parameters,
spurious correlation and problems arising from omitted variables.
Although many of these technical problems have been tackled by methodological en-
hancement such as the concept of cointegration (Engle and Granger, 1987) and the
explicit consideration of time-varying volatility (Engle, 1982) as well as of structural
breaks (Chow, 1960), the relationship between econometrics and economic theory has
remained controversial among economists. Among others, the fact that the specification
of econometric models requires more assumptions than economic theory can provide and
the resulting flexibility in the model specification and the model selection process has
been at the center of the debate. In addition, the widespread usage of time series econo-
metrics that is usually not directly backed by economic theory has further increased the
discrepancy of economic theory and empirical economic research. While Lucas (1976)
argues that the discrepancies between economic theory and econometric models speci-
fied in empirical research render them inadequate for the purpose of policy evaluation,
Pesaran (1988) emphasizes that despite their limitations, econometric models, including
time series econometrics, are indispensable tools for the empirical evaluation of economic
policy and for forecasting purposes.
This thesis takes on the approach of Pesaran (1988) and relies on econometric method-
ology because it allows for the empirical investigation of economic phenomena, while
taking advantage of real world data. Dispensing econometric methods would in turn be
equivalent to throwing away valuable information that may contribute to an improved
comprehension of economic problems. Moreover, even explorative approaches that are
not backed by economic theory have yielded meaningful economic insights that have
stimulated the formulation of more advanced economic theory (Zellner, 1996). Never-
theless, the points raised by critics such as Keynes or Lucas are a valuable framework
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with regard to the interpretation of the empirical results obtained from econometric
models. In specific, they call for sound methodological techniques to overcome tech-
nical difficulties and for a cautious economic interpretation, keeping in mind that the
empirical approach and economic theory may not be fully aligned with each other. As a
consequence of these limitations, econometric models should not be exclusively applied
but rather be combined with alternative methods such as behavioral studies or theo-
retical models to achieve an increased methodological pluralism in economic research
(Pinto, 2011).
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis comprises four empirical essays on energy economics. In Chapter 2, price
determinants in liberalized natural gas markets are investigated with a special emphasis
on the impact of supply interruptions. In specific, the price effect of various fundamental
variables such as weather conditions, inventory, prices of substitutes and supply shortfalls
are analyzed for the German natural gas wholesale market. The essay in Chapter 2 is
based on a modified version of the working paper “What Drives Natural Gas Prices? -
A Structural VAR Approach” (Nick and Thoenes, 2013). Stefan Thoenes co-authored
the study, and contributions to all aspects of the essay were made in equal parts.
The essay in Chapter 3 investigates the informational efficiency of European natural
gas hubs. The essay focuses on two aspects of informational efficiency, namely price
formation and intertemporal arbitrage on spot and futures markets at the hubs in Ger-
many, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This chapter draws upon an updated
version of the working paper “Price Formation and Intertemporal Arbitrage within a
Low-Liquidity Framework: Empirical Evidence from European Natural Gas Markets”
(Nick, 2013), which is single-authored.
Chapter 4 deals with the regulation of natural monopolies in network industries. The
essay in this section analyzes the impact of using static versus dynamic benchmarking
models in the context of incentive-based regulation schemes. The effect of the con-
sideration of investments on the benchmarking outcome is illustrated by an empirical
application to a dataset of US electricity distribution and transmission firms. The essay
is based on the working paper “The Hidden Cost of Investment: Adjustment Costs and
their Impact on Firm Performance Measurement and Regulation” (Nick and Wetzel,
2014) which is a joint work with Heike Wetzel, who equally contributed to all parts of
the study as co-author.
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The economic assessment of power interruption costs is at the center of the essay in
Chapter 5. Within this essay, economic costs of power interruptions in Germany are
approximated by losses in economic output. A revised version of the working paper
“The Costs of Power Interruptions in Germany - an Assessment in the Light of the
Energiewende” (Growitsch et al., 2013) is the underlying work of this essay. It is joint
work with Christian Growitsch, Raimund Malischek and Heike Wetzel. All co-authors
contributed in equal parts to all aspects of the paper.
The subsequent paragraphs briefly outline the research questions, the methodological
framework and the findings of the four essays included in this thesis. Limitations and
methodological caveats are also addressed.
In the essay “What Drives Natural Gas Prices? - A Structural VAR Approach”, the
price determinants in liberalized wholesale natural gas markets are analyzed with special
focus on supply interruptions. The determinants of natural gas prices within liberalized
markets have only received limited attention. Most research has focused on the natural
gas prices in the US and their relationship to crude oil prices and some fundamental
variables such as inventory and weather conditions (see, e.g., Brown and Yu¨cel, 2008,
Hartley et al., 2008). Concerning European gas prices, the empirical approaches focus
exclusively on crude oil prices as the explanatory variable (see, e.g., Panagiotidis and
Rutledge, 2007).1 The aforementioned studies generally suffer from two shortfalls. First,
they lack the consideration of important price determinants such as coal prices or trade
flows of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Second, the authors impose strict exogeneity as-
sumptions on the explanatory variables. While these assumptions are valid for weather
conditions, it seems to be a flaw with regard to inventory as changes in natural gas
inventory, i.e., withdrawal and injections of natural gas in the network by storage oper-
ators, cannot be regarded as independent from changes in the market price for natural
gas.
In order to overcome both shortfalls, the essay in Chapter 2 specifies a structural vector
autoregressive (VAR) model for the German natural gas market. The VAR framework
allows to both incorporate a rich set of fundamental variables in the model and avoid
imposing invalid exogeneity assumptions.2 The fundamental variables included in the
model comprise various supply and demand drivers of natural gas. In specific, natural
gas supply disruptions, LNG imports, meteorological conditions, prices of coal and crude
oil as well as natural gas inventory data are used to empirically assess the determinants
of wholesale natural gas prices. In addition, due to its capability to capture endogenous
1An exception is the work of Regnard and Zakoian (2011), which incorporates weather related data
into the econometric model. However, this study primarily analyzes volatility dynamics of gas price
returns rather than determinants of natural gas price levels.
2VAR models have been extensively used in macroeconomic applications. For a technical introduction
to the methodological framework, see e.g., Sims (1980).
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interaction among the model variables, the VAR approach allows for insights into the
behavior of gas storage operators with regard to changes in natural gas prices or weather
conditions. The econometric model is based on weekly data since this allows for an
explicit modeling of weather conditions and inventory data. The sample covers the
period from January 2008 to June 2012 and is restricted by the availability of hub prices
in Germany before this period.3
The innovative approach of a structural VAR model for the German gas market comes
at the cost of some caveats. First, the missing supply volumes have to be approximated
using a heterogeneous set of data sources. Second, the modeling framework is unable
to reflect physical network characteristics and infrastructure constraints that may also
affect the impact of supply disruptions on natural gas prices. While the first shortfall is
reduced by due diligence and frequent consistency checks with available literature, the
second aspect has to be kept in mind when interpreting the empirical results derived
from the structural VAR model.
A further methodological challenge within the structural VAR approach is the identifi-
cation of the structural model from its reduced-form representation. The reduced-form
interpretation ignores the instantaneous interaction among the variables included in the
model. Thus, these interdependencies are captured by the error terms, rendering a dis-
tinctive economic interpretation of the reduced-form error term impossible. To allow for
an economic interpretation of the VAR residuals, a structural form has to be derived
such that the instantaneous interaction of the variables is explicitly accounted for. By
doing so, error terms with a diagonal variance-covariance matrix allow for a distinctive
economic interpretation. Unfortunately, the identification of the structural form requires
assumptions to be imposed on the data analyzed. Different methodological approaches
have been proposed, such as restrictions on the interaction of model variables in the
long run, in the short run or sign restrictions.4 Within this essay, restrictions on the
instantaneous interaction of the model variables are imposed to obtain the structural
VAR representation. The selection of this identification strategy is motivated by two
arguments. First, the usage of weekly data implies that short-term restrictions are not
as restrictive compared to models that are based on monthly or quarterly data. Sec-
ond, some of the model variables, e.g., weather effects, exhibit exogenous character with
regard to some other model variables, thus facilitating the selection of the restrictions.
Drawing upon the structural VAR model, three econometric techniques are used to
give insight into price determinants and the impact of fundamental shocks to wholesale
3Natural gas inventory data for Germany is only available on a weekly basis prior to 2011.
4For a technical discussion, see e.g., Lu¨tkepohl (2005) and Amisano and Giannini (1997).
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natural gas prices in Germany. First, so-called “impulse response functions” are com-
puted. The impulse response functions allow for the analysis of the effects of structural
shocks, i.e., unexpected changes in a certain variable, on the other variables within the
system. Second, the “forecast error variance decomposition” is used to derive shares
of changes in the explained variable that can be attributed to other model variables.
Thus, forecast error variance decompositions allow for an assessment of the importance
of certain variables for the development of another variable. Third, the parameter esti-
mates of the structural VAR model are used to generate “historical decompositions” of
price changes. The historical decomposition enables the disentangling of the effects of
explanatory variables on the variable of interest during a certain time period.
The empirical findings of the study allow for comprehensive insights into price determi-
nants of natural gas markets. The response functions of the natural gas price to shocks
of the included variables are in line with economic intuition. With regard to demand-
sided price effects, extraordinarily cold temperatures cause an immediate increase in
gas prices, reflecting an increase in natural gas demand for heating. In addition, the
responses of the natural gas price to structural shocks in oil and coal prices are posi-
tive. This suggests that there is a distinctive relationship between these commodities
that may be the result of common price drivers, e.g., the macroeconomic climate, or
substitutability, e.g., the competition between coal and gas in the electricity sector.
Concerning supply-sided price effects, an unforeseen cut in gas deliveries leads to higher
gas prices because the missing volumes have to be replaced by more expensive supply
options, or gas consumers have to be driven out of the market by price signals. Positive
storage shocks, i.e., storage injection that is higher than expected or storage withdrawal
that is lower than expected, also have positive effects on natural gas prices. This finding
is plausible since positive storage shocks represent additional demand or a reduction in
supply on the spot market. Interestingly, the response of storage flows to positive gas
price shocks is significantly negative. This is consistent with the economic intuition that
storage operators withdraw natural gas in the case of an unexpected rise in spot prices.
The forecast error variance decomposition shows that the natural gas price is heavily
affected by weather conditions and supply disruptions in the short run. However, both
price effects are only of transitory nature. In contrast, the effects of coal and crude oil
price shocks on natural gas prices fully unfold only with a certain delay.
In a further step, the structural VAR model is used to analyze the impact of three major
supply interruptions to the German natural gas market by carrying out a historical de-
composition for the respective periods. In particular, the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute
in January 2009, the reduced natural gas supplies from Libya during the “Arab Spring”
in 2011 and the cut in Russian gas deliveries during the cold spell in February 2012
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are analyzed. Overall, the results of the historical decompositions suggest that all three
supply disruptions coincided with other fundamental impacts on natural gas demand.
Therefore, assigning the observed market price reactions exclusively to the cut in natural
gas deliveries would be misleading since demand-side effects either mitigate or aggravate
the impact of supply interruptions on wholesale natural gas prices.
With regard to the Russian-Ukrainian dispute in January 2009, the price increase caused
by the supply disruption was partially mitigated by the weak economic climate as a result
of the global financial crisis. Without the corresponding drop in natural gas demand, the
historical decomposition suggests that a price increase of about 30% instead of the actual
price spike of 15% would have occurred as a consequence of the supply shortfall. The
historical decomposition for the period of the Libyan civil war suggests that the actual
price spike of 15% can be disentangled into two sources. First, the missing volumes
directly increased market prices by about 5%. Second, precautionary gas injection by
storage operators who anticipated future scarcity of supply as a consequence of the
political unrest in North Africa created additional demand on the spot market and
therefore increased natural gas spot prices by about 10%. Concerning the cut in Russian
gas deliveries to Germany in February 2012, the impact of the missing supply volumes
on natural gas prices in Germany is even smaller compared to the two other events
analyzed. According to the historical decomposition of the respective period, the actual
price increase of approximately 40% can be mostly attributed to the extraordinarily cold
weather conditions, resulting in a sharp increase in natural gas demand.
The empirical results of the study suggest that policy makers should not exclusively focus
on purely supply-sided measures in order to increase the security and the competitiveness
of European gas supply as the historical decompositions emphasize that gas prices are to
a large extent driven by demand fundamentals. In fact, attention should also be paid on
flexibility options on the demand side in order to limit abrupt demand spikes in case of
extraordinary cold weather conditions as well as to the functioning of the storage market
since these facilities are of special importance for smoothing out transitory imbalances
in the gas market.
Besides price determinants, the liberalization of European natural gas wholesale market
and the subsequent emergence of natural gas trading hubs in continental Europe have
raised other relevant economic questions. In particular, the low liquidity of continental
European gas hubs has created doubts among market participants and policy makers
regarding the validity of their price signals (see, e.g., Komlev, 2013). In order to add
insights in this area of research, the essay in Chapter 3 addresses the informational
efficiency of the natural gas hubs in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
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The efficiency of the relatively immature continental European trading hubs for natural
gas has only been incompletely addressed thus far. Empirical research has been carried
out to assess the efficient exhaustion of regional price arbitrage opportunities by investi-
gating regional price convergence among the European hubs (see, e.g., Growitsch et al.,
2012, Robinson, 2007). These studies generally suggest a high level of regional integra-
tion of wholesale prices, thus indicating rather efficient regional arbitrage activities.
However, the informational efficiency of European natural gas hubs within an intertem-
poral framework has not yet been explored.5 In addition, the price discovery process of
European natural gas hubs has received only very limited attention in previous empir-
ical research on natural gas markets. However, in the debate surrounding the possible
price indexation of LTCs on hub prices, knowledge about the informational efficiency
is valuable for the market participants affected. To bridge the research gap described
above, the essay in Chapter 3 empirically investigates the price formation process and
the efficiency of intertemporal arbitrage activity at the European natural gas hubs using
econometric approaches on daily spot and futures market price data for the period from
October 2007 to August 2012. Daily data is preferred to weekly or monthly frequency
because this enables a better assessment of the short-term informational efficiency of
the markets investigated.
In the first part of the essay, the price formation process at European natural gas hubs
is analyzed. The underlying motivation is to investigate if either the spot or the futures
market is informationally superior and thus functions as the leader for price discovery.
Fama (1970) states that equally efficient markets for the same underlying asset should
reflect relevant information simultaneously. Thus, a potential systematic lead-lag re-
lationship between spot and futures markets is an indication that one market is more
informationally efficient than the other.
From a methodological perspective, Granger causality testing is applied in order to
investigate whether one market dominates the price discovery process or if both markets
react simultaneously to new information.6 The standard Granger causality test is a
valuable methodology to infer whether a certain variable has explanatory power for
future values of another variable. However, the standard test suffers from two shortfalls.
First, instantaneous causality is not accounted for. Second, it assumes linearity in the
causality relationship. With regard to the empirical application of the essay, the first
shortfall is mitigated by the fact that the goal is to test for a systematic lead-lag pattern
between spot and futures markets and not for an instantaneous interaction between the
5A notable exception is the study of Stronzik et al. (2009). The authors investigate whether the
theory of storage holds at three major European gas hubs between 2005 and 2009. However, they do
not directly address the price formation process and the efficiency of intertemporal arbitrage activity.
6For an extensive discussion on the concept of Granger causality, see Granger (1969).
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markets. The second weakness deserves more attention since there is empirical evidence
of significant nonlinearities in the relationship of commodity spot and futures markets
(see, e.g., Bekiros and Diks, 2008, Chen and Lin, 2004, Silvapulle and Moosa, 1999).
This finding is usually attributed to the nonlinearity of transaction costs, asymmetric
information and heterogeneous expectations of market participants (Arouri et al., 2013).
There are good reasons to assume that these drivers of nonlinear interaction are relevant
for the continental European gas hubs since the low liquidity at these hubs may foster
market frictions such as transaction and information costs. To overcome the caveat
of imposing linearity assumptions on the interaction of natural gas spot and futures
markets, nonlinear interaction between the markets is explicitly accounted for by using
the nonlinear causality test proposed by Diks and Panchenko (2006).
The second part of the essay seeks to assess how efficiently intertemporal arbitrage op-
portunities between spot and futures markets at the European gas hubs are exhausted.
The theory of storage states that spot and futures markets should share a stable long-
run equilibrium since intertemporal arbitrage prevents deviations from this equilibrium
to be persistent (Working, 1949). Such a stable long-run economic equilibrium can
be empirically tested for using cointegration techniques.7 Moreover, the efficiency of
intertemporal arbitrage, i.e., the speed at which deviations from the intertemporal equi-
librium are corrected, can be empirically analyzed using vector error correction models
(VECM).
A shortfall in measuring the efficiency of intertemporal arbitrage based on spot and
futures prices in this essay is that storage costs cannot be explicitly considered due to
to the lack of daily data. While the time-constant effect of storage costs does enter the
estimated long-run equilibrium relationship and is therefore accounted for, information
contained in the variation of storage costs is lost. However, the variation of storage
costs over time is expected to be small because there is only little short-term trading
of storage capacities at European hubs. For this reason, the shortfall arising from the
inability to explicitly account for storage costs seems limited.
While VECMs represent an intuitive and frequently used approach to measure the ef-
ficiency of arbitrage, a potential shortcoming is the assumption of linearity in the er-
ror correction process. Assuming linearity in this context implies that error correction
starts instantaneously even for small deviations from the equilibrium and hence does
not consider transaction costs resulting from market frictions. In the context of Euro-
pean natural gas hubs, the lack of liquidity as well as the physical characteristics of the
market, e.g., restricted withdrawal and injection capacities of gas storages, may affect
7The concept of cointegration states that two economic variables share a common stochastic trend
and thus a long-run equilibrium. For a detailed technical discussion, see Engle and Granger (1987) and
Johansen (1988).
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arbitrage dynamics between the spot and the futures market. Within the essay, such
frictions are thus addressed by estimating a nonlinear threshold VECM (TVECM). The
TVECM enables the identification of regimes that exhibit different arbitrage dynamics
depending on the magnitude of the deviation from the long-run equilibrium. Comparing
the error correction mechanisms of the different regimes therefore provides an oppor-
tunity to assess the magnitude of market frictions that impede intertemporal arbitrage
activity at European natural gas hubs.
Market liquidity as a potential driver of arbitrage efficiency has changed significantly
during the sample period at all hubs analyzed. In particular, the German and Dutch
hubs have experienced remarkable growth in liquidity. Thus, a static VECM with the
underlying assumption of structural stability may not fully capture the arbitrage dy-
namics. In order to account for structural changes in the arbitrage efficiency over time,
a VECM with time-varying coefficients is estimated using the Kalman filter technique.8
This state-space approach allows for the analysis of whether the increase in liquidity has
fostered the short-run informational efficiency of the two continental European gas hubs
throughout the sample period.
The empirical results of the essay allow for insights regarding the informational efficiency
of the European natural gas hubs. Causality testing reveals that price formation takes
place on the futures market at all hubs. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that
futures market participants react more efficiently to information than their spot market
counterparts (Bohl et al., 2012, Silvapulle and Moosa, 1999). It seems plausible to
attribute this finding to the broader scope of market participants on the futures market,
where contracts can be traded for the purpose of hedging and speculation without taking
physical delivery of the commodity. With regard to hub-based pricing of internationally
traded gas, an indexation on futures market prices rather than on spot market prices
thus promises to provide more valid price signals.
The theory of storage seems to hold for all hubs in the long run. Moreover, the hy-
pothesis of long-run informational efficiency, i.e., full convergence of spot and futures
prices, cannot be rejected. Nevertheless, the sticky error correction process points toward
frictions impeding intertemporal arbitrage activities and thus significant informational
inefficiency in the short run. The results of the nonlinear TVECM suggest the exis-
tence of a “band of no arbitrage” for the German and the British hub. Although none
of the hubs considered can be regarded as fully informationally efficient, intertemporal
arbitrage opportunities seem to be most efficiently exploited at the British hub once the
deviation from the long-run equilibrium crosses a certain threshold. However, the dif-
ference in the degree of arbitrage efficiency compared to the other hubs is rather small.
8For a technical discussion of the Kalman filter, see Kalman (1960).
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The state-space VECM approach shows convergence in the short-run informational ef-
ficiency among the hubs within the sample period. Interestingly, only the short-run
informational efficiency of the German hub seems to have benefited from the increase
in liquidity. With regard to the validity of price signals of the continental European
hubs, the convergence in intertemporal arbitrage efficiency implies that the informa-
tional superiority of the British hub has diminished over time. Concerning the hub price
indexation of LTCs, this finding suggests that a price indexation based on continental
European hub prices as opposed to British hub prices is not expected to cause significant
economic disadvantages.
Overall, the empirical results suggest that policy makers and regulators should seek
to increase the short-run informational efficiency at the European natural gas hubs.
Beside fostering liquidity, regulators and competition authorities should carefully assess
whether the access of market participants to storage or network capacities is free of
discrimination in order to ensure an efficient functioning of the European natural gas
wholesale market.
The essay in Section 4 deals with different concepts of inefficiency measurement used in
the context of incentive-based regulation schemes applied to natural monopolies. The
need for regulation of natural monopolies is common knowledge in economic theory.9
Historically, the rate of return regulation has been applied by regulators to firms of
network industries such as telecommunication, railway or energy transmission. Under
rate of return of regulation, the regulator allows the utility to cover its operating costs
and to earn a specified rate of return on its invested capital. While rate of return
regulation effectively limits the rent of the regulated firms (Joskow, 2008), it does not
provide incentives for cost efficiency. Moreover, it may incentivize firms to overinvest in
capital. The latter shortfall is known as the Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson,
1962).
In order to overcome the shortcomings of rate of return regulation, alternative regulatory
approaches have been developed and implemented by regulators. The seminal work
of Shleifer (1985) laid the groundwork for incentive-based regulation schemes. This
regulatory approach is based on cost comparisons among comparable firms, following
the idea of “yardstick competition”. Incentive-based regulatory regimes have since then
found their way into regulatory practice. For the purpose of cost comparison, empirical
benchmarking techniques are commonly applied in incentive-based regulation schemes
to assess firm-specific inefficiency relative to the firm’s peers. Firm-specific “X-factors”,
reflecting cost saving targets imposed by the regulator, can subsequently be obtained
from the inefficiency estimates of the benchmarking model. The objective of these
9For an in-depth discussion on the regulation of natural monopolies see, e.g., Schmalensee (1979).
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“X-factors” is to move inefficient firms towards the efficient frontier defined by the best-
practice firms. Benchmarking models currently used in regulatory practice are static
measures of inefficiency. This means that they focus on a single “snapshot” combination
of inputs and outputs for a certain period in order to determine firm-specific inefficiency.
However, firms are expected to optimize their input usage over a dynamic multi-period
framework rather than on a period-to-period basis. For this purpose, firms will invest
in assets that will reduce costs in the long run. Such investments, however, may lead to
a transitory increase in inefficiency. For instance, the economic benefit of investing in
a new, efficient software system may go along with significant costs for the implemen-
tation, staff training or reorganization. These costs are referred to as adjustment costs.
However, the regulator is unable to disentangle the corresponding transitory inefficiency
caused by investments from the “true” inefficiency because adjustment costs can usually
not be capitalized by the investing firm. Thus, firms that carry out investments in line
with long-run cost minimization may be classified as inefficient by static benchmarking
models. As a consequence, firms aware of this effect may be incentivized to cut their
investments in order to avoid being penalized by X-factors that are too strict.
Overcoming the regulatory problem outlined requires explicitly accounting for the dy-
namic nature of inefficiency caused by adjustment costs. Following this line of argumen-
tation, different approaches to measure inefficiency in a dynamic context have emerged.
Within one of this research strands, the studies of Sengupta (1994, 1999) and Silva
and Stefanou (2003, 2007) represent the theoretical framework for the incorporation of
adjustments costs into the economic rationale of firms within every period.10
The essay in Chapter 4 draws upon the concept of dynamic inefficiency measurement
introduced by Silva and Stefanou (2003) and Silva and Stefanou (2007). Using a data
set of US electricity transmission and distribution firms covering the period 2004 to
2011, the essay investigates how the inclusion of investments and their adjustment costs
into the benchmarking model affects firm-specific and industrial inefficiency estimates
and thus the X-factors imposed by the regulator. The incorporation of both transmis-
sion and distribution firms in the model increases the heterogeneity of the sample and
thus represents a potential obstacle for an exact measurement of inefficiency. However,
the resulting shortfall may be rather small for two reasons. First, nonparametric data
envelopment analysis (DEA) is used. This methodological approach avoids imposing
a restrictive functional form on the data as opposed to parametric methods. Second,
rather than assessing the actual inefficiency of the industry, the essay seeks to contrast
the outcomes of static versus dynamic inefficiency measures. Thus, the difference in
10Another strand of literature is dynamic network DEA in which the initial outputs are allowed to
be treated as inputs in the subsequent periods (Burger and Geymu¨ller, 2007, Fa¨re and Grosskopf, 1997,
Geymu¨ller, 2007, Nemoto and Goto, 1999, 2003).
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inefficiency estimates obtained from the different measures is at the center of interest
rather than the inefficiency level itself, and this difference should not be significantly
affected by heterogeneous sample firms.
In the methodological framework applied in the essay, dynamic technical inefficiency is
assessed by the firm’s ability to simultaneously contract the usage of variable inputs and
expanding gross investments. In contrast, static measures focus exclusively on variable
input contraction. The inclusion of investments resolves the problem that arises in
the measurement of technical inefficiency in the presence of adjustment costs, namely
the inability of firms with high investments to contract variable input usage to the
same extent as their competitors with low investments. As a consequence, the dynamic
measure provides a more valid estimate of a firms actual technical inefficiency than the
static measure in the presence of adjustment costs.
Since adjustment costs automatically enter the cost data used in the benchmarking pro-
cess, the benchmarking costs have to be modified by subtracting the long-run savings
implied in the investments of the respective period. In doing so, the immediate costs as
well as the long-run benefit of investments are considered. This long-run benefit can be
approximated using the marginal value of capital, the so-called “shadow value of cap-
ital”. Obtaining reliable estimates for the shadow value of capital is methodologically
challenging. This is because the shadow value of capital represents a scarcity indica-
tor for this input and thus depends on the initial capital stock, outputs and prices of
inputs of the respective firm (Oude Lansink and Silva, 2013). From a theoretical per-
spective, this endogeneity calls for a simultaneous determination of cost inefficiency and
the firm-specific shadow value of capital (Oude Lansink and Silva, 2013). However, a
simultaneous determination translates into a nonlinear problem with severe numerical
difficulties.
For this reason, two alternative approaches have emerged to sequentially approximate
the firm-specific shadow value of capital and dynamic cost inefficiency. Within these
sequential procedures, the shadow value of capital is determined in a first step and
subsequently incorporated into the computation of dynamic cost inefficiency. One option
to derive the shadow value of capital is an econometric estimation based on historical cost
data, while the second option is to derive the shadow value from first-order conditions
in a nonparametric framework. A potential caveat of the econometric estimation is that
it requires imposing a functional form on the cost function. A second shortfall may
arise from the fact that the sample used for the econometric estimation may not be
characterized by efficient investment behavior of firms. Thus, the estimated shadow
values may reflect in part either the effects of underinvestment or excessive capital
stock expansion. However, the econometric approach represents a more feasible way to
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obtain estimates of firm-specific shadow values than solving the nonlinear optimization
problem and is therefore used in the empirical application of the essay. In addition, the
econometric estimation allows to avoid the unrealistic assumption of dynamic allocative
efficiency that is implied in the nonparametric sequential approach.11
The empirical results emphasize that the consideration of investments and the corre-
sponding adjustment costs significantly affects the inefficiency estimates on an industrial
and firm-specific level. The average dynamic technical inefficiency of the sample firms
is approximately 26%. In contrast, technical inefficiency amounts to 40% in a static
framework, i.e., when investments are ignored. The differences in technical inefficiency
estimates are most pronounced for firms with large investments. With regard to cost
inefficiency, the dynamic and static approaches yield average values of 37% and 40%,
respectively. Similar to the case of technical inefficiency, firms with high investments
perform significantly better when the dynamic cost inefficiency measure is applied. This
suggests that firms with high investment activity are penalized by the application of
static benchmarking models in regulatory practice.
The theoretical considerations as well as the empirical application of the essay illustrate
the potential benefit of using dynamic inefficiency measures in the context of incentive-
based regulation. By applying dynamic inefficiency measures, regulators may derive
X-factors that are in line with long-run cost minimization and hence avoid misleading
incentives to cut investments. Thus, regulatory authorities should carefully assess the
benchmarking models used with respect to their ability to account for adjustment costs.
In particular, regulators may try to assess the economic relevance of adjustment costs
for the regulated firms in order to develop an understanding about the distortion of
X-factors that arises when static benchmarking models are applied. If the regulator
concludes that adjustments costs are of relevance for the respective industry, switching
to a dynamic benchmarking model would appear to be warranted.
The essay in Chapter 5 focuses on the economic costs of power interruptions. Public
interest in the assessment of power interruption costs has grown steadily in Europe
during the last years. This is mainly a result of the ongoing transition of the European
electricity sector, with many European countries trying to decarbonize their electricity
sectors by increasing the share of renewable energies within the overall power production.
Since the electricity feed-in of these sources is at least for some technologies intermittent,
the shift from fossil to renewable resources may have negative effects on the stability of
the electricity system. Significant research efforts have centered around the assessment
of the technical feasibility and the economic efficiency of measures that seek to integrate
11The econometric approach to derive the shadow value of capital is in line with similar studies (see,
e.g., Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 1992).
Chapter 1. Introduction 18
stochastic power generation into the electricity grid (see, e.g. EWI et al., 2010). The
main assumption underlying these efforts is that power interruptions cause high economic
costs.
Thus far, power interruption costs have been quantified for some European countries such
as Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain (see, Bliem, 2005, de Nooij et al., 2007,
2009, Leahy and Tol, 2011, Linares and Rey, 2013). For Germany, research on outage
costs is scarce, although the country is the largest electricity consumer in Europe (IEA,
2012a).12 Thus, the essay in Chapter 5 seeks to improve the understanding of power
interruption costs in Germany. Besides its size, Germany’s regional diversity makes
the German electricity market particularly interesting for an empirical assessment of
outage costs. Since the federal states in Germany are substantially different in terms of
economic structure, outage costs may heavily depend on the region affected. In addition,
outage costs are expected to differ across sectors and industries as a result of different
production technologies. In order to account for the regional and sectoral heterogeneity,
the essay quantifies interruption costs on both the federal state level and for a broad
range of industries.
Three methodological approaches have been applied in previous research to obtain esti-
mates of the economic costs caused by interruptions in power supply. The first method-
ological approach uses data from historical blackouts to approximate outage costs (see,
e.g., Corwin and Miles, 1978, Serra and Fierro, 1997). While case studies have the
advantage that the assessment of outage costs is based on actual supply interruptions,
they can hardly be generalized due to the specific nature of the actual power interruption
(Linares and Rey, 2013). Surveys are used as the second methodology to assess power
interruption costs by investigating the willingness to pay of different economic subjects
for avoiding a power interruption (see, e.g., Balducci et al., 2002, LaCommare and Eto,
2006). Compared to case studies, this approach has the advantage that it can be applied
irrespective of any historical power outage. However, there is the shortcoming that the
interviewed persons may either under- or overstate their willingness to pay due to a lack
of information or strategic behavior. The third methodological option for the empirical
assessment of power interruption costs is the so-called “macroeconomic approach”. This
approach treats electricity as an input in the value-adding process of both firms and
private households. Within this methodological framework, the economic costs of power
interruptions are quantified by the losses in output resulting from the outage.
Unfortunately, the macroeconomic approach suffers from various drawbacks. First, the
approach exclusively quantifies losses in output, while it abstains from considering one-off
12A notable exception is the study by Praktiknjo et al. (2011). However, the authors focus on esti-
mating the power interruption costs of private households and only shortly address the welfare losses of
commercial sectors at a high level of industrial and regional aggregation.
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damages caused by the outage. Second, it assumes linearity among the usage of the input
factor electricity and the generated output. While the first shortcoming suggests that the
approach understates real interruption costs, the latter may lead to an overestimation.
This is because the output in at least some economic sectors is less than proportionately
related to the consumption of electricity. Despite its caveats, the essay in Chapter 5
relies on the macroeconomic approach because it represents a more general measure
than the alternative methodologies. In addition, the macroeconomic approach allows
for an estimate of outage costs based on publicly available data. However, the empirical
results of the essay should be interpreted as a rough approximation of outage costs rather
than as precise estimates.
For firms, the economic costs of electricity outages are approximated by the loss in
gross value added induced by the interruption in power supply. Dividing the gross value
added by the electricity consumption yields the “Value of Lost Load” (VoLL). The VoLL
thus represents the loss in output caused by one unit of electricity not supplied to the
respective customer. In the case of private households, the output generated is assumed
to be leisure activity valued in monetary terms. Thus, the VoLL of the residential sector
is calculated as the ratio of the monetary value of electricity-based leisure time and
power consumption of private households. According to microeconomic theory, leisure
time may be evaluated based on the opportunity costs, i.e., marginal wages (Becker,
1965). Since data on marginal wages is not available, the study uses average net wages
instead. In addition, the empirical approach accounts for the fact that not all leisure
activities are based on electricity consumption and that non-employed people may have
lower opportunity costs of leisure. For this reason, an electricity dependence of leisure
of 50% and opportunity costs for non-employed people of 50% of the average net wage
are assumed. Clearly, these assumptions are shortcomings in the sense that they are
based on intuition rather than on empirical evidence. However, they are in line with
similar studies (e.g., Bliem, 2005) and enable to quantify at least a rough estimate of
the power interruption costs within the residential sector. Moreover, a comprehensive
sensitivity analysis is carried out with respect to the electricity dependence of leisure
and the opportunity costs of non-employed persons.
The empirical results reveal an average national VoLL of about 7.4e/kWh. The inter-
pretation of this estimate is that, averaged over the year and all sectors, one kWh not
supplied causes losses in economic output of approximately 7.4e. Due to the different
role of electricity in the value adding process of the sectors considered, large differences
between the sectoral VoLL estimates can be observed. In industries with a high ratio
of electricity consumption relative to value added, such as the pulp and paper industry
or the chemical industry, the VoLL ranges between 1e/kWh and 2e/kWh. In contrast,
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in the service sector, a kWh of electricity not supplied causes output losses of approx-
imately 11e. With regard to absolute outage costs, the results of the macroeconomic
approach emphasize significant fluctuations in output losses over time. In almost all
sectors covered, outage costs vary considerably with regard to the time of the day, week-
days and seasons. Generally speaking, outage costs are high at noon and in the evening,
while rather low during the night. In addition, outage costs are higher in the winter
than during the other seasons, reflecting an increase in electricity consumption in this
season. On a national level, the average economic costs of a one-hour interruption of
total power supply causes losses in output of about 430 Mio e , while a missing gigawatt
hour on average causes economic costs of 7.6 Mio e . Throughout the year, almost half
of the output losses can be assigned to the residential sector, emphasizing that private
households are also subject to substantial welfare losses in the case of power outages.
The insights gained from the empirical analysis may be used in various ways. The first
field of application is the assessment of interruptible electricity supply contracts. The
disaggregated VoLL estimates represent an approximation of the welfare losses induced
by one unit of electricity not supplied and can thus be regarded as an indication as to in
which sectors and regions the establishment of interruptible electricity supply contracts
may be cost-efficient. The controversial concept of “rational rationing” represents the
second area of application. This concept follows economic theory, suggesting that load
shedding, if necessary, should be applied to the customer suffering the lowest welfare
losses. It thus recommends to carry out load shedding, given supply shortages, based on
the VoLL of the different consumers. However, the approach seems to be problematic
from a social point of view, and an application may hardly be feasible due to network
constraints and regional interdependencies in the electricity grid. It should therefore
be assessed with care. The third field of application is the economic evaluation of
measures to maintain or improve the reliability of electricity supply. The costs of such
measures should be compared to the increase in expected outage costs if the measure is
not undertaken. The estimates of power interruption costs in this essay can therefore
provide guidance for regulators, network operators and policy makers in assessing the
economic efficiency of measures that intend to increase the security of electricity supply.
Chapter 2
What Drives Natural Gas Prices?
- A Structural VAR Approach
2.1 Introduction
The price of natural gas is of significant economic interest for various stakeholders. Not
only does gas play a crucial role as a primary fuel in the residential and commercial
heating market, but it also serves as an important input for industrial applications and
electricity generation. Consequently, understanding the drivers of natural gas prices is
relevant from both a macro and firm-specific perspective. However, the price formation
at liberalized natural gas hubs is complex since these markets are faced with a variety of
fundamental demand and supply influences such as meteorological conditions, business
cycles, international trade flows and substitution effects among energy commodities.
Moreover, unforeseen disruptions in gas supply may induce significant repercussions
in these markets. This holds true especially for the continental European natural gas
market, which recently has been exposed to supply disruptions due to the Russian-
Ukrainian gas transit dispute of January 2009, production outages caused by the Libyan
civil war in the spring of 2011 and the cut in Russian gas deliveries in February 2012.
In this study, we focus on Germany, one of the largest European natural gas markets,
which is heavily dependent on natural gas imports via pipelines and therefore provides
an interesting setting for the investigation of the impact of supply disruptions on the
21
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gas price. For this purpose, we develop a structural vector autoregressive model (VAR)
to investigate the effects of various fundamental variables on gas prices. The natural
gas-related variables analyzed in this study include gas supply disruptions, weather
conditions, storage activity and imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Moreover, the
model yields insights into the relationship of the natural gas price and the prices of
coal and crude oil, which we use as proxies for the substitution relationship between the
different energy commodities.
The impulse responses provided by the VAR are consistent with economic theory and
suggest that the natural gas price reacts to the underlying supply and demand character-
istics. The natural gas price rises in reaction to supply interruptions and due to extraor-
dinarily cold temperatures increasing the heating demand. The response to structural
shocks of storage follows the idea that storage flows either serve as additional demand or
additional supply in the respective period. Whereas coal prices have an immediate and
persistent impact on natural gas prices, the crude oil price only affects natural gas prices
after a substantial delay. The decomposition of the forecast error variance of the natural
gas price highlights that supply disruptions and unexpected meteorological conditions
have an important, but transitory, effect on gas prices. For medium- and long-term
horizons, gas prices are mainly affected by both coal and crude oil prices.
To better understand the effects of natural gas supply interruptions, we use our VAR
model to disentangle the historical structural shocks affecting the German gas market
during the three recent supply shortfalls. Our results show that the positive price im-
pact of the Russian-Ukrainian transit dispute of January 2009 was partly offset by the
negative price pressure of the coinciding financial crisis and economic slowdown. The
structural effects on gas prices during the Libyan civil war suggest that the increase
of German wholesale gas prices was rather induced by precautionary demand of stor-
ages than by the actual supply shortfall to the European gas market. Furthermore, the
sharp price spike in February 2012 was caused to a greater extent by the extremely low
temperatures compared to the sudden shortfalls in Russian supply.
A major contribution of our research is the identification of the distinct influences that
affect gas prices in critical market situations. By disentangling the respective structural
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shocks, we are able to infer how the main fundamental variables interact in case of supply
interruptions. Hence, we can distinguish the contribution of the different variables on
gas prices. This is especially valuable since the observed natural gas price increases
are caused not only by the supply shock, but also by various coinciding shocks of all
variables. The proposed model therefore helps to provide new empirical insights into
the security of supply for the European natural gas market.
Our finding that coal prices have a significant impact on the natural gas market chal-
lenges the conventional opinion of crude oil being the primary explanatory variable for
cross-commodity effects on gas prices, which is common in most of the empirical gas
market research.13 Economic reasons for a decoupling of oil and gas prices could be the
increasing production of shale gas in the United States or the rise of liquid spot markets
in Europe fostering gas-to-gas competition and therefore a slow but steady decline in oil-
indexed contracts. We also add to the literature as our structural VAR approach allows
for endogeneity of fundamental gas market variables, such as storage and LNG supplies.
Most approaches treat gas inventories as exogenous with respect to gas prices.14 The
assumption of exogenous gas inventories implies that storage operators do not adjust
flows according to market prices, which is a restrictive assumption for liberalized gas
markets.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: We give an overview about the
related literature in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes the data used for our analysis.
The structural VAR framework and the identification of our model are given in Section
2.4. The results of the impulse response analysis as well as the decomposition of forecast
error variance are presented and discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 provides a brief
overview of the three recent gas supply interruptions affecting the German natural gas
market and also contains the event studies of these situations. Section 2.7 concludes.
13See for example Hartley et al. (2008), Panagiotidis and Rutledge (2007) and Brown and Yu¨cel
(2008).
14See for example Brown and Yu¨cel (2008), Erdos (2012), Mu (2007) or Ramberg and Parsons (2012).
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2.2 Literature Review
Our study combines the VAR methodology frequently used in macroeconomic appli-
cations with different strands of commodity market research. The subsequent section
provides an overview on the related literature and positions our study within the existing
literature.
There is a large amount of empirical literature investigating the interaction between
crude oil prices and macroeconomic aggregates. Using a structural VAR methodology,
Kilian (2009) and Lippi and Nobili (2012) argue that oil price movements are driven by
a range of different macroeconomic and oil-specific shocks. Depending on the source of
the oil price fluctuation, the effect on the economy may be very different, as argued by
Kilian (2008) in the context of exogenous oil supply shocks. The structural VAR models
can also be used to analyze certain unusual situations and scenarios, such as political
events leading to supply shocks. Our study applies this idea, promoted for the crude oil
market by Baumeister and Kilian (2012) as well as by Kilian and Murphy (2013), to the
European natural gas market and draws upon the methodology commonly used in the
area of oil market research.
Most studies investigating natural gas markets focus on the interaction between gas
prices and the prices of other energy commodities. Hartley et al. (2008) and Brown
and Yu¨cel (2008) use a cointegration framework and specify error correction models
to capture the mechanisms among the markets for natural gas and crude oil both in
the short run and the long run. Both studies use natural gas inventory data, heating
degree days and shut-in gas production in the models and show that natural gas and
crude oil prices in the United States are closely tied together. However, the stability of
the cointegration relationship has been questioned by Ramberg and Parsons (2012) as
there seems to be a decoupling of oil and gas prices. They find that the cointegration
relationship between oil and gas prices in the United States is not stable over time
and argue that the price of oil has only weak explanatory power for short-term gas
price fluctuations. Erdos (2012) shows that the cointegration link between natural gas
and crude oil prices in the United States only lasted until the year 2009, when the
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increasing production of shale gas led to a decoupling. In his study, shut-in natural gas
production, storage and weather are included as exogenous variables. Considering coal,
oil and natural gas markets, Bachmeier and Griffin (2006) also find that the prices of
these three primary energy carriers are at most weakly integrated. Accounting for the
macroeconomic conditions and their implications on the US natural gas market, Mu
(2007) focuses on returns and volatilities using equity market and treasury bill rates as
proxies for economic conditions.
Our study is innovative as it introduces a comprehensive econometric model of the Eu-
ropean natural gas market.15 Probably due to a lack of available data, fundamental
variables are often not used when analyzing the European natural gas market. Most
studies focus solely on price dynamics or the relationship to crude oil prices. For ex-
ample, Panagiotidis and Rutledge (2007) analyze the cointegration properties of natural
gas and oil prices in the UK without considering additional variables. Regnard and
Zakoian (2011) include temperatures in addition to crude oil prices in their analysis
of natural gas price volatility properties at the Zeebrugge hub. Stronzik et al. (2009)
analyze the storage behavior in the European natural gas market indirectly by testing
no-arbitrage conditions between the spot and forward prices. Another line of research,
including Renou-Maissant (2012) and Growitsch et al. (2012), establishes the increasing
integration of the different national European natural gas markets by analyzing the coin-
tegration properties with time-varying parameter models. Asche et al. (2013) consider
the relationship between different European monthly spot natural gas prices, German
contract-based natural gas import prices and Brent crude oil prices. The study shows
that the contract-based price is indeed based on oil prices. Furthermore, the European
natural gas prices are found to be relatively well integrated with each other and they are
also correlated with the the oil price in the long run. However, Asche et al. (2013) are
not able to distinguish whether the link between deregulated natural gas and oil prices
is based on economic effects such as substitution or on the traditional contract-based oil
indexation.
15Brown and Yu¨cel (2008), Mu (2007), Ramberg and Parsons (2012), Hartley et al. (2008) and Maxwell
and Zhu (2011) all focus on the natural gas market in the United States.
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In contrast to the aforementioned empirical gas market research, our model does not
exclusively focus on a single price determinant, but rather allows for a more comprehen-
sive assessment of the interactions in the European gas market. Moreover, in contrast to
most of the referenced studies, we allow for endogeneity between the variables of interest
and therefore generate more realistic and accurate insights into the drivers of natural
gas prices.
Additionally, our structural model provides a coherent framework to analyze both the
determinants and the impact of LNG imports in the European market. In this area, the
research is still in the early stage as there are only few studies that explicitly account
for LNG imports. Maxwell and Zhu (2011) employ a reduced-form VAR and Granger
causality tests to investigate the interdependency of LNG imports and the gas market
in the United States. More research, such as Neumann (2009), has been devoted to
the role of LNG as a driver of cross-continental market integration. These studies
generally employ cointegration analysis using the prices of major gas hubs, but do not
explicitly account for LNG shipments. Thus, the argument of LNG being the main
force behind this development is based on economic rationale rather than on empirical
evidence. Brown and Yu¨cel (2009), who use a similar cointegration approach, therefore
argue that the coordination of natural gas prices between the markets in the United
States and Europe may be driven by crude oil prices rather than physical shipments of
LNG. Siliverstovs et al. (2005) use a principal components analysis and a cointegration
framework to show that up to the year 2004, the integration between the European,
Japanese and North American natural gas markets was very limited.
2.3 Data
Our data set comprises weekly data within the period from January 2008 to June 2012.16
It consists of the NetConnect Germany (NCG) natural gas price, the Brent crude oil
price, the North-Western-European coal price, the deviation from historical average
heating degree days in Germany, German natural gas storage data, shortfalls of natural
16The first observation is the week ending on Friday February 1st, 2008 and the last observation is the
week ending on Friday June 1st, 2012.
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gas supplies to the European market and European LNG import data.17 Figure A.1 in
the Appendix displays all time series used for the analysis and Table 2.1 summarizes
the definition of the variables used in this study. In the following, detailed descriptions
concerning data sources and the construction of variables are provided.
Table 2.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Description Unit Source
Heating degree days
deviation (Temper-
ature)
Deviation from historical heating
degree days during the respective
week
Degrees celsius Deutscher Wetterdienst
(DWD), German Meteo-
rological Service
Supply Shortfall Missing natural gas supply volumes
due to specific events
Billion cubic me-
ters (bcm)
Own estimates based on
various sources
Price of Brent crude
oil
Europe Brent spot crude oil price Euro per barrel Energy Information Ad-
ministration (EIA)
Price of coal Coal price for North-Western-
Europe
Euro per ton McCloskey
LNG imports to
EU-27
Linearly detrended LNG import
volumes for all EU-27 countries
Million cubic
meters (mcm)
Eurostat
Storage Difference between historical and
actual weekly changes in the Ger-
man natural gas storage utilization
rate
Percentage
points
Gas Infrastructure Eu-
rope (GIE)
Natural gas price NetConnect Germany (NCG) day-
ahead natural gas price
Euro per Mega-
watt hour
European Energy Ex-
change (EEX)
Notes: All time series are transformed to weekly data within the period from January 2008 to June
2012
The data set for the econometric analysis is rather comprehensive with seven variables
included. The decision of variable selection is justified by the diversity of fundamental
impacts on gas prices, which do not allow a more parsimonious model specification. As
reference prices for the German gas market, we use day-ahead prices of the market area
NCG quoted at the European Energy Exchange (EEX).18 We rely on spot prices as we
expect that some short-term impacts of crucial interest for our research question, such
as temperature induced demand spikes or unexpected supply shortfalls, are reflected to
a greater extent in the day-ahead than in the futures market. We focus on spot prices
17For cases in which time series are available on a daily level, we generally construct five-, respectively
seven-day averages (depending on the number of trading days per week).
18Available at https://www.eex.com/de/marktdaten/erdgas/spotmarkt/ncg#!/2014/04/07
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at NCG rather than at Gaspool because liquidity within the NCG market area is higher
and therefore prices in this market should represent more valid signals.19
We specify our model in weekly frequency since this allows both for an inclusion of
storage data, which is only available on a weekly frequency before 2011, and the incor-
poration of short-term meteorological conditions. The choice of an appropriate frequency
with respect to weather and storage activity has the consequence that we cannot rely on
macroeconomic data on the degree of capacity utilization, industrial production or gross
domestic product as an approximation for the business cycle. Weekly data is mainly
available for financial data including stock prices and behavioral indicators such as in-
vestor or consumer sentiment indices. However, these measures are highly complex in
their formation and lack physical linkage to the industrial natural gas consumption. We
therefore abstain from incorporating these indices because we think that they do not
adequately approximate industrial demand for natural gas.
However, spot prices of Brent crude oil may be interpreted as a proxy for the macroeco-
nomic environment as outlined by He et al. (2010).20 In addition, the oil price captures
the substitution relationship of oil and gas in the residential heating market as well as
the still prevailing oil indexation of German gas imports. Beside crude oil prices, spot
prices of coal for delivery in North-Western Europe, as published by McCloskey, are used
in the model.21 The price of coal is included to capture the interaction of gas and coal
within the electricity sector and therefore represents cross-commodity effects related to
fuel substitution.
Some of our variables may be non-stationary or cointegrated. However, since it is well
known that unit root tests have low power in the case of near-unit root processes (see
Elliott, 1998), we do not know with certainty whether some of our series do actually
contain a unit root. We tested for long-run relationships among our variables using
19In March 2012, the trading volume for H-gas was approximately 85,500 gigawatt hours (GWh)
at the Gaspool Hub, while approximately 116,600 GWh were traded at NCG in the same pe-
riod. The respective churn rates were 3.02 for Gaspool and 3.51 for NCG. This data is avail-
able at http://www.gaspool.de/hub_handelsvolumina.html and http://datenservice.net-connect-
germany.de/Handelsvolumen.aspx?MandantId=Mandant_Ncg
20The oil price data is available at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&
s=RBRTE&f=D.
21Available at http://cr.mccloskeycoal.com/story.asp?sectioncode=164&storyCode=34769
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the cointegration testing procedure suggested by Johansen (1988) but did not find ro-
bust statistical evidence of a cointegration vector among some of our series.22 More
importantly, the estimates of our impulse response functions are consistent even when
unit roots or a cointegration relationship are ignored, whereas falsely imposing a unit
root or cointegration would yield inconsistent estimates (see Kilian and Murphy, 2013,
Lutkepohl and Reimers, 1992, Sims et al., 1990, Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). Thus, we
specify our structural VAR model by using natural logarithms of the commodity prices
to avoid inconsistent impulse response estimates. This procedure is in line with similar
applications of structural VAR models, such as Kim and Roubini (2000), Kilian (2009),
Kilian (2010), Kilian and Murphy (2013) and Abhyankar et al. (2013).
We also account for the fact that gas demand, especially in the residential space heating
sector, is highly sensitive to temperature. However, in a liberalized gas market, storage
operators are expected to exploit predictable seasonal demand variations. Therefore,
only unexpected shifts in gas demand, which are caused by extraordinary short-term
weather conditions, are expected to be relevant for the gas price formation. Conse-
quently, we focus on deviations from the average seasonal meteorological pattern as a
determinant of gas prices. Thus, in a first step, we construct the historical average
seasonal series of heating degree days (HDD) using temperature data from the German
Weather Service for Frankfurt am Main during 1949-1999.23 In a second step, we calcu-
late the deviations of observed HDD and their historical averages in order to estimate
the effects of unexpected temperature conditions on gas prices.
We include storage data because storage operators are both part of the supply side
(storage withdrawal) and the demand side (storage injection). Existing German un-
derground gas storage sites can be split into two categories.24 On the one hand, pore
storages balance out the seasonal divergence of supply and demand during winter and
summer months. Due to technical restrictions, they are rather inflexible in their oper-
ation and hence many of them may be unable to respond to short-term price signals.
22The test results are provided in the Appendix.
23Available at http://www.dwd.de/bvbw/appmanager/bvbw/
24In addition to underground gas storages, many above ground gas storages exist in Germany. How-
ever, since the working gas volume is relatively small, they are of less importance compared to under-
ground gas storage facilities.
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On the other hand, more flexible cavern storages offset short-term imbalances between
gas supply and demand. The most straightforward modeling approach would be to only
consider flows of sufficiently flexible storages, which can quickly adapt their withdrawal
and injection activity according to price fluctuations. Unfortunately, storage flow data
is neither available on a site-specific nor on a category-specific level for Germany as
only aggregated storage data is published. Therefore, we take an alternative approach
to separate the two aforementioned categories. Accounting for the fact that inflexible
storages follow a rather strict seasonal pattern, whereas flexible storages do not, we first
construct an average seasonal pattern of storage utilization based on data published
by Gas Storage Europe.25 We consider utilization rates instead of absolute volumes to
control for changes in the total storage capacity. In a second step, we take the first
differences of the average weekly utilization. These values are the changes in average
utilization for each calender week, measured in percentage points of total storage vol-
ume, and represent the seasonal storage flows. Finally, we take the difference between
these average seasonal changes in utilization and the actual change in each week as a
proxy for the flows related to flexible storages.
As the supply side is concerned, natural gas production data with monthly or weekly
frequencies is not available. However, we account for the gas supplies with a supply
shortfall variable, which represents gas volumes that are unexpectedly not delivered to
the continental European market. Thus, the variable is equal to zero when no sup-
ply interruption occurs and amounts to the missing volumes, measured in billion cubic
meters (bcm), during periods of supply shocks. We consider the impact of the Russian-
Ukrainian transit dispute of 2009, the supply shortfalls caused by the civil war in Libya
in 2011 and the lack of Russian gas supplies in February 2012.26
Beyond capturing supply interruptions via the supply shortfall approach presented above,
we also draw upon the EU-27 LNG-imports provided by Eurostat as an indicator of cur-
rent supply conditions.27 Unfortunately, the import data is only available on a monthly
frequency. Therefore, we apply linear interpolation to the data as we argue that any
25Available at https://transparency.gie.eu.com/
26Details about the crises and the calculation of the missing supply volumes are given in Section 2.6.
27Available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nrg_124m&lang=en
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resulting errors from this procedure are expected to be rather small compared to the
benefit of modeling LNG volumes entering the European gas market. Since the EU-27
LNG-imports exhibit a significant growth over time, we linearly detrend the variable by
regressing the interpolated series against time.
The major European gas markets are highly interdependent, as shown by Robinson
(2007) and Growitsch et al. (2012). Based on the empirical findings of these studies, we
conclude that changes in supply volumes, no matter in which market area they originally
occur, induce repercussions in other continental European gas markets. Therefore, we
refer to supply shortfalls and LNG-imports on a European rather than only on a national
level.
2.4 A Structural VAR for the German Natural Gas Mar-
ket
We employ a structural vector autoregression for modeling the interdependencies be-
tween the main gas market fundamentals in order to explicitly examine the relevant
transmission channels affecting the natural gas price. Accounting for the exogeneity of
some variables, we constrain certain feedback-effects by restricting their coefficients to
zero.
The model in its reduced-form representation can be written as
yt = v +A1yt−1 + . . .+Apyt−p + ut (2.1)
where yt = (y1t, . . . , yKt)
′ is a vector of K endogenous variables and p is the number of
lags included in the model. The vector v is an intercept vector with K rows and the A’s
are K×K coefficient matrices. Furthermore ut = (u1t, . . . , uKt) is a K-dimensional vec-
tor of reduced-form errors with the properties E(ut) = 0, E(utu
′
s) = Σu and E(utu
′
s) = 0
for s 6= t, where Σu is an invertible K × K variance-covariance matrix. We specify the
VAR model to have a lag length of two lags as indicated by the Schwarz Information
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Criterion. However, since ut reflects the instantaneous causality among the variables
not accounted for in the reduced-form model, this representation does not allow an eco-
nomic interpretation of the error term. For this purpose, the structural model has to be
identified. The structural VAR has the representation
Ayt = A
∗
1yt−1 + . . .+A
∗
pyt−p + t (2.2)
or equivalently, adding (Ik −A)yt to both sides of the equation,
yt = (IK −A)yt +A∗1yt−1 + . . .+A∗pyt−p + t (2.3)
where IK represents the identity matrix of order K,A is an K ×K matrix of instanta-
neous interaction among the variables and A∗i is equal to AAi for i = 0, . . . , p. Moreover,
t = (1t, . . . , Kt)
′ is a row-vector of dimension K representing structural errors with
variance-covariance matrix Σ. As the instantaneous causality of the variables is cap-
tured by A, Σ is diagonal. Hence, the errors of the structural representation can be
assigned to a single variable and therefore have economic meaning. The identification
of the structural form is based on restrictions placed on the instantaneous coefficient
matrix A. To derive the structural representation, a total of K(K − 1)/2 restrictions
must be imposed. We choose a recursive identification structure as the starting point
for our model. However, in case the recursive identification diverges from our economic
expectations, we deviate from the recursive ordering and impose restrictions that are
more appealing from an economic point of view. The instantaneous restrictions imposed
for the identification of the structural VAR model are summarized in Table 2.2.
Since weather is apparently exogenous with respect to the other included variables, de-
viations from historical heating degree day averages are ordered first within the matrix
of instantaneous interaction. The supply shortfall variable, accounting for absent gas
deliveries to the European market, also exhibits exogenous character. However, histori-
cal evidence suggests that supply shortfalls of Russian gas are more likely during peak
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Table 2.2: Identification of the Contemporaneous Matrix
Temp- Supply Crude Coal LNG Storage Gas
erature Shortfall Price Price Price
Heating degree days deviation ? 0 0 0 0 0 0
Supply Shortfall ? ? 0 0 0 0 0
Price of Brent crude oil ? ? ? 0 0 0 0
Price of coal ? 0 ? ? 0 0 ?
LNG imports to EU-27 ? ? 0 0 ? ? ?
Storage ? ? ? ? 0 ? ?
Natural gas price ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Notes: Each row of this table indicates an equation in the VAR model with the respective dependent
variable. Each column indicates the instantaneous impact of a variable in each equation. The ? denotes
that a parameter is estimated from the data and that the model allows for an instantaneous relationship,
whereas a 0 indicates that the according parameter is restricted to zero.
demand periods.28 Consequently, we leave the instantaneous influence of temperature
deviations on supply shortfalls unrestricted. As the price of crude oil is concerned, it
appears intuitive to let it instantaneously react to the supply shortfall variable as gas
supply disruptions frequently go hand in hand with a shortened supply of crude oil. A
recent example of this phenomenon is the case of the civil war in Libya in 2011, which
affected both natural gas and crude oil production. Furthermore, extraordinarily cold
weather periods increase the demand for heating oil in Europe and possibly increase the
price of Brent crude oil through this channel. Therefore, we do not restrict the impact of
heating degree days on the crude oil price. The price of coal is assumed to be instanta-
neously affected by weather conditions (via an increase in power demand). Additionally,
accounting for the role of crude oil as a global benchmark commodity and the character
of gas as a substitute for coal, it seems reasonable to assume a contemporaneous impact
of oil and gas prices on the price of coal.
The first variable directly related to the German gas market is the EU-27 import of LNG.
Unexpected weather conditions as well as supply shocks are likely to evoke significant
changes in natural gas market fundamentals and hence the demand for LNG volumes.
Therefore, we do not place any restrictions on the respective coefficients. Furthermore,
LNG imports are expected to be affected by gas prices and storage flows. Regarding
the necessary restrictions for identifying this equation, we argue that the instantaneous
28The experienced shortfalls of Russian gas supply to Western Europe in 2009 and 2012 both occurred
during extraordinarily cold weather conditions. This may be a consequence of Gazprom’s priority to
satisfy domestic demand.
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impact of coal and oil prices are of less, if any, relevance. Hence we restrict these
coefficients to zero.
It is necessary to account for the endogeneity of storage flows with respect to changes
in gas prices. Gas storages are likely to react instantaneously to changes in gas prices
since intertemporal price arbitrage is the economic rationale of any commercial storage
operator. Additionally, storage flows are expected to balance temporary divergence of
supply and demand caused by any unforeseen shifts in market conditions, e.g., weather,
supply surprises or cross-commodity effects. Thus, we allow for the direct effects of
gas prices, coal prices, oil prices, unexpected temperatures and supply shortfalls on
storage flows. Finally, since the German gas price is of main interest to our research, no
restrictions are placed on the equation of this variable. This allows for a comprehensive
analysis of the instantaneous impacts of all variables considered in the model on the
price of natural gas.
As the instantaneous restrictions required for identification are based on economic the-
ory, we use them also for lagged relationships with the following exceptions: First, the
supply shortfall variable is set to be strictly exogenous, i.e., not affected by lagged tem-
perature changes. Second, we allow for cross-commodity price effects in all directions
because, from our perspective, there is no need to impose strict exogeneity to crude oil
prices a priori. Third, the process of heating degree days is modeled as a first-order au-
toregressive process and has no lagged influence on crude oil and coal prices. We argue
that temperature effects on commodity prices exhibit short-term character. Addition-
ally, we allow LNG imports, storage and natural gas prices to depend on lags of all other
variables. Table 2.3 summarizes the parameter restrictions on the lagged relationships.
The restrictions placed on lagged relationships imply different regressors within the
VAR-framework. The existence of different explanatory variables makes the ordinary
least squares estimator inefficient, as pointed out by Zellner (1962), because the error
term of the reduced-form representation contains instantaneous correlation among the
variables. Accordingly, we explicitly account for the correlation between the variables
when estimating the reduced-form model using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS).
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Table 2.3: Lag Restrictions in the VAR Model
Temp- Supply Crude Coal LNG Storage Gas
erature Shortfall Price Price Price
Heating degree days deviation ?/0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Supply Shortfall 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Price of Brent crude oil 0 ? ? ? 0 0 ?
Price of coal 0 0 ? ? 0 0 ?
LNG imports to EU-27 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Storage ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Natural gas price ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Notes: Each row of this table indicates an equation in the VAR model with the respective dependent
variable. Each column indicates a lagged impact of a variable in each equation. The ? denotes that a
parameter is estimated from the data, whereas a 0 indicates that the according parameter is restricted to
zero.
The estimation of the structural model in the second step is based on the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals estimated via FGLS. The structural-
form parameters are nonlinear with respect to the reduced-form parameters and therefore
only iterative algorithms, instead of a closed-form solution, can be applied. Hence, we
estimate the structural-form parameters using the scoring algorithm of Amisano and
Giannini (1997), as proposed by Lu¨tkepohl (2005).
2.5 Empirical Results
The structural moving average (MA) representation of our model can be used to infer
impulse response functions. Dropping the intercept term as it is of no interest for the
analysis, allows the structural MA-form to be written as
yt =
∞∑
i=0
Θit−i (2.4)
where  has the properties as described in Section 2.4. The Θi-matrices can be cal-
culated using the previously estimated structural coefficient matrices and contain the
dynamic multipliers within the system. Hence, the response of variable j, i periods after
an impulse of variable k is reflected in θjk,i, the jk-th element of Θi. The impulses have
the size of one standard deviation as we use the square roots of the estimated structural
variance-covariance matrix for the calculation of responses. Following Lu¨tkepohl (2005),
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who emphasizes the problematic finite sample properties of asymptotic confidence in-
tervals for impulse responses, we rely on numerical resampling methods to derive error
bands. We refer to Hall’s 95-percentage bootstrap intervals using 1000 draws (see Hall,
1995). We generate responses of the natural gas price on impulses of all other variables,
thus exploring the dynamic effects of gas market fundamentals on the price development.
Figure 2.1 presents the estimated impulse response functions for the natural gas price.
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Figure 2.1: Responses of the Natural Gas Price
Notes: The impulse responses (solid lines) are based on one standard deviation of the respective
structural shock. They can be interpreted as the percentage change in the natural gas price
as a reaction to a standardized shock of the respective variable. Confidence intervals (dashed
lines) are bootstrapped as Hall’s 95-percentage bootstrap interval using 1000 draws.
The impulse responses of the natural gas price are consistent with economic reasoning.
Extraordinarily cold weather results in an immediate and strong increase in the natural
gas price. This increase is significant but lasts only for two weeks, indicating that
temperature deviations have rather short-term effects on gas prices. Supply disruptions,
approximated by the structural innovations of the supply shortfall variable, also cause
a rise in the natural gas price. This result is consistent with both historical market
conditions, e.g., the price spikes in January 2009 and February 2012, and economic
intuition. The missing volumes are replaced by more expensive sources of supply to
satisfy the rather price-inelastic gas demand. Furthermore, the impact on the natural
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gas price could also be attributed to the uncertainty of future supply conditions resulting
in spot purchases (e.g., storage injection as a consequence of anticipated price increases).
The derived structural response functions of the natural gas price, with respect to oil
and coal prices, provide evidence of significant interdependencies among the different
energy commodities. The price of gas responds positively to shocks of both oil and coal
prices. However, the pattern with which oil and coal influence the natural gas prices is
fundamentally different. The impact of coal prices on gas prices occurs instantly and
remains stable over time. In contrast, oil prices only affect natural gas prices after a
substantial time delay.29
The strong interdependency of coal and gas prices can be attributed to different features
of European energy markets. First, the fuel competition of the primary energy carriers
gas and coal in the electricity sector may induce a positive cross-price elasticity for
these commodities. Consequently, a rise in coal prices implies an increased demand for
gas and therefore a resulting price increase. Second, since the spot prices used in this
study comprise the North-Western European coal price and the German natural gas
price, they reflect the same regional economic dynamics. Both aforementioned effects
are reflected in the response function of the natural gas price with respect to coal prices
since our model setup does not allow separating the pure substitution effect from the
shared regional macroeconomic effects.
In contrast, the physical link between crude oil and natural gas exhibits rather long-term
character since direct substitution is effectively limited to the residential heating sector.
However, in the long run, as oil-indexed long-term contracts still prevail in German gas
imports, a certain degree of long-run correlation between these two commodity prices
seems plausible. While oil price indexation has decreased in relevance during the sample
period, it may still cause an additional linkage between both commodity price series
in continental Europe compared to markets without oil-indexed long-term contracting
such as the US market. Unfortunately, our data does not allow for a distinction whether
29This finding is also supported by the correlations of price returns. While the returns of gas and
coal prices have a correlation coefficient of 0.2088, the correlation of oil and gas returns is 0.0486 and
statistically insignificant. The two-tailed 5% critical value is 0.1305 for 226 observations.
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macroeconomic factors, the actual physical substitution or the impact of long-term con-
tracts establishes the link between crude oil prices and natural gas prices. We refer to
Asche et al. (2013) for a further investigation of contractual natural gas import prices
into Germany
Next, the influence of the endogenous gas market variables on the natural gas price is
discussed. There is no clear effect of a LNG import shock on the natural gas price, which
may be caused by the use of interpolated monthly LNG import data. The German gas
market is only indirectly affected by LNG imports to its neighboring countries (especially
Belgium and the Netherlands) and subsequent cross-border trades as Germany itself does
not have an LNG import terminal. Therefore, the volatile character of LNG deliveries
to Europe as well as potential bottlenecks in the cross border capacity may prevent us
from identifying a significant price effect in our model setting.
A positive structural storage shock contributes to rising gas prices as the injected volumes
increase the spot market demand. Intuitively, a positive structural storage shock can be
interpreted as an abnormal storage injection or as a storage withdrawal that is smaller
than presumed for the current market situation. The price effect of inventory in natural
gas markets has also been subject to previous econometric research. Brown and Yu¨cel
(2008) estimate a significant negative impact of inventory deviations from historical
averages on gas prices in the United States. Using the same inventory variable as Brown
and Yu¨cel (2008), Ramberg and Parsons (2012) cannot find a significant effect on US
gas prices for a more recent sample. Erdos (2012) also relies on the deviation from
average storage utilization and does not find a significant price influence of this variable
on neither UK nor US gas prices. Taking the first difference of his inventory variable,
however, reveals a significant negative price effect in the US market. Following a slightly
different approach, Mu (2007) constructs a variable representing storage surprises using
a Fourier transformation to control for the seasonal pattern in natural gas inventory.
His econometric estimations show that positive storage surprises, i.e., a higher rise in
inventory than anticipated by market participants, affect the prices of US gas futures
contracts negatively.
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All of these studies share the strong assumption that the storage variable is exogenous
with respect to the gas price. However, we argue that this assumption is invalid for
liberalized natural gas markets since storage operators are expected to adjust the stor-
age operations to current market conditions, i.e., to changes in gas prices. Thus, the
aforementioned studies may suffer from an endogeneity bias resulting in inconsistent
parameter estimates with regard to the price impact of gas inventory. In contrast, our
approach to treat storage in a VAR framework explicitly allows for endogeneity between
storage and other variables such as gas prices. Hence, we avoid any endogeneity bias
and therefore generate more reliable estimates of the price effect of gas inventory. Our
results are qualitatively similar to those of Brown and Yu¨cel (2008) and Mu (2007).
However, a direct comparison is not adequate since these studies rely on unexpected
deviations from average storage level rather than on deviations from average changes in
utilization.
Although our focus is on the determinants of the natural gas price, we briefly discuss the
structural responses of LNG imports and storage since they are a novelty in econometric
research on European gas markets. The respective impulse responses are presented in
the Appendix. The endogenous treatment of our storage variable enables us to infer
on how storage operators adjust their flows to changing market conditions including
unexpected changes in spot market prices or temperature shocks.
The impulse response analysis shows that extraordinarily low temperatures lead to stor-
age withdrawals. This relationship is caused by an increase in the temperature-sensitive
natural gas demand in the residential and commercial heating sector. The additional
demand has to be satisfied by gas withdrawal from storage facilities. The reaction of
storage flows to supply disruptions is rather volatile and does not reveal a clear pattern.
The response of storage flows to structural shocks in the natural gas price is consis-
tent with the economic objectives of storage operators because higher natural gas prices
incentivize storage operators to withdraw natural gas. Our empirical finding that stor-
age operators react to price, temperature and supply shocks by withdrawing natural gas
stresses their economic importance for smoothing out gas consumption and supply in ex-
traordinary circumstances. The determinants of LNG imports are estimated with large
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error bands. Thus, there seems to be no clear pattern how the included fundamental
gas market variables influence the amount of imported LNG.
In the following discussion, we return to the investigation on the impact of different
fundamental influences on the natural gas price. In order to analyze the relative con-
tribution of the variables considered in the modeling framework, we perform a forecast
error variance decomposition using the results of the estimated structural VAR model.
Based on the structural MA-representation of the VAR model, the contribution of in-
novations in variable k to the error variance of an h-step forecast of variable j can be
written as
ωjk,h =
h−1∑
i=0
e′jθ
2
i ek/MSE[yj,t(h)] (2.5)
with
MSE[yj,t(h)] =
h−1∑
i=0
K∑
k=1
θ2jk,i (2.6)
as the mean squared error (MSE) of h-step forecasts for variable j and ek as the k-th
column of an identity matrix of order K. Consequently, in our model framework, ω7k,h
represents the fraction of gas price variance that can by explained by the structural
innovations of another variable included in the model.
Table 2.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the Natural Gas Price
Forecast Weather Supply Crude Coal LNG Storage Gas
Horizon Shortfall Price Price Price
1 0.26 0.08 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.24 0.24
2 0.23 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.26 0.25
4 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.26 0.26
8 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.33 0.02 0.23 0.23
12 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.39 0.02 0.19 0.19
26 0.05 0.02 0.30 0.37 0.02 0.12 0.12
52 0.04 0.02 0.39 0.26 0.01 0.14 0.14
Table 2.4 shows the estimated shares of the variance of the natural gas price accounted
for by the structural innovations of each variable. The results are both intuitive and
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consistent with the economic arguments provided above. In the short run, supply disrup-
tions and unexpected temperature deviations are of major importance for the natural
gas price and explain 34% of its fluctuation. However, the impact of these effects is
rather short lived and hence, their influence diminishes over time. For longer horizons,
the forecast errors of gas prices can be explained more precisely by developments re-
lated to the coal and oil markets. The variation in coal prices reaches its maximum
explanatory power in medium-term horizons (12 to 26 weeks), while the long-term gas
price development (up to 52 weeks) is heavily affected by variations in oil prices. With
a forecast horizon of half a year, the aggregated effects of changes in coal and oil prices
account for 67% of the gas price variance. Furthermore, our results indicate that storage
flows have an important short-term influence on gas prices, a finding that is consistent
with the fact that storage facilities balance the demand and supply fluctuations occur-
ring in the natural gas market. In contrast, the explanatory power of LNG imports on
the gas price is weak for all time horizons.
Both the impulse response analysis and the decomposition of the forecast error vari-
ance indicate that coal prices are more relevant than crude oil prices in explaining the
natural gas price in the short term. While recent literature, for example Brown and
Yu¨cel (2008), Ramberg and Parsons (2012) and Hartley et al. (2008), focuses on the
relationship between crude oil and natural gas prices, our results highlight that for an
improved understanding of gas price dynamics, attention should also be paid to the
interdependencies of gas and coal markets.
2.6 Event Studies of Supply Interruptions: Historical De-
composition
In this section, we examine the price impact of the three major interruptions in gas
supply since the year 2008. First, we analyze the import disturbances from Russia in
January 2009, which were caused by a dispute between Russia and Ukraine about the
conditions of gas transit. Second, the Libyan production outage in the spring of 2011
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due to a civil war is investigated. Third, we explore the withheld exports by Russia in
February 2012.
Two difficulties regarding our analysis are that the nature of these supply shocks is not
perfectly equivalent and that the gas infrastructure also changes over time. For example,
the Russian-Ukrainian gas transit dispute could have a different impact if it occurred
after the commissioning of the Nord Stream pipeline.30 In order to harmonize the impact
of these different disruptions, we attempt to objectify the magnitude by calculating
approximative values for the volumes of supply shortfall. Taking into account the high
degree of integration among European national gas markets, as shown by Robinson
(2007), Renou-Maissant (2012) and Growitsch et al. (2012), we argue that one unit
of production or import shortfall to the European market results in similar economic
effects for all cases and locations of the gas shortage. The method has the advantage
that the estimated effect of supply shocks, as derived from our model, has a generalizable
interpretation. This property is desirable because future supply shocks are inherently
uncertain with respect to the time and location of their occurrence.
The proposed structural VAR model is able to disentangle the different fundamental
effects during the supply disruptions described above. The technical procedure of our
analysis is generally the same for all three event studies of the respective supply shocks.
We determine the first week in which the specific situation begins and calculate the
impact of the relevant structural shocks on the natural gas price. For this purpose,
we do not only use the shock in the first week, which would be similar to an impulse-
response analysis, but extract the actual sequence of the relevant structural shocks to
infer the accumulated impact in each period. As an indicative benchmark, we also show
the actual development of the natural gas price in each plot.31
30The Nord Stream pipeline directly connects Russia with Germany through the Baltic Sea and there-
fore bypasses the transit route of the Ukrainian corridor. Thereby, Russia increases its own bargaining
position towards transit countries as pointed out by Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011).
31The actual change in the natural gas price also depends on structural shocks before the time period
analyzed. However, in the historical decomposition of the event studies, these shocks prior to the event
are not included in the relative contribution of each influence during the specific event considered.
Therefore, the relative influences during the crisis itself do not necessarily provide an optimal fit of the
actual change in the natural gas price, which is therefore only included for illustrative purposes.
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2.6.1 The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict of 2009
The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of 2009 is one of the most prominent examples of
political supply risks related to natural gas imports from Russia. In January 2009,
natural gas transits from Russia into Western Europe were disrupted for about two weeks
as Russia and the Ukraine could not find an agreement on transit charges. According
to Lochner (2011), who analyzes this crisis in detail, Russia at this time accounted for
25% of the natural gas supplies to the European Union, 65% of which were transported
through Ukraine. Our estimates of the supply shortfalls during this crisis are based on
the supply statistics of Naftogaz Ukrainy reprinted in Pirani et al. (2009). The transit
volumes declined from 318.4 million cubic meters (mcm) on January 1st, 2009 to a
complete stop on January 7th. The gas flows were interrupted until January 20th and
regained normal levels on January 22nd. In order to calculate the volume of missing
deliveries, we take the volume of gas transported on January 1st as a reference case
and consider volumes below that level as supply shortfall. To measure losses between
January 20th and January 22nd, we linearly interpolate to the pre-crisis volumes to be
reached on January 22nd.
Following this procedure, the calculated lacking transit volumes amount to 4932.1 mcm
in total. To test for robustness, we compare this estimate with the Eurostat Russian
natural gas exports to EU-27 countries. The exports reported in January 2009 are 4585.9
mcm lower than in January 2008, 4793.7 mcm lower than in January 2010 and 5119.2
mcm lower than in January 2011. This comparison indicates that our estimates are of
reasonable magnitude. As a second robustness test of our approach, we compare our
estimates of lacking deliveries with the simulation-based estimate derived by Lochner
(2011). According to that analysis, the affected daily gas transits via Ukraine account
to 303.5 mcm on a normal winter day, which is close to the value found using our
methodology.
Figure 2.2 shows the fundamental drivers of gas prices during the Russian-Ukrainian
dispute of January 2009 and for a period of 12 weeks. The shortfall of natural gas
supplies accounts for an increase in the gas price of more than 30% and is therefore
the main driver of the observed price spike. Increased demand due to unusually low
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Figure 2.2: Historical Decomposition of Structural Influences During the Russian-
Ukrainian Gas Dispute
Notes: Week 1 refers to the week ending on Friday January 9th, 2009
temperatures accounts for 10% of the price increases and is especially of importance
during the first two weeks. To summarize, the natural gas price follows the fundamental
signals both from supply (interruption of imports) and demand (extraordinarily low
temperatures) closely.
However, the actual increase in the gas price was less than what would have been implied
by the sudden supply shortfall and extreme temperature when setting all other influences
to zero. This is due to the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute occurred during
the financial crisis and the natural gas price was already following a negative trend.
During this time, the financial crisis and the global economic downturn constituted
a distinctive influence on all commodity markets. Therefore, we investigate the price
impact during a longer period surrounding the supply disruption. Figure 2.3 shows the
weekly development of the natural gas price for the six months after the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008. In this figure, the spike in natural gas price
in week 17 is driven by the start of the Russian-Ukrainian dispute in January 2009. The
extended time window illustrates that while the short-term impact of the supply shock
is substantial, it only had a short-lived impact on the overall downward sloping trend of
the natural gas price. The results of this event study confirm our previous finding that
the long-term development of the natural gas price crucially depends on the economic
climate and closely follows the benchmark commodity prices of oil and coal.
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Figure 2.3: Historical Decomposition of Structural Influences During the Financial
Crisis
Notes: Week 1 refers to the week ending on Friday September 19th, 2008. The price increase
in week 17 reflects the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009.
2.6.2 The “Arab Spring” and the Civil War in Libya 2011
In February 2011, the civil unrest of the so-called “Arab Spring” spread to Libya and
resulted in a civil war with foreign military intervention. This turmoil led to an inter-
ruption of natural gas production in Libya. Lochner and Dieckho¨ner (2012) point out
that Italy, the main recipient of Libyan gas deliveries, compensated for the Libyan im-
ports by using storage withdrawals and additional imports via Austria and Switzerland,
highlighting the integration of European natural gas markets. The shortfall of Libyan
production therefore indirectly affects the German natural gas market because natural
gas flows from Russia were diverted to Southern Europe and could consequently not be
delivered to German consumers.
In order to estimate the supply shortfall, we use monthly Eurostat export data from
Libya to Italy, which is Libya’s main customer in the EU. We linearly interpolate from
monthly to weekly frequency and define the supply shortfall as the difference between
the actual exports and the exports before the interruption. According to Lochner and
Dieckho¨ner (2012), delivery via the Greenstream pipeline to Italy was interrupted from
February 22nd to October 13rd, 2011. This period is consistent with Eurostat data
indicating no exports to the EU between March and September 2011. As Italy was able
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to compensate the Libyan supply shortfalls by additional imports from Russia, we only
consider the missing Libyan gas volumes until the mid of April 2011 as a shock.32
In addition to the actual supply shortfall, there were also other indirect effects on the
natural gas market. First, there was an additional risk that the Arab Spring could
spread to Algeria and thus disrupt the Algerian natural gas production. In this case, as
Lochner and Dieckho¨ner (2012) point out, the consequences for the European natural gas
market would have been more severe. Second, the Arab Spring also affected the crude
oil market both directly and indirectly. Libya is a relevant crude oil exporter and the
market, according to news coverage, accounted for the risk that the Arab Spring could
spread to other more important crude oil producers in the Middle East. Baumeister and
Kilian (2012) discuss how the supply shock in Libya, as well as a precautionary demand
shock driven by the political unrest resulting in a stocking up of crude oil, contributed
to the increase in oil prices.
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Figure 2.4: Historical Decomposition of Structural Influences During the Supply
Shortfall After the Libyan Civil War
Notes: Week 1 refers to the week ending on Friday February, 18th, 2011
Figure 2.4 shows the impact of the Libyan supply shortfalls in Spring 2011. Due to the
relatively small amount of supply shortfalls, the direct impact on the gas price is rather
weak. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that the development of the crude oil price
does not seem to be a major explanatory factor for the German gas price increase during
32Lochner and Dieckho¨ner (2012) argue that the lack of imports from Libya were mainly compensated
by increased imports via the Austrian TAG pipeline carrying Russian natural gas deliveries. However, as
it takes approximately two weeks for Russian gas to be physically transported to Italy, the compensation
mechanism of delivering additional gas via pipelines from Russia was mainly relevant after the first few
weeks of the interruption.
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the Libyan civil war in 2011. Yet, due to the political instability and risks associated
with Algeria as a larger natural gas exporter, the increased precautionary demand for
storage leads to increased gas prices. Such behavior is typical for energy markets during
situations of uncertainty or turmoil in supplying countries, as shown by Kilian and
Murphy (2013) using the Iranian Revolution in the year 1979 as one example.
2.6.3 Supply Interruptions of Russian Gas Deliveries in February 2012
In late January 2012, unusually low temperatures increased the domestic Russian gas de-
mand for a sustained period of time. As the cold weather spread to Central and Western
Europe, Russia found itself unable to meet its export commitments and thereby induced
supply shortages and price spikes at various European gas hubs. However, there is a lack
of quantitative estimates regarding the amount of the shortfall of supply during Febru-
ary 2012. In order to calculate a reasonable estimate, we draw upon different sources
including the Dow Jones TradeNews Energy, the ICIS Heren European Gas Markets
report and a report by Henderson and Heather (2012). Details regarding the informa-
tion in these sources is given in the Appendix. The estimates of supply interruptions
are mostly in the range of 10% to 30%, but vary depending on the date, geography or
company considered. Given this wide range of estimates, we assume a shortfall of 20%
in the first two weeks of February 2011 and assume a normal weekly delivery volume of
2.5 bcm to the EU as indicated by Eurostat data.
In Figure 2.5, we analyze the period of reduced Russian supplies in February 2012
coinciding with extraordinarily cold temperatures. Our results indicate that the abnor-
mally low temperatures can explain a larger share of the actual price increase than the
relatively small amount of supply shortfall. Consequently, we conclude that the price
increase was rather driven by a positive demand shock than by the temporary cut in gas
supplies.
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Figure 2.5: Historical Decomposition of Structural Influences During the Russian
Supply Shortfall in February 2012
Notes: Week 1 refers to the week ending on Friday January 27th, 2012
2.7 Conclusion
In this study, we introduced a novel approach to model the economics of natural gas
prices. Our structural model allows us to appropriately account for the dynamics within
the natural gas market as well as for the relationship to other commodity markets.
The empirical results for Germany show that abnormal temperatures and supply shocks
affect the natural gas price in the short term. However, in the long term, the price
development is closely tied to crude oil and coal prices, indicating a high importance of
cross-commodity effects.
The structural model allows us to perform a historical decomposition of the shocks af-
fecting the natural gas price. We focus on the three major recent supply interruptions,
namely the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of 2009, the Libyan supply shortfall in the
spring of 2011 and the withheld Russian exports in February 2012. We explicitly analyze
the specific contribution of the main fundamental variables on gas price development in
these periods. Our findings can be used to draw conclusions about how the security of
gas supply can be improved by different measures. The results of our structural model
indicate that while supply shortfalls have a significant impact on the German gas mar-
ket, their effect on gas prices may be overestimated since some of the discussed shortfalls
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occurred simultaneously with extraordinary demand conditions. These conditions com-
prise both extremely low temperatures and precautionary demand resulting from the
anticipation of further supply interruptions, as pointed out in Section 2.6.
Consequently, the objective to improve the security of German gas supplies should not
only focus on supply-sided measures such as a diversification of gas imports, but could
also address flexibility options on the demand side of the market such as temperature-
indexed interruptible contracts for industrial customers. Moreover, storage facilities as
an important measure to smooth out temporary supply and demand imbalances deserve
special attention from regulators and policy makers. Our model provides a solid frame-
work for further research on more specific economic mechanisms within gas markets.
Additionally, it could be easily extended to a European scope or other geographical re-
gions. However, the current application is still restricted by the limited data available
for the European gas markets.
Chapter 3
The Informational Efficiency of
European Natural Gas Hubs:
Empirical Evidence on Price
Formation and Intertemporal
Arbitrage
3.1 Introduction
The price signals of commodity spot and futures markets are of economic significance
for market participants and various stakeholders as they tend to ensure an efficient al-
location of resources. However, the extent to which commodity spot and futures prices
fulfill their function crucially depends on the informational efficiency of the respective
market. Economic theory suggests that sufficient market liquidity facilitates the pro-
cessing of information into valid price signals. Thus, the efficiency of markets that are
still immature and suffer a lack of liquidity may be questioned. This holds true for the
natural gas wholesale markets within continental Europe. Spot markets for immediate
delivery of natural gas as well as futures markets have emerged rather recently as a
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consequence of the natural gas directives of the European Parliament (EU, 2003b, EU,
2009b), aiming towards an integrated and competitive European gas market. Liquidity
on these markets, though rising, is still low compared to the mature gas markets in the
UK or the US. The limited liquidity of both spot and futures markets at continental
European gas hubs has entered the scientific debate as European gas pricing is currently
undergoing a transition phase from traditional oil indexed pricing of long-term contracts
(LTC) to an increase in the significance of hub-based pricing.33
The shifting towards hub-based pricing of natural gas in continental Europe is based
on the assumption that the respective hubs are capable of providing valid price sig-
nals. In this context, this study seeks to shed light on the informational efficiency of
European gas hubs by empirically investigating two areas that allow for insights with
regard to market efficiency: The price discovery process at spot and futures markets for
the same underlying asset and the efficiency of intertemporal arbitrage between these
two markets. It draws upon econometric approaches for the German hub “NetConnect
Germany” (NCG), the Dutch hub “Title Transfer Facility” (TTF) and the British “Na-
tional Balancing Point” (NBP), where the mature and liquid British hub serves as a
benchmark for the other hubs.34
This paper extends research on natural gas markets in various ways: Foremost, it an-
alyzes the informational efficiency of the European gas hubs through the investigation
of the price formation process and the efficiency of intertemporal arbitrage. Second,
it explicitly addresses the specific characteristics of the European gas market, namely
low liquidity and technical constraints, by nonlinear econometric approaches. Third, it
provides an insight into the evolution of informational efficiency at European gas hubs
over time.
The empirical results of this study yield multiple insights into the informational efficiency
of European natural gas markets. First, they show that the futures market is more
33For an elaborated discussion of the economics fostering the transition from oil indexation to hub-
based pricing, see Stern and Rogers (2010). A real-life illustration are the current renegotiations of LTCs
between various continental European gas importers with their suppliers (ICIS, 2013).
34Although the British gas hub may be considered as an appropriate benchmark for pricing European
gas imports in terms of liquidity, the limited cross-border transportation capacity between mainland Eu-
rope and the UK as well as the implied currency risks for European gas traders carrying out transactions
at this hub suggest the need for a continental European gas price benchmark.
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informationally efficient than the spot market and that price discovery exclusively takes
place on the futures market. Second, the analysis of intertemporal arbitrage reveals that
there is a stable long-run equilibrium between spot and futures markets, but short-run
equilibrium deviations can be quite persistent, pointing towards significant frictions in
intertemporal arbitrage trading. Third, the increase in liquidity seems to have improved
informational efficiency only at one of the three hubs considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the underly-
ing economic theory and relevant previous research. Section 3.3 provides information
with regard to market liquidity and the flexibility potential of gas storages at the hubs
considered. Section 3.4 presents the data used in this study and preliminary statistical
tests. In Section 3.5, price discovery at European gas hubs is investigated using linear
and nonlinear causality testing while Section 3.6 analyzes the efficiency of intertemporal
arbitrage. A state-space approach to capture the evolution of arbitrage efficiency over
time is specified in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Considerations and Previous Research
Informationally efficient markets are expected to process relevant information instan-
taneously (Fama, 1970). Within an intertemporal context, this implies that informa-
tionally efficient spot and futures markets should react simultaneously to news that
affect both markets. Consequently, there should be no systematic lead-lag relationship
between the two markets (Zhang and Jinghong, 2012). This is in line with the Fama
(1970) weak-form efficiency hypothesis stating that excess returns on efficient markets
should be unpredictable as otherwise risk-free profits may be generated (Arouri et al.,
2013). However, if one of the markets is more efficient in processing information, this
market may become the leading market. In that case, price discovery takes place at the
leading market and the price signal is subsequently transmitted to the following market.
There are various hypotheses with regard to the differences in informational efficiency
of spot and futures markets and the resulting systematic relationship. Silvapulle and
Moosa (1999) and Bohl et al. (2012) suggest that futures prices may react quicker to
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the arrival of information because informationally efficient speculators are only active
in this market. As a result, information processing and price discovery occur in the
futures market and spot prices adjust accordingly until an arbitrage-free equilibrium is
achieved. In contrast, Moosa and Al-Loughani (1995) argue that the spot market should
lead the futures market because arbitrageurs react to spot price movements by engaging
in futures market positions.
Empirical research on price discovery on natural gas spot and futures markets is scarce.
Dergiades et al. (2012) explore causality relationships between spot and futures prices at
the US gas hub. Their econometric approach based on a frequency domain causality test
provides evidence of causality running from the month-ahead futures market to the spot
market. Focusing on the northwest US natural gas market, Gebre-Mariam (2011) tests
for causality among spot and futures market prices and market efficiency by drawing
upon cointegration techniques. The empirical results of the study suggest that there is no
general pattern in causality between spot and futures prices as the direction of causality
depends on the maturity of the futures contracts considered. In specific, futures contracts
with a maturity of more than one year seem to significantly influence spot prices, while
spot prices in turn affect the short-term futures market. Concerning the European gas
market, empirical research has centered on the assessment of market integration and
the efficiency of regional arbitrage (e.g., Neumann et al., 2006, Growitsch et al., 2012),
whereas the price formation process at the European spot and futures markets has thus
far been neglected.
The theory of storage suggests that spot and futures markets for storable commodi-
ties are linked through transactions of market participants optimizing their portfolios
intertemporally, resulting in a stable long-run relationship between these markets (Work-
ing, 1949). The corresponding cost-of-carry condition is characterized by the equivalence
of the price of a futures contract in period t with the delivery in period t + k, Ft+k|t,
and the spot price compounded with the respective interest rate rt+k|t, St(1 + rt+k|t),
plus the storage costs wt+k|t adjusted for the economic benefit of physical ownership,
the so-called “convenience yield” ct+k|t. This condition can be stated as
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Ft+k|t = St(1 + rt+k|t) + wt+k|t − ct+k|t, (3.1)
Deviations from the intertemporal equilibrium may trigger arbitrage activity by market
participants. In this context, arbitrage can be considered as the economic activity of
generating risk free profits by taking advantage of the substitutability between commod-
ity spot and futures markets (Schwartz and Szakmary, 1994). As outlined by Huang
et al. (2009), a long arbitrage position, i.e., buying the commodity on the spot market
and selling a futures contract, is profitable if the basis bt = Ft−St exceeds the difference
of warehouse costs and convenience yield, adjusted for the interest rate r:
bt − Strt+k|t > wt+k|t − ct+k|t. (3.2)
In contrast, a short arbitrage position, i.e., selling the commodity on the spot market
and buying a futures contract, generates profits if
bt − Strt+k|t < −(wt+k|t − ct+k|t). (3.3)
The theory of storage has been empirically analyzed for different commodity markets
by Fama and French (1987), and more recently by Considine and Larson (2001) and
Huang et al. (2009). With regard to the European natural gas market, Stronzik et al.
(2009) find significant deviations from the theory of storage for three European hubs
for the period 2005 to 2008 using indirect testing procedures. However, the efficiency
of intertemporal arbitrage activity at European gas hubs has not yet been addressed in
the existing literature.
3.3 The Role of Liquidity and Storage Capacity
The spot and futures markets of the gas hubs considered in this study differ significantly
with respect to their liquidity. While the NBP hub can be considered as mature and liq-
uid, the younger hubs NCG and TTF suffer from low liquidity despite steadily increasing
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trading volumes during the last years. The churn rate, defined as the ratio between the
number of traded contracts and the number of contracts that result in physical delivery
of the underlying asset, can be used to assess the degree of financialization of commodity
markets. Table 3.1 illustrates the differences among the three hubs with regard to their
trading volumes, measured in billion cubic meters (bcm), and their churn rates as of
2011. The historical development of traded volumes is presented in Figure 3.1. There
is no agreement as to which churn rate is required for a market to be considered as
sufficiently liquid. However, a churn rate in the range from eight to fifteen is frequently
regarded as critical (IEA, 2012b). As can be seen in Table 3.1, only the churn rate
of NBP is situated within this range. Based on the superior liquidity of the British
hub, information processing is expected to be more efficient at NBP compared to the
continental European hubs.
Table 3.1: Liquidity at European Gas Hubs
Physical Volume (bcm) Traded Volume (bcm) Churn Rate
NCG 35.5 108.5 3.1
TTF 35.6 151.7 4.3
NBP 79.6 1137.2 14.3
Source: IEA (2012b), Gasunie (2011), NCG (2011). The figures pre-
sented refer to the total hub trades (sum of trades in the “Over The
Counter” (OTC) market and those via exchanges).
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Figure 3.1: Trading Volumes at European Gas Hubs
Source: IEA (2012b)
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Beside the frictions resulting from illiquid spot and futures markets, the efficiency of
intertemporal arbitrage activity may be restricted by technical constraints. In particular,
scarcity in storage capacity may prevent efficient arbitrage trading at least in the short
run since the construction of additional storage facilities requires significant amount of
time. A first indicator for the availability of sufficient storage capacity is the ratio of
aggregated working gas volume to annual gas consumption. In addition, the flexibility
potential of the existing storage capacities is crucial for an efficient adjustment of storage
flows in order to exploit arbitrage opportunities. Frequently used measures for the
degree of gas storage flexibility are the shares of aggregated injection capacity (IC)
and aggregated withdrawal capacity (WC) on aggregated working gas volume (WGV).
Table 3.2 presents data on WGV, natural gas consumption (C) and the three flexibility
indicators for Germany35, the Netherlands and the UK as of 2011.
Table 3.2: Storage Capacity and Flexibility Potential
WGV (bcm) C (bcm/a) WGV/C WC / WGV IC / WGV
Germany 20.1 77.6 0.2590 0.0215 0.0111
Netherlands 5.1 47.9 0.1065 0.0410 0.0112
UK 4.5 82.6 0.0545 0.0195 0.0055
Source: IEA (2012c), GIE (2011).
The data emphasize the ample storage capacity of the German gas market. In con-
trast, storage capacity in the UK is rather scarce in a physical sense since the WGV
only amounts to approximately 5% of annual gas consumption. The Netherlands range
between Germany and UK in terms of this indicator. With regard to operational flexi-
bility, Dutch gas storages seem most capable of adjusting operations to changing market
conditions in the short run, while UK storage facilities are fairly inflexible. From a
technical point of view, the indicators thus suggest that the storage market in the UK is
less supportive of efficient intertemporal arbitrage activity compared to NCG and TTF.
Beside the physical capacity constraints discussed above, contractual congestion may
hamper intertemporal arbitrage activity. However, the regulators in all the countries
considered generally opted for a negotiated, rather than a regulated, third party access
model in order to implement the third European natural gas directive (EU, 2009b).
35Currently, there are two market areas in Germany, NCG and Gaspool. Therefore, total national gas
consumption and storage capacity cannot be fully allocated to NCG. However, the national consumption-
to-storage ratio is used here as an approximation for this hub.
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Thus, the regulatory approach to ensure third party acces to storage facilities may
not be expected to fully explain potential differences in the efficiency of intertemporal
arbitrage between the hubs investigated.
3.4 Sample Description and Preliminary Data Analysis
The sample comprises daily spot, one month-ahead (m+1), two month-ahead (m+2) and
three month-ahead (m+3) futures prices for the hubs NCG36, TTF and NBP37 during
the period October 2007 to August 2012.38 All prices represent the settlement prices
of the respective trading day. The selection of the two continental European hubs is
motivated by the steady rise in trading activity during the last years, suggesting that
at least one of these hubs will emerge as the leading continental European trading area
(Heather, 2012). The NBP hub, as the most mature and liquid hub in Europe, serves
as benchmark to assess the informational efficiency of NCG and TTF. Monthly futures
contracts are preferred to quarterly or seasonal products to account for the tendency
towards the trading of monthly contracts with short maturity (NMA, 2012). Descriptive
statistics of the price return series, computed as the differences in the logarithms of two
consecutive daily settlement prices, are provided in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Gas Price Returns
Observations Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
NCG Spot 1228 1.88e-04 0.0023 -0.5081 12.3466
NCG m+1 1228 1.45e-04 0.0008 1.8054 21.6685
NCG m+2 1228 1.53e-04 0.0007 2.1349 25.2165
NCG m+3 1228 1.11e-04 0.0006 2.3307 23.7995
TTF Spot 1228 2.81e-04 0.0018 -0.1175 8.9574
TTF m+1 1228 1.51e-04 0.0008 1.3689 14.1179
TTF m+2 1228 1.55e-04 0.0007 1.5960 19.2947
TTF m+3 1228 1.29e-04 0.0006 1.9247 20.0573
NBP Spot 1268 2.23e-04 0.0062 -0.2147 18.9689
NBP m+1 1268 2.36e-04 0.0011 2.5508 27.0689
NBP m+2 1268 1.93e-04 0.0009 1.8292 19.7212
NBP m+3 1268 2.13e-04 0.0007 1.5505 18.2572
36For NCG, spot and futures prices were obtained from the European Energy Exchange, available at
http://www.eex.com/de/marktdaten/erdgas
37For TTF and NBP, spot prices were obtained from Endex (http://www.iceendex.com/), futures
prices from the Intercontinental Exchange (https://www.theice.com/natural_gas.jhtml).
38The beginning of the sample has been restricted by the availability of NCG prices which were not
available before October 2007.
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All price return series have means close to zero. The Samuelson Hypothesis, stating
that the variance of price returns decreases with the maturity (Samuelson, 1965), is con-
firmed by the data as spot market returns have the greatest variance, while fluctuations
gradually decline from the m+1 to the m+3 contracts. All return series exhibit excess
kurtosis, reflecting a fat-tailed distribution that is frequently observed in commodity
market return series. For the subsequent econometric analysis, the stationarity proper-
ties of all price series are investigated using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test
and the nonparametric Phillips-Perron test to avoid misleading statistical inference. For
all price series, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the log-level cannot be rejected,
which is the case for the first differences, i.e., the daily returns.39 Thus, the intertem-
poral equilibrium between the spot and futures market at the hubs considered can be
investigated using cointegration analysis.
The concept of cointegration was developed by Engle and Granger (1987) and implies
that two or more time series share a stable long-run equilibrium. In technical terms,
it states that for two time series, both integrated of order n with n ≥ 1, there exists a
linear combination of these series that is integrated of order n− 1. Following Lu¨tkepohl
(2005), the cointegration relationship can be investigated based on a k-dimensional VAR
model of order p:
yt = A1yt−1 + ...+Apyt−p + ut, (3.4)
where cointegration of rank r implies that the matrix
Π = −(Ik −A1 − ...−Ap) = αβ′, (3.5)
is of rank r. In Equation (3.5), α and β represent the loading matrix and the cointegra-
tion matrix, respectively, and are of dimension (k x r) and of rank r. To determine the
rank of Π, the procedure proposed by Johansen (1988) is applied. The null hypothesis
of absent cointegration between spot and futures prices can be rejected for all hubs.
Thus, there is empirical evidence of an intertemporal equilibrium between the spot and
39The results of the unit root tests are provided in the Appendix.
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futures markets at the hubs considered. Table 3.4 presents the results of the Johansen
cointegration tests for the spot and the month-ahead prices at the hubs considered.40
Table 3.4: Results of the Johansen Cointegration Test (Spot and m+1)
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Critical Value (95%) p-Value
NCG r=0 0.0611 78.694 20.262 0.0000
NCG r≤ 1 0.0013 1.5589 9.1645 0.8627
TTF r=0 0.0548 70.511 20.262 0.0000
TTF r≤ 1 0.0012 1.5125 9.1645 0.8712
NBP r=0 0.0450 60.508 20.262 0.0000
NBP r≤ 1 0.0019 2.3415 9.1645 0.7092
3.5 Price Formation: Linear and Nonlinear Causality Test-
ing
This section investigates the price discovery process on the spot and futures markets
of the European gas hubs. Econometric tests are applied to investigate whether the
hypothesis of simultaneous information processing (Fama, 1970) holds for the spot and
futures markets under consideration. The idea of simultaneous information processing
implies that there should be no systematic, i.e., no causal, relationship between price
changes on spot and futures markets. Thus, linear Granger causality testing (Granger,
1969) can be applied to analyze information transmission and price formation. A process
xt is said to cause a process yt in the sense of Granger if
Σz(h|Ωt) < Σz(h|Ωt\(xs|s ≤ t)) for at least one h = 1,2,...,N, (3.6)
where Σz(h|Ωt) is the optimal mean squared error of an h-step forecast based on the
information set Ωt reflecting all past and current information (Lu¨tkepohl, 2005).
The test is carried out for the price returns within a vector error correction (VECM)
framework. Thereby, the cointegration relationship between spot and futures prices is
40In the following, this study focuses on the month-ahead contracts rather than on futures contracts
with longer maturity. This is in line with the fact that the trading of futures contracts at the European
gas hubs is centered on the month-ahead contract. However, the choice of maturity does not significantly
affect the findings and the empirical results for futures contracts with longer maturity are provided in
the Appendix.
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explicitly accounted for to avoid misleading inference.41 In addition, the VECM-filtered
residuals are tested for any remaining linear causality pattern. Table 3.5 contains the
results of the linear Granger causality tests for the spot- and month-ahead return series.
For the unfiltered return series, the null hypothesis of absent Granger causality can be
rejected for the direction from futures to spot markets at all three hubs. This means
that the change in the month-ahead futures price has explanatory character for the next
day’s spot price change, violating the Fama (1970) weak-form efficiency hypothesis that
is based on the unpredictability of price returns.42 Consequently, information is not
processed simultaneously by spot and futures market participants.
In fact, information is first processed within the futures market and subsequently trans-
mitted to the spot market. Thus, the month-ahead market seems to be the dominant
market in terms of price discovery. The finding of the futures market providing price
discovery for the spot market is noteworthy in the context of natural gas markets, where
the information sets of spot and futures markets partially differ from one another. Most
notably, short-run influences such as weather conditions or infrastructure outages are
expected to affect spot market returns significantly, whereas their impact on the futures
market should be limited. However, despite these specific characteristics of the purely
physical spot market, the futures market still has significant explanatory power for the
subsequent outcome of the spot market.
The informational superiority of the futures market may result from the broader scope
of participants on this market. The opportunity to trade futures contracts multiple
times before maturity and thus close out the trading position without taking physical
delivery makes the futures market attractive for hedgers and speculators without interest
in physical delivery of the underlying asset. These additional market participants may
cause a greater efficiency of information processing of the futures market compared to
the one of the spot market, as suggested by Silvapulle and Moosa (1999) and Bohl et al.
41Ignoring an existing cointegration relationship may lead to invalid results of linear and nonlinear
Granger causality tests, as outlined by Chen and Lin (2004).
42The finding of Granger causality from futures market price returns to spot market price returns at
all hubs remains unchanged when controlling for conditional heteroskedasticity of the price return series
within a GARCH(1,1)-framework. The results of the Granger causality tests for the spot market and
longer-maturity futures markets are presented in the Appendix. For all hubs, there is empirical evidence
of futures markets leading the spot market.
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(2012). Overall, the empirical evidence of the month-ahead natural gas futures market
leading the corresponding spot market is in line with the findings of Dergiades et al.
(2012) for the US natural gas market. For the VECM-filtered series, the null hypothesis
of absent Granger causality cannot be rejected in any direction for all hubs.43 This
suggests that all linear causality is captured by the VECM-model.
Table 3.5: Pairwise Linear Causality Tests for Gas Price Returns
Direction Chi-sq-Statistic
NCG Spot on NCG m+1 0.1193
NCG m+1 on NCG Spot 5.7441**
TTF Spot on TTF m+1 2.8416
TTF m+1 on TTF Spot 306.06***
NBP Spot on NBP m+1 2.1940
NBP m+1 on NBP Spot 8.6832**
Notes: *** (**) Denotes significance at the 99 (95)%-
level. Granger causality has been investigated within the
VECM-framework, explicitly accounting for the cointe-
gration relationship.
The econometric methodology as applied thus far is only capable of investigating lin-
ear relationships. However, there is empirical evidence suggesting nonlinearities in the
relationship of commodity spot and futures markets, which is usually attributed to the
nonlinearity of transaction costs and market microstructure effects such as minimum
lot sizes (Bekiros and Diks, 2008, Chen and Lin, 2004, Silvapulle and Moosa, 1999).
Additionally, asymmetric information and heterogeneous expectations of market partic-
ipants may also induce nonlinearities in the relationship between commodity spot and
futures prices (Arouri et al., 2013). There are good reasons to believe that these drivers
of nonlinearity are relevant for the continental European gas hubs because the low liq-
uidity at these hubs may foster market frictions such as significant bid-ask spreads and
information costs.
Following this reasoning, the nonlinear causality test proposed by Diks and Panchenko
(2006) is applied to investigate nonlinear dynamics among the considered spot and fu-
tures markets. The testing procedure of Diks and Panchenko (2006) is based on the
Hiemstra Jones Test (Hiemstra and Jones, 1994). The null hypothesis of absent nonlin-
ear Granger causality between two series is tested using their conditional distributions.
43Test statistics are provided in the Appendix.
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Assuming stationarity, the null hypothesis of Y with respect to X implies that the condi-
tional distribution of a variable Z given its past realization Y = y equals the conditional
distribution of Z given Y = y and X = x. Thus, the joint probability functions and
their marginals can be used to state the null hypothesis as
fX,Y,Z(x, y, z)
fY (y)
=
fX,Y (x, y)
fY (y)
· fY,Z(y, z)
fY (y)
. (3.7)
Diks and Panchenko (2006) show that the null hypothesis can be reformulated as
q ≡ E [fX,Y,Z(X,Y, Z)fY (Y )− fX,Y (X,Y )fY,Z(Y, Z)] = 0. (3.8)
As outlined by Diks and Panchenko (2005), the test statistic has to be corrected for pos-
sible size bias resulting from time-varying conditional distributions. Diks and Panchenko
(2006) show that the adjusted test statistic is
Tn(n) =
n− 1
n(n− 2) ·
∑
i
(fˆX,Z,Y (Xi, Zi, Yi)fˆY (Yi)− fˆX,Z(Xi, Yi)fˆY,Z(Yi, Zi)), (3.9)
where fˆW (Wi) is the estimator of the local density of a dw-variate random vector Wi
with
fˆW (Wi) = (2n)
−dW (n− 1)−1
∑
j,j 6=i
Iij
W , (3.10)
where n is the bandwidth depending on the sample size n and Iij
W = I(‖Wi−Wj‖ < n)
is an indicator function. Diks and Panchenko (2006) demonstrate that the distribution
of the test statistic equals
√
n
(Tn(n)− q)
Sn
d→ N(0, 1), (3.11)
for a lag length of 1 and n = Cn
−β with C > 0 and 14 < β <
1
3 . Sn is the estimator
of the asymptotic variance of Tn(·) (Bekiros and Diks, 2008). Furthermore, Diks and
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Panchenko (2006) show that the optimal bandwidth minimizing the mean squared error
of Tn is
∗n = C
∗n(−2/7). (3.12)
The nonlinear causality testing procedure is applied to the VECM-filtered residuals to
ensure that any detected causality can be attributed to nonlinear interaction of the spot
and futures markets. Following Diks and Panchenko (2006), the constant term C∗ of
the bandwidth n is set to 8.
44 Inserting C∗ into Equation (3.12) results in a bandwidth
n of approximately 1.
45
As can be seen in Table 3.6, the null hypothesis of absent nonlinear Granger causality
among spot and month-ahead return series can be rejected in both directions for all three
hubs.46 This suggests that there is a bidirectional nonlinear interaction between the spot
and futures markets investigated. However, as outlined by Bekiros and Diks (2008),
these nonlinear interdependencies may stem from volatility effects. As a consequence, a
multivariate GARCH model is applied to capture the dynamics in the second moment of
distribution in both markets, filtering out time-varying volatility effects. The diagonal
BEKK GARCH model of Engle and Kroner (1995) is applied to explicitly control for
conditional heteroskedasticity.47 Subsequently, the nonlinear causality test of Diks and
Panchenko (2006) is used for the BEKK GARCH-filtered VECM residuals.
For all hubs, the nonlinear causality from spot to futures markets disappears after
BEKK-GARCH filtering. This suggests that any predictive power of spot return dis-
tributions for subsequent distributions of futures market returns results from volatility
effects rather than from informational superiority. Interestingly, except for TTF, there
remains no more causality from the futures market to the spot market after filtering out
linear causality and volatility effects. Thus, the interaction between spot and futures
44Similar values of C∗ have been used for comparable empirical approaches (e.g., Bekiros and Diks
(2008) set C∗ equal to 7.5).
45As a robustness check, the test has been conducted with smaller and larger bandwidths within the
range of 0.9 and 1.1. However, the results are not very sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.
46The results of the nonlinear causality tests for the other pairs of return series are presented in the
Appendix.
47BEKK refers to the first letters of the names of Baba, Engle, Kroner and Kraft, who jointly developed
the model.
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markets at NCG and NBP seems limited to the first and the second moment of distri-
bution. To sum up, the performed causality analysis suggests that price formation takes
place on the more informationally efficient futures markets with the less informationally
efficient spot markets adjusting accordingly.
Table 3.6: Pairwise Nonlinear Causality Tests for Gas Price Returns
Direction t-Statistic
VECM-filtered Data NCG Spot on NCG m+1 4.219***
NCG m+1 on NCG Spot 5.520***
TTF Spot on TTF m+1 3.965***
TTF m+1 on TTF Spot 7.703***
NBP Spot on NBP m+1 3.305***
NBP m+1 on NBP Spot 3.222***
BEKK GARCH-filtered Data NCG Spot on NCG m+1 -1.944
NCG m+1 on NCG Spot -0.477
TTF Spot on TTF m+1 -0.711
TTF m+1 on TTF Spot 5.698***
NBP Spot on NBP m+1 1.016
NBP m+1 on NBP Spot 0.939
Notes: *** Denotes significance at the 99%-level.
3.6 The Efficiency of Intertemporal Arbitrage: Linear and
Threshold Error Correction
The finding of cointegration for the spot and futures market price series at all hubs
in Section 3.4 suggests that the theory of storage holds in the long run. The long-run
relationship can be written as
St = c+ βFt + t. (3.13)
Here, St and Ft are the spot and the futures prices, respectively. The coefficient β rep-
resents the degree of price convergence in the long run and t captures the deviations
from the long-run relationship.48 As pointed out by Arouri et al. (2013), cointegra-
tion between the spot market and the futures market is a necessary but not a sufficient
48With regard to the cost-of-carry relationship, the intercept in Equation 3.13 contains the time-
invariant spread between futures and spot prices that can be assigned to the convenience yield, storage
costs and the interest rate. Assuming time-invariant carrying parameters, t represents the deviation
from the cost-of-carry relationship, triggering arbitrage trading between spot and futures markets. One
should keep in mind that in case of time-varying carrying parameters, e.g., fluctuations of storage costs,
t may not completely reflect deviations from the cost-of-carry condition.
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condition for informational efficiency in the long run. In fact, long-run informational effi-
ciency implies full price convergence (β=1). This hypothesis can be empirically assessed
by testing the respective coefficient restriction.
However, even if the market is informationally efficient in the long run, arbitrage op-
portunities and thus short-run inefficiencies may exist (Arouri et al., 2013). In order to
assess the short-run informational efficiency of spot and futures markets, the short-term
behavior of the spot and futures price series is therefore of special interest. Since these
series are cointegrated, their short-run behavior can be modeled by a VECM (Engle and
Granger, 1987). The bivariate VECM for the analysis of the spot and futures market
price return series behavior has the following representation:
∆ft = α
f t−1 +
k=n∑
k=1
γfk∆ft−k +
k=n∑
k=1
δfk∆st−k + η
f
t ,
∆st = α
st−1 +
k=n∑
k=1
γsk∆ft−k +
k=n∑
k=1
δsk∆st−k + η
s
t ,
(3.14)
where α is the adjustment coefficient representing the error correction of the series in
case of any deviation from the long-run equilibrium (Lu¨tkepohl, 2005) and n denotes the
number of lags included in the model. The γ and δ coefficients account for autoregressive
behavior of the series. To asses the short-run informational efficiency, the α coefficients
are of central interest because they measure the speed of error correction. The greater the
value of the adjustment coefficient in absolute terms, the more informationally efficient
are the market participants in exhausting arbitrage opportunities. For the assessment
of both the long-run and the short-run informational efficiency of the markets analyzed,
linear VECMs are estimated as proposed by Johansen (1988) in order to obtain estimates
of β and α simultaneously . Table 3.7 presents the estimated cointegration vector of the
long-run relationship and the short-run adjustment coefficients for the spot price and the
month-ahead futures price. As to the long-run informational efficiency, the estimated β
coefficients are close to unity. A likelihood ratio test (LR test) is carried out to test the
hypothesis of long-run informational efficiency, i.e., β = 1. The null hypothesis cannot
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be rejected for all hubs (see Table 3.8). Thus, long-run informational efficiency in terms
of full price convergence cannot be rejected.
Table 3.7: Normalized Cointegration Vectors and Error Correction Coefficients
Parameter Standard Error t-Statistic
cNCG -0.0276 0.0761 -0.3621
βNCG 0.9836 0.0203 38.849***
αNCG,spot -0.1329 0.0176 -7.5461***
αNCG,m+1 0.0107 0.0106 1.0021
cTTF -0.0368 0.0816 -0.4509
βTTF 0.9809 0.0272 36.005***
αTTF,spot -0.1111 0.0130 -8.5230***
αTTF,m+1 0.0036 0.0105 0.3453
cNBP -0.0665 0.1520 -0.4375
βNBP 0.9758 0.0394 24.858***
αNBP,spot -0.1538 0.0196 -7.8323***
αNBP,m+1 0.0044 0.0088 0.5035
Notes: *** Denotes significance at the 99%-level. A
lag length of 1 for the VECM is selected based on the
Schwarz Information Criterion for NCG and TTF, while
the same criterion suggests to include 2 lags for NBP.
Table 3.8: Results of the Likelihood Ratio Test on the Cointegration Vector
Chi-sq-Statistic p-Value
NCG 0.4036 0.5252
TTF 0.4726 0.4918
NBP 0.3605 0.5482
Notes: The test was applied to the cointegration
vector of the spot and the month-ahead futures
prices. The null hypothesis of the LR test is: β
=[1;-1].
With regard to the short-run informational efficiency, the adjustment coefficient is statis-
tically significant in all spot price return equations. Hence, deviations from the long-run
relationship are corrected within the spot market at all hubs. In contrast, the futures
price return series do not react to deviations from the equilibrium. This finding is in
line with Huang et al. (2009), who obtain similar results for crude oil spot and futures
markets in the period 1991 to 2001. The insignificant adjustment coefficient in all fu-
tures return equations suggests that these series are weakly exogenous with respect to
the corresponding spot price series (Urbain, 1992).49 The small absolute values of the
49Similar results are obtained from the VECM estimation for the interaction of spot prices and futures
prices with longer maturity. The respective test statistics are presented in the Appendix.
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adjustment coefficients imply a rather low efficiency of intertemporal arbitrage and sug-
gest significant informational inefficiency in the short run.50 Although this means that
none of the considered hubs can be regarded as fully informationally efficient, arbitrage
seems to be most efficiently exploited at NBP. This finding is noteworthy as technical
storage flexibility is smaller in the UK than in Germany and in the Netherlands (see
Table 3.2) and may be a result of the superior liquidity of the British hub. However,
the difference in the speed of adjustment and hence in the degree of arbitrage efficiency
compared to NCG and TTF is fairly moderate.
The specified VECMs assume linearity in the adjustment process. This implies that
error correction starts instantaneously in case of any, arbitrarily small, deviation from
the long-run equilibrium, thus neglecting any kind of market frictions. However, the
exhaustion of arbitrage opportunities at European gas hubs may be constrained by
significant transaction costs resulting from the low liquidity on the respective spot and
futures markets and by physical constraints such as limited injection and withdrawal
capacity of storage facilities. Thus, arbitrage may only be triggered if the deviation
from the intertemporal equilibrium exceeds a certain threshold, such that the arbitrage
traders are compensated for the incurred transaction costs (Li, 2010), resulting in a so-
called “band of no arbitrage” around the long-run equilibrium. Therefore, the threshold
vector error correction model (TVECM) proposed by Granger and Lee (1989) is applied
in the following to explicitly address market frictions resulting from low liquidity or from
physical characteristics of the gas market. TVECMs have proved to be a useful approach
for capturing arbitrage dynamics among spot and futures markets for financial assets
(e.g., Anderson, 1997) and various commodities (Li, 2010, Huang et al., 2009, Root and
Lien, 2003) by explicitly accounting for market frictions.
50For instance, the absolute value of the adjustment coefficient of the NCG spot return series implies
a half-life period of error correction of about five days.
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The bivariate TVECM of order n applied to the system of spot and futures market
returns used in this study has the representation
∆ft = (I − 1)αfht−1 + Iαfl t−1 +
k=n∑
k=1
γf∆ft−1 +
k=n∑
k=1
δf∆st−1 + η
f
t ,
∆st = (I − 1)αsht−1 + Iαsl t−1 +
k=n∑
k=1
γs∆ft−1 +
k=n∑
k=1
δs∆st−1 + ηst ,
(3.15)
where I denotes the regime indicator stating whether the lagged deviation from the long-
run equilibrium is below or above the threshold (in absolute terms). The coefficient αh
(αl) represents the error correction dynamic for the case in which the absolute value of
the deviation is higher (lower) than the threshold (Enders and Siklos, 2001).
The model of Equation (3.15) is estimated using different thresholds. The thresholds are
assumed to be symmetric and their size is defined in terms of the standard deviation of t,
the error term of the cointegration regression.51 This approach reveals the magnitude
of the deviation from the long-run equilibrium that is necessary to trigger arbitrage
activity by investigating the statistical significance of αl, the adjustment coefficient in
the “lower regime”, for different thresholds. Table 3.9 contains the estimates for the
regime-specific adjustment coefficients of the TVECM.
Table 3.9: Estimates of Threshold Vector Error Correction Models
NCG TTF NBP
Threshold Regime αspot αm1 αspot αm1 αspot αm1
0.5σ high -0.1359*** 0.0238 -0.1101*** 0.0012 -0.1603*** 0.0042
0.5σ low -0.0834 0.0094 -0.1312*** 0.0421 -0.0465 0.0078
σ high -0.1358*** 0.0148 -0.1092*** 0.0080 -0.1835*** 0.0033
σ low -0.1203*** -0.0144 -0.1212*** -0.0243 -0.0196 0.0094
Notes: *** (**) Denotes significance at the 99%-level. The estimation is based on OLS using
robust standard errors as proposed by Newey and West (1987). A lag length of 1 for the
VECM is selected based on the Schwarz Information Criterion for NCG and TTF, while the
same criterion suggests to include 2 lags for NBP.
51The standard deviations of t are 0.08 for NCG and TTF, and 0.11 for NBP. The thresholds selected
for the TVECM estimation are 0.5σ and σ. In general, smaller and greater thresholds can be used to
investigate the regime-dependent arbitrage dynamics. However, these threshold choices result in a small
sample for one of the regimes with large standard errors of the estimated coefficients, hindering valid
statistical inference. The same problem occurs when estimating the thresholds endogenously following
the procedure of Balke and Fomby (1997).
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In the TTF spot price return equation, the adjustment coefficient is always statistically
significant in both regimes. Thus, for the threshold values tested, there is no empirical
evidence of a “band of no arbitrage” at the TTF hub. In contrast, arbitrage at NCG and
NBP does not start until the deviation from the long-run equilibrium exceeds a certain
threshold, i.e., αl is insignificant for at least one of the specifications. Surprisingly,
although NBP is the most liquid hub in the sample, it exhibits a rather broad “band
of no arbitrage”, indicating frictions impeding instantaneous intertemporal arbitrage.
Interestingly, the TVECM seems not to improve the model fit substantially compared
to the linear VECM. In general, the sum of squared residuals is almost identical in both
settings. Moreover, Wald tests carried out on the adjustment coefficients in the TVECM
reveal that the hypothesis of equal adjustment behavior in the two regimes, i.e., linearity,
can only be rejected for NBP.52 Thus, even the linear VECM may be regarded as an
adequate framework to investigate the interaction of the natural gas spot and futures
markets considered in this study.
To sum up, the theory of storage holds for all hubs in the long run. Moreover, the hy-
pothesis of long-run informational efficiency, i.e., full price convergence of the spot and
the futures markets, cannot be rejected. However, there is empirical evidence of signif-
icant short-run informational inefficiencies as deviations from the long-run equilibrium
are only slowly exploited by intertemporal arbitrage activity. Comparing the different
hubs, intertemporal arbitrage starts most instantaneously at TTF but is executed most
efficiently at NBP once the deviation from the intertemporal equilibrium crosses a cer-
tain threshold. The first finding is in line with the high flexibility of Dutch gas storage
(see Table 3.2), while the latter may be attributed to the superior liquidity of NBP (see
Table 3.1).
52The results of the Wald tests are provided in the Appendix.
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3.7 The Evolution of Intertemporal Arbitrage Efficiency:
A Kalman Filter Approach
Various political and regulatory measures have been introduced to foster the liquidity of
the continental European gas hubs.53 As a consequence, one may expect informational
efficiency at these hubs to have increased over time. To test this hypothesis, a dynamic
state-space approach is applied to capture the evolution of intertemporal arbitrage ef-
ficiency over time. Time-varying coefficient models have been used for the European
gas market in different applications. Neumann et al. (2006) draw upon a state-space
approach to investigate regional price convergence. Growitsch et al. (2012) estimate a
time-varying VECM to assess the evolution of regional price arbitrage efficiency over
time. However, in contrast to the aforementioned studies, this paper applies the state-
space methodology within an intertemporal context to the European natural gas market.
In doing so, the intertemporal arbitrage dynamic is investigated by estimating Equation
(3.16) in order to assess the development of the adjustment coefficients over time.
∆ft = α
f
t t−1 +
k=n∑
k=1
γfk∆ft−k +
k=n∑
k=1
δfk∆st−k + η
f
t ,
∆st = α
s
t t−1 +
k=n∑
k=1
γsk∆ft−k +
k=n∑
k=1
δsk∆st−k + η
s
t ,
(3.16)
with
αt = αt−1 + ζt, (3.17)
where αt represents the time-varying adjustment coefficient following a random walk as
specified in Equation (3.17) and t−1 is the lagged error term of the linear cointegration
regression. The recursive procedure suggested by Kalman (1960) is applied to estimate
53Most notably, the Third Gas Market Directive of the European Union from 2009 comprises various
efforts to improve access to gas infrastructure and thus facilitates the development of liquid natural gas
hubs (EU, 2009b).
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the state-space model.54 Based on the hypothesis of increasing short-run informational
efficiency at the continental European hubs due to the rise in liquidity, the absolute val-
ues of the respective adjustment coefficients are expected to increase over time. Figure
3.2 presents the estimated time paths for the adjustment coefficients in the spot return
equation.55 Some of the spikes in the plotted series can be attributed to the economic
downturn in autumn 2008, and gas market-specific shocks such as the extraordinary
supply interruptions resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian crisis in January 2009 and
the cold spell in February 2012.56 There is a distinctive pattern in the evolution of the
relative short-run informational efficiency of the hubs considered over time, as can be
inferred from the time-varying coefficient estimates. As of the beginning of 2008, NCG
is the least informationally efficient hub. However, the absolute value of the adjustment
coefficients grows towards the end of the sample period, indicating an increase in short-
run informational efficiency. In contrast, the absolute value of the adjustment coefficient
of NBP decreases over time, indicating a decline in the efficiency of intertemporal ar-
bitrage. For the Dutch TTF hub, short-run informational efficiency is at a rather low
level and decreases slightly during the sample period.57 Overall, there is convergence
in the degree of short-run informational efficiency of the hubs considered and only the
short-run informational efficiency of NCG seems to have moderately benefited from the
increase in liquidity. Thus, as of 2012, the differences in informational efficiency between
the hubs considered appear significantly reduced.
54As initial value of α, zero is selected assuming informational inefficiency at the beginning of the
sample period. The variance of the respective spot return series, σ2rspot, is selected as initial variance of
ηt and ζt is set to σ
2
rspot/1000. In line with the linear VECM specified above, one lag is included for
NCG and TTF, while two lags are used in the specification for NBP.
55The evolution of the adjustment coefficient in the futures return equation is neglected due to statis-
tical insignificance.
56In the latter two periods, it seems reasonable to infer that the strong increase in spot price represents
an immediate reaction to the physical supply and demand imbalance, independent from the futures
market price. For a more detailed discussion of the economic impact of these events on German gas
prices, see Nick and Thoenes (2013).
57The visual impression of increasing (decreasing) short-run informational efficiency at NCG (NBP
and TTF) is confirmed when fitting the respective time-varying adjustment coefficient estimates against
a constant and a linear trend. For TTF and NBP, the trend coefficients are slightly positive and
statistically significant, while a negative and significant trend coefficient is obtained for NCG. However,
since the left-hand side variable of this regression is itself an estimated value, the statistical inference
has to be interpreted cautiously.
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Figure 3.2: Time-Varying Adjustment Coefficients of Spot Price Return Series
3.8 Conclusion
The objective of the paper was to analyze the informational efficiency of different Euro-
pean gas hubs by empirically investigating price discovery and arbitrage activity between
spot and futures markets. For this purpose, linear and nonlinear econometric approaches
were specified to explicitly account for the low-liquidity environment and the physical
characteristics of the gas market.
Causality testing reveals that price formation takes place on the futures market at all
hubs. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that futures market participants react
more efficiently to information than spot market traders (Silvapulle and Moosa, 1999,
Bohl et al., 2012) and may be assigned to the broader scope of market participants on the
futures market. The opportunity to trade the contract multiple times before maturity,
and thus to close out the trading position without taking physical delivery, enables their
use for hedging and speculation. Thus, in contrast to the purely physical spot market,
the futures market is easily accessible for traders without interest in physical delivery.
Apparently, this structural difference between both markets yields the futures market
to be significantly informational superior compared to the spot market. In the light of
hub-based pricing of internationally traded gas, an indexation on futures market prices
rather than on spot market prices therefore promises to provide more valid price signals.
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The theory of storage seems to hold for all gas hubs considered in the long run, indicating
the existence of significant arbitrage between the respective spot and futures markets.
Moreover, the hypothesis of long-run informational efficiency, i.e., complete convergence
of spot and futures market prices, cannot be rejected. However, the error correction
process is rather sticky, suggesting frictions impeding intertemporal arbitrage activity
and thus a low level of short-run informational efficiency. From a dynamic perspective,
the state-space estimations reveal a convergence in short-run informational efficiency
across the hubs during the sample period.
With regard to the role of liquidity, the empirical results provide mixed evidence. On
the one hand, intertemporal arbitrage opportunities are most efficiently exploited at the
liquid NBP once the deviation from the intertemporal equilibrium is sufficiently large.
In addition, the rise in liquidity seems to have slightly fostered arbitrage efficiency at
NCG. On the other hand, the detected frictions in the price formation process and
arbitrage activities are similar for all hubs, regardless of their liquidity. Therefore,
it seems reasonable to attribute the limited short-run informational efficiency at least
partly to specific characteristics of the gas market such as limited storage flexibility or
inefficient allocation of storage and network capacity, rather than exclusively to market
liquidity.
The empirical findings of these studies suggest that regulators and policy makers may
think about measures to improve the short-run informational efficiency of the European
natural gas market. Besides fostering liquidity, attention should also be paid to the
functioning of the third party access to storage or network infrastructure in order to
facilitate arbitrage activity. A promising field for further research on the short-run
informational efficiency of the European gas market could be the extension of the analysis
to intraday data and thus the investigation of the interaction between spot and futures
markets at an even higher time resolution. This approach, however, suffers from the
lack of data availability and is therefore left for future research ventures.
Chapter 4
The Hidden Cost of Investment:
The Impact of Adjustment Costs
on Firm Performance
Measurement and Regulation
4.1 Introduction
Allocating the costs and benefits of economic decisions to certain time periods represents
an important element in everyday economic life. In specific, the effects of an investment
in capital assets have to be distributed over time by accountants in order to allow
stakeholders to gain an assessment of the firm’s performance within a certain period.
However, an adequate allocation of the true economic costs and benefits of an investment
over time is hindered by the fact that the measurable costs and benefits considered in the
bookkeeping may diverge from the actual economic costs and benefits. This phenomena
is referred to as an allocation problem of financial accounting (Thomas, 1969).
For an illustrative example of this accounting problem, consider a firm investing into
a new, more efficient software system. In the initial period, the implementation of
the new system will cause significant adjustment costs for installation, training and
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reorganization that are reflected in the firm’s operational expenditures. In contrast, the
measurable economic benefits of the new system will unfold only later in the following
periods. As a consequence, the firm will appear less profitable for investors, regulators
and other stakeholders during the installation period although it is implementing an
investment decision that increases the performance of the company in the long run.
This work addresses a specific version of such an allocation problem in accounting,
namely the mismatch between the benchmarking methods used in the context of incentive-
based regulation schemes and the multi-period optimization behavior of the regulated
firms. Current benchmarking practice usually ignores the intertemporal linkage of invest-
ments outlined above by relying solely on static inefficiency measures. These inefficiency
measures focus on input and output data (costs or quantities) for a certain period and do
not control for adjustment costs of investments that affect the observable combination of
variable inputs and output in the respective benchmarking period. Thus, the regulator
ignores the fact that the measured inefficiency may reflect short-term adjustment costs
from investments necessary for long-run cost minimization rather than the “actual” in-
efficiency. As a result, firms with high investments in the benchmarking period may be
worse off when compared to peers with lower investments. In contrast, firms with low
investments may operate far from the dynamic optimum but may be deemed as fully
efficient from a static perspective. This distortion in the outcome of static benchmark-
ing exercises may not even be reversed in the benchmarking process for the subsequent
regulatory period since the economic lifetime of capital assets in network industries is
expected to heavily exceed the duration of one regulatory period.
Following this line of argumentation, the need for dynamic benchmarking approaches
in order to explicitly address the intertemporal character of long-term input decisions
made by firms has been widely acknowledged. However, there is only limited empir-
ical research on the application of dynamic inefficiency estimation in the presence of
adjustment costs. Moreover, the regulatory implications of applying dynamic rather
than static inefficiency measures have yet to be addressed. This paper seeks to fill this
research gap. Using a data set of US electricity transmission and distribution firms for
the period 2004 to 2011, we assess the firms’ dynamic technical inefficiency explicitly
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accounting for changes in the capital stock and their implied adjustment costs. Drawing
upon dynamic data envelopment analysis (DEA), we compute a dynamic directional
distance function that enables us to analyze the dynamic technical inefficiency of our
sample firms. Nonparametric DEA is applied rather than parametric estimation tech-
niques in order to avoid imposing a restrictive functional form on our heterogeneous
sample of firms. We use the established duality between the dynamic directional dis-
tance function and the current value of the optimal value function of the intertemporal
cost minimization problem in order to compute the dynamic cost inefficiency and the dy-
namic allocative inefficiency in an adjustment cost framework. We compare our derived
dynamic inefficiency estimates to their static counterparts, i.e., the inefficiency estimates
obtained by ignoring the adjustment costs of changes in the capital stock. This allows
us to assess the impact of applying dynamic inefficiency measures on the outcome of
benchmarking exercises, both on a firm-specific and industrial level.
This study provides two main contributions to empirical research in the field of ineffi-
ciency measurement: First, our paper illustrates the impact of the methodological choice
of static versus dynamic inefficiency measures on the outcomes of benchmarking exer-
cises frequently carried out in regulatory practice. In doing so, we discuss the incentives
implied in both methodologies with regard to long-term investments for the firms under
regulation. Second, we provide new insights into the dynamic inefficiency of the US elec-
tricity transmission and distribution industry, explicitly controlling for the adjustment
costs of investments.
Overall, our empirical findings suggest that investments in capital assets and their im-
plicit adjustment costs should be accounted for by the regulator in order to avoid biased
firm-specific cost saving targets and misleading incentives to cut investments. We find
that the average dynamic technical inefficiency of the US electricity transmission and
distribution industry is around 26% during the sample period. The dynamic approach
yields on average lower technical inefficiency scores than the corresponding static inef-
ficiency estimates focusing exclusively on variable input contraction (40%). Dynamic
cost inefficiency of the industry amounts on average to 37% and is 3 percentage points
lower than the corresponding static measure. On a firm-specific level, the application
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of dynamic inefficiency measures has even stronger implications on the inefficiency es-
timates. Thus, the economic impact of biased inefficiency factors derived from static
benchmarking procedures for the firms under regulation is expected to be severe.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides the theoretical background and
Section 4.3 discusses relevant previous research. The methodology is outlined in Section
4.4. Section 4.5 presents the data, while empirical results are discussed in Section 4.6.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Background
The need for regulation of natural monopolies in network industries such as telecommu-
nication, railway or energy distribution and transmission has been extensively discussed
(see, e.g., Joskow, 2008, Leland, 1974). As emphasized by Jamasb and Pollitt (2007),
regulatory measures applied to these industries aim to provide incentives for an efficient
operation of the regulated firms and to ensure a sharing of productivity gains between
firms and customers. Historically, “cost-of-service” (rate of return) regulation has been
used by regulators. Under rate of return of regulation, the regulator sets the price which
the utility can charge in such a way that the utility can cover its operating costs and
additionally is allowed to earn a specified rate of return on its capital employed. Al-
though the rate of return regulation is effective in terms of “rent extraction” (Joskow,
2008), it lacks cost reduction incentives and provides incentives to overinvest in capital.
The latter shortfall is widely known as the Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson,
1962).
In order to avoid the aforementioned economic inefficiencies, the seminal work of Shleifer
(1985) proposes an alternative regulatory approach that promises a more efficient out-
come based on cost comparisons among comparable firms, the so-called “yardstick com-
petition”. Incentive-based regulatory regimes reflecting the idea of yardstick competition
are nowadays common practice in the regulation of natural monopolies, usually imple-
mented via a price or revenue cap mechanism.58 As the price or revenue cap is fixed
58 See, e.g., Joskow (2008) for a review on incentive-based regulation in electricity networks.
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for a certain period, any cost reductions translate into additional profit for the firms,
thereby providing a strong incentive for cost-efficient behavior of the regulated firms.
In order to determine the socially-optimal price or revenue cap, empirical benchmarking
techniques such as DEA or stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) are frequently applied.
These techniques measure a firm’s inefficiency relative to its peers. Firm-specific cost
saving targets, the so-called “X-factors”, are then derived from the benchmarking out-
come. The X-factor specifies the inefficiency decrease for a certain firm within a regu-
latory period required by the regulator in order to force the firm back to the efficient
frontier. It is then incorporated into the adaption of the price or revenue cap for the
next regulatory period (Joskow, 2008):
P1,i = P0,i(1 +RPI −Xi) (4.1)
In Equation (4.1), RPI denotes the inflation of input prices (rate of input price increase),
Xi denotes the firm-specific rate of inefficiency decrease, and P0,i and P1,i are the initial
and the adjusted firm-specific price or revenue caps, respectively (Joskow, 2008).
Changes in the capital stock and the corresponding costs can cause various problems
when static benchmarking models are applied to derive the X-factors within incentive-
based regulation schemes. Increases in capital costs directly transfer into measured
inefficiency if total costs enter the static benchmarking model as input data. That way,
firms with high investments are penalized by significant X-factors. To avoid misleading
incentives to reduce investments, capital costs are frequently excluded from the bench-
marking model (Joskow, 2008). However, even if only operational costs are subject
to benchmarking, adjustment costs such as expenditures for reorganization, investment
support or staff training may distort the validity of static benchmarking outcomes since
these costs are reflected in the operational expenditures.
The regulatory problem arising from adjustment costs can be illustrated using a simple
example. Consider two homogeneous firms i and j subject to incentive-based regulation
where static benchmarking on operational costs is carried out at the beginning of the
regulatory period. For the upcoming regulatory period, both firms have the option to
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either minimize their long-run costs by choosing a combination of contracting the vari-
able input usage and expanding the capital stock via investments or to focus exclusively
on contracting their variable input usage, i.e., solely minimize their short-run costs. If,
in the presence of adjustment costs, firm i decides to stick to long-run cost minimizing
behavior and therefore invests in its capital stock, it will be unable to contract the usage
of variable inputs to the same extent as firm j that exclusively focuses on contract-
ing variable input usage. As a consequence, firm j will be deemed as fully efficient by
the static benchmarking outcome. In contrast, firm i is classified as inefficient due to
the adjustment costs implied in the investments and reflected in the operational costs,
although it sticks to the socially-optimal minimization of long-run costs. Even if the
benefits from the changes in the capital stock of firm i unfold later on, the relative dis-
advantage of firm i against firm j in terms of the assigned X-factor may not be (fully)
mitigated in the subsequent benchmarking since the economic lifetime of capital assets
usually heavily exceeds the duration of one regulatory period.59
The example places emphasis on two interesting effects: First, firms that carry out in-
vestments consistent with long-run cost minimization may be classified as inefficient by
static benchmarking methods since they suffer from adjustment costs that translate into
higher operational costs. In contrast, firms that deviate from the long-run cost mini-
mizing behavior by cutting investments may be deemed as fully efficient in the static
benchmarking process. Second, firms may have an incentive to cut investments. The
second effect results from the first since firms try to avoid being classified as inefficient
although they minimize their long-run costs.60 To sum up, the X-factors derived from
static benchmarking measures are inconsistent with long-run cost minimization in the
presence of adjustment costs and may thus encourage firms to deviate from the opti-
mal input decision path by cutting investments. The source of this problem is that the
static benchmarking models used by regulators are based on a “snapshot” combination
59 CEPA et al. (2010) estimate the economic lifetime of capital assets in the electricity transmission
and distribution industry to vary between 10 and 140 years. The weighted average is calculated to be
around 50 years for electricity transmission and around 70 years for electricity distribution. In contrast,
a typical regulatory period within incentive-based regulation schemes comprises three to eight years
(Ernst & Young, 2013).
60 Beside cutting investments, firms may also have an incentive to defer investments into other periods
than the benchmarking period. However, the effectiveness of this approach depends on the persistence
of the adjustment costs induced by the respective investment.
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of input and output without taking into account the intertemporal effect of investments
on inefficiency. The usage of this “snapshot” without controlling for adjustment costs
in static benchmarking models makes it impossible to distinguish between “true” opera-
tional inefficiency and transitory inefficiency caused by changes in capital assets. Thus,
regulators that rely on static benchmarking models ignore the fact that the measured
inefficiency may be partly caused by investments that are necessary for the minimization
of long-run costs. The regulatory problem is illustrated in Figure 4.1 using the example
outlined above.
Figure 4.1: Bias in X-Factors Derived From Static Benchmarking in the Presence of
Adjustment Costs
Overcoming the bias in X-factors derived from static benchmarking results requires
accounting for the adjustment costs induced by investments in capital assets. In Sec-
tion 4.4, we discuss a dynamic approach to inefficiency measurement that is able to do
so. Prior to that, Section 4.3 shortly reviews relevant previous research concerning the
impact of incentive-based regulation on the investment activity of the regulated firms as
well as the application of benchmarking within this context.
4.3 Previous Research
The relationship between investment and incentive-based regulation has been intensively
discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Guthrie, 2006, Kwoka, 2009). While economic the-
ory initially suggested that incentive-based regulation is generally associated with un-
derinvestment, some recent theoretical and empirical studies draw a more comprehensive
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picture. In particular, they indicate that investment decisions within an incentive-based
regulatory regime highly depend on the way in which regulation is handled in practice
(Vogelsang, 2010). In a study from 2009, Roques and Savva show that a relatively high
price cap can speed up investment, while a low price cap can be a disincentive for invest-
ment. Nagel and Rammerstorfer (2009) obtain similar results. They find that a stringent
price cap encourages firms to lower investments. Furthermore, in an empirical applica-
tion to a sample of EU energy utilities from 1997 to 2007, Cambini and Rondi (2010)
show that the investment behavior of incentive-regulated firms is negatively related to
the level of the X-factor set by the regulatory authority.
With regard to benchmarking, a number of studies deal with nonparametric approaches
to dynamic inefficiency measurement. One strand of this literature uses dynamic net-
work DEA (Fa¨re and Grosskopf, 1997, Nemoto and Goto, 1999, 2003). An interesting
application of this methodological approach on the inefficiency of European electric-
ity transmission system operators are the studies of Burger and Geymu¨ller (2007) and
Geymu¨ller (2007). Within this methodological framework, intertemporal behavior is
modeled by allowing outputs from the initial period to be used as inputs in the follow-
ing periods (Fallah-Fini et al., 2013).
Within another strand of the literature, introduced by Sengupta (1994, 1999) and Silva
and Stefanou (2003, 2007), intertemporal behavior among subsequent periods is cap-
tured via model constraints within a dynamic formulation of the conventional DEA
framework (Fallah-Fini et al., 2013). In particular, Silva and Stefanou (2003, 2007)
define an intertemporal cost minimizing problem in which the decision making unit in
every time period is required to minimize its discounted flow of costs over time. Build-
ing on this theoretical framework, Silva and Oude Lansink (2009) and Oude Lansink
and Silva (2013) measure dynamic inefficiency in the presence of adjustment costs via
a directional distance function approach. Moreover, they establish duality between the
primal representation of the adjustment cost production technology, the dynamic di-
rectional distance function, and the current value of the optimal value function of the
intertemporal cost minimization problem.
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In this paper, we follow the approach developed by Silva and Oude Lansink (2009) and
Oude Lansink and Silva (2013) and apply dynamic DEA to a sample of US electricity
distribution and transmission companies. Furthermore, we compare the derived dynamic
inefficiency measures to their static counterparts in order to assess how the consideration
of economic costs and benefits induced by investments affects the outcome of empirical
benchmarking approaches. Our paper is innovative in the sense that applies this concept
of dynamic inefficiency measurement to a sample of firms within the electricity distribu-
tion and transmission sector. Moreover, it relates an empirical application of dynamic
inefficiency measures to existing benchmarking practice in the context of incentive-based
regulation schemes.
4.4 The Model
In this section, we present and discuss the dynamic inefficiency measurement model
formulated by Silva and Oude Lansink (2009) and Oude Lansink and Silva (2013). We
review the main elements of the model using Oude Lansink and Silva’s notation and
provide some additional explanations and economic interpretation, also with a graphical
illustration.
4.4.1 Dynamic Technical Inefficiency and the Dynamic Directional
Distance Function
To model a production technology within an adjustment cost framework, assume that
y ∈ <++ denotes a vector of outputs, x ∈ <+ denotes a vector of variable inputs, and
K ∈ <++ denotes a vector of initial capital stocks or quasi-fixed inputs that can be
adjusted by a vector of gross investments I ∈ <+. Following Silva and Stefanou (2003),
the input requirement set can then be specified as:
V (y : K) = {(x, I) : (x, I) can produce y given K} , (4.2)
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where V (y : K) represents all the combinations of variable inputs x and gross investments
I that can produce the output vector y given the initial capital stock vector K. The set
V (y : K) is nonempty, compact and satisfies the standard properties of no free lunch,
possibility of inaction and strong disposability of variable inputs and outputs (see, e.g.,
Fa¨re and Primont, 1995).
Furthermore, in order to incorporate the economic concept of adjustment costs in the
production technology, Silva and Stefanou (2003) suggest three additional properties.
First, we assume negative monotonicity of V (y : K) in I. That is,
if (x, I) ∈ V (y : K) and I ′ ≤ I, then (x, I ′) ∈ V (y : K). (4.3)
This property explicitly accounts for the adjustment costs within the intertemporal
framework. It states that an adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs through gross investments
decreases the production level of the outputs given a certain level of the variable inputs.
Or, in other words, an increase in the level of gross investments requires, other things
being equal, an increase in the level of inputs to produce the same level of outputs.
Second, we assume that a higher initial capital stock increases the level of outputs given
a certain level of the variable inputs. In other words, the same level of output can be
achieved with lower variable input given a greater capital stock. Formally,
if K ′ ≥ K, then V (y : K) ⊂ V (y,K ′). (4.4)
Together, the properties defined in (4.3) and (4.4) reflect the trade-off within the in-
tertemporal economic calculus of firms regarding the optimal level of gross investments:
Gross investments decrease the current output levels through adjustment costs but in-
crease future output levels via an increase in the future capital stock (Oude Lansink and
Silva, 2013, Silva and Stefanou, 2003).
Finally, we assume V (y : K) to be strictly convex. That is,
if (x, I) ∈ V (y : K) and (x′, I ′) ∈ V (y : K) then
(µx+ (1− µ)x′, µI + (1− µ)I ′) ∈ V (y : K) for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
(4.5)
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This property implies increasing marginal adjustment costs and therefore is consistent
with gradual rather than one-off investment behavior.
As shown by Silva and Oude Lansink (2009), an input requirement set that satisfies
these assumptions can be represented by a dynamic directional distance function. This
input-orientated dynamic directional distance function can be specified as:
~D(y,K, x, I; gx, gI) = max{β ∈ < : (x− βgx, I + βgI) ∈ V (y : K)}, (4.6)
where g = (gx, gI) ∈ <++ ×<++ and β represent the direction and proportion to which
the input combination (x, I) is scaled, respectively, to reach the boundary or frontier
of the input requirement set V (y : K). The directional distance function value β is
bounded below by zero. A value of zero identifies the observed input combination as
located on the frontier and, hence, as being technically efficient. Values greater than zero
belong to input combinations within the frontier, indicating technical inefficiency. Thus,
the dynamic directional distance function is a measure of dynamic technical inefficiency.
A graphical illustration of the relationship between dynamic technical inefficiency and
the dynamic directional distance function is provided in Figure 4.2. The vertical axis
shows the usage of variable input x, while the horizontal axis shows the gross invest-
ments I. The set V (y : K) is the area of all the combinations of x and I that can
produce the output vector y given the initial capital stock vector K. Points A, B and
C represent efficient production points located on the frontier of the input requirement
set, while point D above the frontier indicates an inefficient production point. Using the
directional vector g = (x, I), the dynamic directional distance function then measures
the proportion to which the original input combination (x, I) at point D can be simul-
taneously contracted in x and expanded in I to reach the efficient input combination
(x− β x, I + β I) at point C.
In contrast, from a static perspective, the input requirement set V (y : K) reduces to
the line segment 0D′ on the vertical axis since investments are neglected. Within the
static framework, A′ represents the efficient variable input level of production point A,
and D′ represents the inefficient variable input level of production point D. Hence,
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the static directional distance function measures the proportion in which the original
variable input level at point D′ can be reduced to reach the efficient variable input level
at point A′.
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Figure 4.2: Dynamic Directional Distance Function
As proposed by Silva and Stefanou (2003, 2007), the input-orientated dynamic direc-
tional distance function presented in Equation (4.6) can be determined by dynamic
DEA. Given a sample of J firms with M outputs, N variable inputs and F quasi-fixed
inputs, the dynamic directional distance function ~D for each observation i is obtained
by solving the following optimization problem:
~D(yi,Ki, xi, Ii; gx, gI) = max
(βi,γj)
βi
s.t.
J∑
j=1
γjyjm ≥ yim, m = 1, . . . ,M, (i)
J∑
j=1
γjKjf ≤ Kif , f = 1, . . . , F, (ii)
J∑
j=1
γjxjn ≤ xin − βigxn , n = 1, . . . , N, (iii)
J∑
j=1
γjIjf ≥ Iif + βigIf , f = 1, . . . , F, (iv)
γj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , J, (v)
(4.7)
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where γj are intensity variables assigning a weight to each observation j when construct-
ing the dynamic frontier. The inequality constraints in (i)-(iv) ensure that observation i
is located within the feasible production region, while the non-negativity constraints on
the intensity variables in (v) indicate that constant returns to scale are assumed. The
solution to this program, the maximum value of βi, shows to what extent the variable
inputs and the gross investments of observation i can be proportionally contracted and
expanded relative to the efficient benchmark on the frontier at given outputs and given
capital stocks.
4.4.2 Dynamic Cost Inefficiency and the Intertemporal Cost Mini-
mization Problem
Given that the dynamic directional distance function defined in Equation (4.6) is a
valid representation of the input requirement set specified in Section 4.4.1, a firm’s
intertemporal cost minimization problem at any base period t ∈ [0,∞) can be specified
as:
W (y,Kt, w, c, r, δ) = min
(x,I)
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)[w′x(s) + c′K(s)]ds
s.t.
K˙(s) = I(s)− δK(s),K(t) = Kt
~D(y,K, x, I; gx, gI) ≥ 0, s ∈ [t,+∞],
(4.8)
where W denotes the value function, y ∈ <++ is a vector of outputs in the base period
and Kt ∈ <++ represents a vector of initial capital stocks (Oude Lansink and Silva,
2013). The vectors of the current input prices for the variable input vector x(s) ∈ <++
and the capital stock vector K(s) ∈ <++ are represented by w ∈ <++ and c ∈ <++,
respectively. The time-invariant discount rate is r > 0, and δ is a diagonal matrix of
depreciation rates δf > 0, f = 1, . . . , F . Finally, I and K˙ are vectors of gross and net
investments, respectively (Oude Lansink and Silva, 2013, Silva and Oude Lansink, 2009).
The intertemporal cost minimization problem defined in Equation (4.8) requires a firm
to minimize the discounted flow of cost over time subject to two restrictions that have
to hold in every time period s. The first restriction states that a change in a quasi-fixed
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factor can only be achieved via investments and is therefore accompanied by adjustment
costs. The second restriction requires the combination of variable inputs and investments
to be located within the input requirement set V (y : K).
To derive the combination of variable inputs and gross investments that leads to the
current value of the optimal value function within a certain period, the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellmann (H-J-B) equation can be applied. Oude Lansink and Silva (2013) show that
the H-J-B equation for the intertemporal cost minimization problem in Equation (4.8)
can be written as:
rW (y,K,w, c) = min
(x,I)
{
w′x+ c′K +W ′K(I − δK) : ~D(y,K, x, I; gx, gI) ≥ 0
}
, (4.9)
where W ′K = WK(y,K,w, c)
′ is the vector of shadow values of the quasi-fixed factors.
The long-run savings implied in investments are explicitly incorporated in the H-J-B
equation, as the shadow value WKf of the quasi-fixed factor f measures the decrease in
the long-run costs if the initial capital stock Kf is increased by a marginal unit.
61
61 Obtaining reliable estimates for the shadow values of the quasi-fixed factors is methodologically
challenging. This is because each shadow value represents a scarcity indicator for the respective quasi-
fixed factor and thus depends on the initial capital stock vector, output quantities and input prices.
This endogeneity calls for a simultaneous determination of optimal firm-specific input quantities and
the firm-specific shadow values of the quasi-fixed factors (Oude Lansink and Silva, 2013). However, a
simultaneous determination translates into a nonlinear problem with severe numerical difficulties. For
this reason, we use an alternative sequential approach to determine the shadow value of the quasi-fixed
factor within our empirical application (see Section 4.6).
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Similar to the dynamic directional distance function, Equation (4.9) can be represented
by a dynamic DEA model. The corresponding optimization problem for a sample of J
firms with M outputs, N variable inputs and F quasi-fixed inputs is given by:
rW (yi,Ki, wi, ci) = min
(x,I,γj)
[wi′x+ ci′Ki +W i′K(I − δKi)]
s.t.
J∑
j=1
γjyjm ≥ yim, m = 1, . . . ,M, (i)
J∑
j=1
γjKjf ≤ Kif , f = 1, . . . , F, (ii)
J∑
j=1
γjxjn ≤ xn, n = 1, . . . , N, (iii)
J∑
j=1
γjIjf ≥ If , f = 1, . . . , F, (iv)
γj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , J, (v)
xn ≥ 0, n = 1, . . . , N, (vi)
If ≥ 0, f = 1, . . . , F, (vii)
(4.10)
where W i′K represents a vector of firm-specific shadow values of the quasi-fixed factors.
The inequality constraints (i)-(v) have the same interpretation as in Equation (4.7).
The constraints in (vi) and (vii) ensure the non-negativity of variable inputs and gross
investments.
By using duality theory, Silva and Oude Lansink (2009) and Oude Lansink and Silva
(2013) show that a firm-specific dynamic cost inefficiency (CIE) measure can be derived
from the solution of Equation (4.10) as follows:
CIE =
w′x+ c′K +W ′K(I − δK)− rW (y,K,w, c)
w′gx −W ′KgI
≥ ~D(y,K, x, I; gx, gI). (4.11)
That is, firm-specific CIE is the deviation of the observed total shadow cost of the actual
input choices from the minimum total shadow cost of the optimal input choices, divided
by w′gx −W ′KgI to construct a unit-free measure.62 The right-hand side of Equation
62 For a detailed discussion on the duality between the dynamic directional distance function and the
current value of the optimal value function of the intertemporal cost minimization problem, see Oude
Lansink and Silva (2013).
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(4.11) denotes the firm-specific dynamic technical inefficiency (TIE), represented by the
dynamic directional distance function. As a consequence, the difference between CIE
and ~D(y,K, x, I; gx, gI) yields a measure for firm-specific dynamic allocative inefficiency
(AIE ≥ 0). The obtained dynamic allocative inefficiency scores provide an indication as
to whether the trade-off between variable input contraction and capital stock extension
is optimal in terms of long-run cost minimization.
The relationship between dynamic TIE, CIE and AIE is illustrated in Figure 4.3. As
in Figure 4.2, points A, B and C denote technically efficient production points located
on the frontier of the input requirement set V (y : K), while point D above the frontier
indicates a technically inefficient production point. The distance between D and C
measures the dynamic TIE of production point D.
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Figure 4.3: Dynamic Inefficiency Estimates
Further, in order to illustrate dynamic CIE, an isocost line ISA is mapped. The slope
of the isocost line is given by the negative ratio of the shadow value of the quasi-fixed
factor WK and the price of the variable input w: −WK/w, with WK < 0. Thus,
the slope represents the ratio of the savings obtained from variable input contraction
and from investing in the capital stock. Isocost lines with higher intercepts represent
higher long-run costs. Consequently, only point A, at which the frontier is a tangent
to the isocost line ISA, represents a dynamic cost-efficient production point. Points
B and C denote technically efficient but allocatively inefficient production points with
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higher costs. Within the illustration, B and C should invest less and focus more on
variable input contraction given the relationship between the shadow value of capital
and the price of the variable input. Point D, in contrast, suffers from both technical
and allocative dynamic inefficiency.
4.5 Data for Empirical Application
We apply the methodology outlined and discussed in Section 4.4 to a sample of firms
within the electricity sector. The sample comprises US electricity transmission and dis-
tribution companies for the period 2004-2011. The data is obtained from the FERC
Form No.1. After correcting for outliers and eliminating all firms with missing obser-
vations during the period considered, the sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 61
firms covering 8 years with 464 observations in total.
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics on the model variables. The choice of output
variables for electricity transmission and distribution firms is not straightforward. Dif-
ferent measures, such as peak load of the system, network length, number of customers
and total electricity delivered are summarized in Jamasb and Pollitt (2001). In this
study, we argue that the total number of customers, aggregated over all segments, and
the total electricity flow through the network most appropriately reflect the economic
output of our sample firms. We choose two outputs rather than one to account for
the heterogeneity of our sample, comprising firms with a focus on either distribution or
transmission of electricity.
We select the operational expenditure (OPEX) as the variable input. To adjust the
variable input expenses for changes in input prices, we deflate OPEX using a weighted
average of a labor cost index for the electricity transmission and distribution industry on
the state level (LCI)63 and the producer price index for the electricity transmission and
63 The index is calculated from the average annual pay data obtained from the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages, which is published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/
cew/cewind.htm#year=2010&qtr=1&own=5&ind=10&size=0.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Total Number of Customers (in millions) 1.05 1.07 0.12 5.25
Total Flow of Electricity (in MWh) 33.88 28.19 1.37 122.51
OPEX (in million 2002 US$) 136.12 139.54 15.34 645.16
Capital Stock (in billion 2002 US$) 3.19 3.37 0.27 20.24
Gross Investments (in billion 2002 US$) 0.27 0.33 0.01 2.01
Labor Cost Index 1.21 0.16 0.88 1.70
Producer Price Index 1.22 0.15 0.96 1.64
Consumer Price Index 1.16 0.06 1.05 1.25
Notes: Information on the components used to compute the figures presented as well as their
FERC Form No.1 definitions can be found in the Appendix.
distribution industry (PPI)64. The quasi-fixed input, i.e., the capital stock, is approxi-
mated by the balance sheet value of the network assets. The capital stock is deflated
by the PPI. Gross investments are computed by taking the sum of net investments
(changes in the deflated capital stock) and the deflated depreciation on these assets in
the respective year. For the computation of dynamic cost inefficiency and dynamic al-
locative inefficiency, we use the same deflators outlined above as an approximation for
the price of the variable input and the price of capital. However, in order to generate
real monetary values, we adjust both input prices for inflation using the consumer price
index (CPI).65 Finally, capital expenditure (Capex) is given by the sum of the deflated
annual depreciation and the required annual return on the balance sheet value of the
network assets. Following Nillesen and Pollitt (2010), we assume a rate of return of 6
percent for all assets.
4.6 Empirical Results
This section presents and interprets the results of applying the dynamic inefficiency mea-
sures outlined in Section 4.4 to our sample of US electricity distribution and transmission
firms. The derived average inefficiency values per year are reported in Table 4.2.
64 Obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
PCU221122221122.
65 Obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm.
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Table 4.2: Average Dynamic and Static Inefficiency Scores
Year TIE Dynamic CIE Dynamic AIE dynamic TIE/CIE static
2004 0.29 0.44 0.15 0.42
2005 0.29 0.37 0.08 0.42
2006 0.26 0.36 0.10 0.41
2007 0.28 0.38 0.10 0.43
2008 0.26 0.39 0.13 0.33
2009 0.29 0.37 0.08 0.41
2010 0.25 0.33 0.08 0.45
2011 0.19 0.30 0.11 0.36
Mean 0.26 0.37 0.10 0.40
The average dynamic technical inefficiency (TIE) of our sample firms ranges between 19%
and 29% for the years considered. On average, industrial dynamic technical inefficiency
amounts to 26%, indicating that there is substantial potential for the industry to move
towards the dynamic technical efficiency frontier by simultaneously contracting variable
input usage and expanding gross investments.
We compare and contrast our dynamic technical inefficiency estimates with their static
counterparts to assess the impact of considering changes in the quasi-fixed inputs in the
benchmarking process. For this purpose, static technical inefficiency is computed for our
sample firms by applying DEA to a restricted version of the linear program stated in
Equation (4.7). In this specification, the investment (iv) and capital (ii) constraints are
ignored and the directional vector is set to g = (x, 0). Thus, the efficient static frontier
can be achieved by exclusively contracting variable input usage, disregarding changes in
the quasi-fixed input. The resulting static benchmarking model is in line with regulatory
practice, where the focus frequently lies on benchmarking operational costs.
The average static technical inefficiency values per year are also reported in Table 4.2.
The average technical inefficiency of our sample firms is higher when applying the static
measure compared to the dynamic approach. This finding is not surprising as the dy-
namic approach to technical inefficiency allows for an additional dimension in the bench-
marking process (namely the expansion of gross investments) besides the contraction of
variable inputs. On average, dynamic technical inefficiency is around 14 percentage
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points below the static technical inefficiency. This finding emphasizes that the assess-
ment of the industrial technical inefficiency is significantly altered when adjustments of
quasi-fixed inputs via investments are accounted for. The differences in the distribu-
tion of technical inefficiency scores between the static and the dynamic approach are
illustrated in Figure 4.4 using kernel density estimates. Clearly, the mean of the dy-
namic technical inefficiency distribution is smaller than the corresponding static value.
Moreover, applying the dynamic measure results in a larger number of fully technically
efficient observations, while the number of observations with very high dynamic technical
inefficiency scores is rather low.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Dynamic and Static Technical Inefficiency
Note: Kernel density estimate based on an Epanechnikov kernel.
For the assessment of dynamic cost and allocative inefficiencies, we first approximate the
firm-specific long-run cost savings induced by a marginal increase in the capital stock by
estimating a quadratic dynamic cost function. Differentiating this function with respect
to the capital stock yields firm-specific shadow values of capital.66 Subsequently, in a
second step, these values are incorporated into the dynamic DEA model, as described
in Equation (4.10). We rely on this sequential approach in order to circumvent the
numerical problems present in a simultaneous determination of optimal firm-specific
66A detailed description of the parametric approximation of the firm-specific shadow values of capital
is provided in the Appendix.
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input quantities and firm-specific shadow values of capital. In addition, the sequential
parametric approach avoids imposing the unrealistic assumption of dynamic allocative
efficiency that is inherent in an alternative sequential nonparametric approach. The
median of the estimated shadow values of capital is about −0.21, suggesting that one
additional monetary unit of capital leads to long-run cost savings of about 0.21 monetary
units on average.
We find that the dynamic cost inefficiency (CIE) of our sample firms is considerably
large, with an average dynamic cost inefficiency of 37% (see Table 4.2).67 This finding
indicates notable potential for savings in long-run costs for the US electricity distribution
and transmission industry. The significant level of allocative inefficiency (AIE) in most
of the sample years suggests that firms may face problems when choosing the mixture
of variable and quasi-fixed inputs given the respective input prices. This means that
their trade-off between variable input contraction and capital stock expansion is not in
line with the ratio of the variable input price and the shadow value of capital, i.e., the
economic benefits of both choices.
Comparing dynamic and static cost inefficiency in our empirical application is compli-
cated by the fact that the dynamic cost inefficiency incorporates allocative inefficiency,
while the static cost inefficiency does not.68 The application of the dynamic cost in-
efficiency measure yields an average cost inefficiency that is 3 percentage points lower
compared to the static measure. In particular, more observations are deemed to be fully
cost-efficient when the dynamic input and the shadow value of capital are controlled for.
Thus, considering adjustment costs and long-run cost savings induced by investments
does affect the outcome of cost inefficiency measurement, although the effect is not very
pronounced in our application. With regard to benchmarking carried out in regulatory
practice, this suggests that X-factors derived from static benchmarking models may
deviate from long-run cost minimization targets of the firms under regulation.
67 For a limited number of observations, we find dynamic cost inefficiency values greater than one. This
is the case when actual and optimal investments show a huge difference. Considering these observations
as extreme cases, we denote them as outliers and do not include them in our further analysis.
68 Since we use only one variable input measured in monetary terms (OPEX) in our empirical appli-
cation, the obtained results on the static technical inefficiency can also be interpreted as a static cost
inefficiency measure, i.e., inefficiency due to over-usage in cost.
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The methodological choice of applying either static or dynamic inefficiency measures is
expected to most severely affect firms with large investments due to the fact that these
firms may face high adjustment costs through changes in the capital stock. Thus, we find
it promising to analyze the inefficiency scores obtained from static and dynamic measures
for firms with different investment activity. For this purpose, we sort our observations
according to their investment shares, defined as the ratio of gross investments and capital
stock, and compare the static and dynamic inefficiency scores of different percentiles.
The average inefficiency scores for the percentiles considered are reported in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Average Dynamic and Static Inefficiency Scores for Investment Ratio Per-
centiles
Cumulative Percentile
of Investment Ratio
Observations
TIE
Dynamic
CIE
Dynamic
AIE
Dynamic
TIE/CIE
Static
Total Sample 464 0.26 0.37 0.11 0.40
5 441 0.25 0.36 0.11 0.40
25 348 0.22 0.33 0.11 0.39
50 232 0.21 0.33 0.12 0.41
75 116 0.17 0.28 0.11 0.44
95 24 0.07 0.20 0.13 0.44
The comparison reveals that firms with high investment ratios suffer heavily when in-
vestments are neglected in the assessment of inefficiency. While the static inefficiency
values differ only slightly among the different percentiles, the dynamic technical and
dynamic cost inefficiency values show significant variation. For instance, dynamic aver-
age technical inefficiency of the upper investment ratio quartile is 27 percentage points
lower than its static counterpart. For the case of the upper fifth percentile, the differ-
ence in technical inefficiency between the dynamic and static measure even increases to
37 percentage points. In contrast, firms with small investment shares are less exposed
to the choice of the technical inefficiency measure. With regard to cost inefficiency, a
similar pattern arises. For the case of the upper fifth percentile, the difference in cost
inefficiency between the dynamic and static measure amounts to 24 percentage points,
while for the total sample the difference is only 3 percentage points.
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4.7 Conclusion
The objective of this study was to investigate the impact of using static versus dynamic
inefficiency measures in the context of benchmarking used for incentive-based regula-
tion schemes. We therefore applied the concept of dynamic inefficiency developed by
Silva and Oude Lansink (2009) and Oude Lansink and Silva (2013) to a sample of US
electricity distribution and transmission firms in order to obtain dynamic technical and
dynamic cost inefficiency estimates using dynamic DEA. We then compared our dynamic
inefficiency estimates with their static counterparts.
Most importantly, our empirical results reveal that the consideration of investments and
the corresponding adjustment costs significantly affect the outcome of benchmarking
exercises, both in terms of technical and cost inefficiency. In specific, firms with large
investments are extremely vulnerable to the choice of the inefficiency measure underlying
the benchmarking process and suffer from X-factors that are too strict when static
benchmarking models are applied by the regulator. As a result, firms subject to X-
factors derived from static benchmarking models may have incentives to deviate from
the long-run cost minimization by cutting investments.
This finding emphasizes that the application of dynamic inefficiency measures in the
context of incentive-based regulation may be beneficial. Dynamic inefficiency measures
have the advantage that they are consistent with the multi-period optimization of firms
and explicitly address adjustment costs from changes in quasi-fixed inputs. Thus, X-
factors derived from dynamic benchmarking models can resolve the mismatch between
benchmarking methods used in regulation and the optimization of firms with regard
to the time horizon of decision making. Moreover, the dynamic approach allows for a
comparison of the optimal and the actual mix of static and dynamic factor usage via
estimating dynamic allocative inefficiency. This enables the regulator to shift incentives
in the regulatory design towards the desired direction.
In addition, our empirical findings point towards a significant potential for long-run cost
savings for the US electricity distribution and transmission industry. The computation
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of the dynamic directional distance function reveals an average dynamic technical inef-
ficiency of 26%, while average dynamic cost inefficiency amounts to 37%. The rather
high level of dynamic inefficiency may be attributed to a lack of efficient regulation
within the industry considered. For instance, incentive-based regulation of electricity
transmission and distribution firms is not in place in many states in the US (Kwoka,
2009). However, when interpreting the results of our inefficiency measures, one should
keep in mind that our sample firms are rather heterogeneous. We therefore recommend
a cautious interpretation of the inefficiency scores obtained.
Our study has generated various insights into the application of static and dynamic mea-
sures of inefficiency and the implicit consequences on derived X-factors in incentive-based
regulatory schemes. Nevertheless, different extensions of our research seem promising,
such as the application of dynamic inefficiency measurement to other industries in which
the role of adjustment costs is expected to be different. Another interesting opportunity
for further research would be to apply the static and dynamic methods to a more ho-
mogeneous sample and to draw concrete conclusions with regard to the financial effects
for the firms under incentive-based regulation schemes.
Chapter 5
The Costs of Power Interruptions
in Germany - a Regional and
Sectoral Analysis
5.1 Introduction
The availability of cheap and reliable electricity supply is a key element of economic
competitiveness and prosperity. At first glance, affordability and reliability of electricity
supply may appear to be a trade-off. However, the economic costs of electricity supply
go beyond the electricity sector and include the risk of insufficient electricity supply
for society and the resulting welfare losses in the case of blackouts. This risk can be
separated into two aspects: technical and economical. The technical aspect can be
described as the technical probability of a service interruption. The economic aspect
relates to the economic damage a customer has to take in the case of interruption.
This damage is equivalent to the opportunity costs of alternative (economic) activity or
the Value of Lost Load (VoLL). In this paper, we estimate the costs of potential power
interruptions based on the VoLL in Germany. Given Germany’s regionally heterogeneous
population, industry structure and demand patterns, we place special focus on regional
economic vulnerability imposed by potential power interruptions. Therefore, we estimate
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the costs of potential power interruptions for different German regions and sectors. This
approach allows us to assess the economic risk of potential power interruptions on a very
disaggregated regional and sectoral level.
Methodologically speaking, three different approaches have been applied in previous re-
search to derive the economic costs of power interruptions. First, some studies draw
upon historical blackouts to infer outage costs from available data (see, e.g., Corwin
and Miles, 1978, Serra and Fierro, 1997). The advantage of such case studies is that
real, as opposed to hypothetical, interruptions are examined. However, as each inter-
ruption is specific in terms of place, time and duration, case studies suffer from a lack
of generalization (Linares and Rey, 2013). Second, surveys are often used to investigate
the willingness to pay for avoiding an interruption among different groups of customers
(see, e.g., Balducci et al., 2002, LaCommare and Eto, 2006). While the obvious advan-
tage of this methodology is the independence from actual power outages (which are rare
in developed countries), a clear shortfall is that surveys rely on subjective rather than
objective measures. Consumers may both under- or overstate their willingness to pay
either due to a lack of information or as a result of strategic response behavior. More-
over, surveys are exceptionally time and cost intensive. The third methodology used
to obtain estimates of welfare losses caused by interruptions in electricity supply is the
macroeconomic approach. Within this framework, electricity is interpreted as an input
factor both for firms and for private households. The approach seeks to derive economic
costs of electricity outages from the loss in output generated by these two groups.
As the macroeconomic approach relies on publicly available data, it represents a more
feasible approach than studies based on historical outages. However, the benefits of the
macroeconomic methodology also come at a cost since the approach only captures losses
in output while disregarding instantaneous damages caused by the supply interruption.
Another critical aspect of the macroeconomic approach is the implied assumption of
linearity among electricity input and generated output. An immediate consequence of
this supposition is that the relation between outage duration and interruption costs is
also characterized by linearity. This may be considered a shortfall, as any adjustment
by electricity customers to outages is neglected.
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Overall, each methodology has its own assets and drawbacks. As historical outages
are rare and comprehensive survey data is not available for Germany, we rely on the
macroeconomic approach. Using a rich data set on industry and households, we first
estimate regional- and sector-specific VoLLs, defined as the loss in output resulting from
failing to supply one unit of electricity and measured in Euro per kilowatt hour (e/kWh).
We then multiply these VoLLs with hourly regional and/or sectoral demand (in KW) to
obtain hourly costs of power interruption. Furthermore, we choose four typical hours,
each representing a distinctive load structure, and compute the national and regional
outage costs for the case in which one GWh is not supplied. Notwithstanding the
aforementioned shortcomings of the macroeconomic approach, this process allows us
to derive at least a rough estimate of the regional and sectoral distribution of power
interruption costs in Germany. In addition, in order to account for the uncertainties in
the assumptions that have to be made, e.g., on the degree of electricity dependence of
residential leisure time, we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 discusses previous
research. Section 5.3 presents the methodological approach. Results from the empirical
analysis are discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Previous research
Several studies have relied on the macroeconomic approach to determine the economic
value of a secure electricity supply. Bliem (2005) investigates the economic costs of
power interruptions for Austria. He derives VoLLs for both households and economic
sectors based on electricity-dependent leisure activities and sector-specific gross value
added. Beyond the sectoral disaggregation, the research also accounts for demographic
and economic structures of various regions through the derivation of regional VoLL
figures. Overall, Bliem concludes that the outage costs within the residential sector and
the aggregated outage costs within the economic sectors have comparable magnitude.
On a national average, the VoLL amounts to 8.60e/kWh.
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De Nooij et al. (2007) analyze the economic value of supply security in the Netherlands.
They calculate sectoral VoLLs accounting for day-of-the-week effects and construct es-
timates of aggregated hourly outage costs. On a national average, they estimate the
economic cost of one kWh electricity not supplied to be 8.56e. In an extension of this
work, de Nooij et al. (2009) advocate the superiority of rational rationing, i.e., cur-
tailing regions with low VoLLs first, to minimize the social costs per unit of electricity
not supplied, compared to a random selection of curtailed regions in case of an out-
age. Following a similar approach, Leahy and Tol (2011) investigate the value of secure
electricity supply in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. They estimate the
economic costs of a one-hour blackout with respect to different times of day, days of the
weeks and groups of customers. Their findings reveal that the residential sector exhibits
the greatest VoLL across all sectors in both countries. Linares and Rey (2013) explore
national as well as regional outage costs in Spain. Their study stresses both the regional
and sectoral heterogeneity of power interruption costs. On an aggregated level, they es-
timate the average VoLL for Spain to be 6.35e/kWh. Moreover, the authors argue that
electricity market regulation in Spain does not provide appropriate incentives to prevent
electrical power outages. Thus, they conclude that the Spanish level of electricity system
reliability is not optimal from a welfare point of view.
In the context of Germany’s nuclear phase out, Praktiknjo et al. (2011) estimate the
economic value of supply security within Germany for the residential sector. The authors
rely on numerical simulation and are therefore able to account for uncertainty regarding
consumer preferences, marginal wages and time use. The result of their Monte Carlo
approach yields a right-skewed distribution of residential VoLL estimates, with average
economic costs of 15.70e/kWh electricity that is not supplied to the customer. Moreover,
they investigate the additional economic costs that would arise if the German System
Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) was increased to the European average.
Praktiknjo et al. (2011) conclude that such a decrease in the level of service reliability
in Germany would cause significant economic costs.
However, previous research on outage costs in Germany has neglected the investigation
on a disaggregated sectoral level as well as the combined effects of regional and sectoral
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effects. Our paper contributes to the existing literature by identifying sectoral as well
as regional VoLLs and outage costs, thereby giving insight into the regional- and sector-
specific economic value of a reliable electricity system.
5.3 Methodological Approach
In the case of firms, we measure the economic costs in the event of power interruptions
by the loss in gross value added. Dividing the gross value added by the electricity
consumption yields the VoLL, representing a measure of economic output generated by
inputting one unit of electricity. Another way to look at the VoLL is to interpret it as
the loss in output and hence the economic costs caused by one unit of electricity not
supplied. The macroeconomic approach assumes that the value adding process of firms
fully depends on electricity consumption. As noted by de Nooij et al. (2007, 2009), this
linearity assumption may lead to an overestimation of the outage costs. On the other
hand, as costs from losses in goods and materials or restarting costs are not included, an
underestimation may also occur. Therefore, our estimated outage costs should be seen
rather as a rough estimate than as an absolute exact figure.
Just as the role of electricity in production processes varies significantly across economic
sectors, the same holds true for the VoLL. Hence, the accuracy of estimates regarding
economic costs of power interruptions crucially depends on the extent of sector-specific
granularity. Following this argumentation, we investigate power interruption costs on
a disaggregated sectoral level and calculate VoLLs and time-varying outage costs for a
number of economic sectors. Beyond the sector-specific differences, power interruption
costs may also depend on the regional economic structure as well as the technologies
that are regionally available. Therefore, we additionally differentiate between federal
states in our calculations, allowing the obtained VoLL estimates to be more credible
since we account for both regional and sectoral heterogeneity. Consequently, the VoLL
of sector s in federal state f is
V oLLs,f =
GV As,f
ECs,f
, (5.1)
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where GV As,f and ECs,f are the (annual) gross value added and the (annual) electricity
consumption of sector s in federal state f , respectively. The VoLL, as calculated in
Equation (5.1), is by construction a static value as it normalizes the annual output to
the use of one unit of electricity. However, the gross value added by firms is unarguably
not equally distributed throughout time. Thus, outage costs differ with respect to the
moment at which the interruption occurs. Moreover, actual economic interruption costs
are also determined by the absolute amount of power not supplied. Therefore, for
an absolute and time-varying estimate of outage costs, the static VoLL (measured in
e/kWh) is not sufficient. In fact, the static VoLL of an economic sector s within a
federal state f has to be multiplied by its power consumption ECs,f,t in hour t to yield
a proper estimate of time-varying costs. The time-varying outage costs within sector s
in federal state f at a specific hour t are
OCs,f,t =
GV As,f
ECs,f
× ECs,f,t = GV As,f × lfs,t. (5.2)
In other words, the hourly outage costs represent the respective VoLL multiplied by
current power consumption. This is equivalent to the annual output scaled by the
hourly load factor lfs,t. The load factor represents the share of electricity consumption
in a respective hour in overall annual electricity consumption. It can be obtained from
an appropriate standard commercial load profile, which is a representative mapping of
electrical load over time.69
For the derivation of electrical power outage costs within the residential sector, it is
important to consider the kind of output generated by households. People gain util-
ity from leisure activities. However, the relationship between availability of electricity
and leisure activities is not straightforward. While some leisure activities directly or
indirectly depend on electricity, e.g., watching television, others do not, e.g., reading in
times of daylight. This reasoning suggests that the correlation of leisure-induced welfare
and electricity consumption may neither be zero nor one, but rather in the range be-
tween these two values. Since substitutability between electricity-based leisure activities
and non-electricity-based leisure activities is likely to exist, we follow the approach as
69 The assignment of load profiles to the different commercial sectors is discussed in Section 5.4.2.
Chapter 5. The Costs of Power Interruptions in Germany 104
advocated by Bliem (2005) and assume a coefficient of electricity dependency equal to
0.5. In other words, power outages reduce the amount of welfare households gain from
leisure activities by 50%.70
In order to determine the amount of time households dedicate to leisure activities, we
take advantage of labor market data and available information regarding the time al-
located by households to different activities. Computing the annual amount of leisure
across all households and multiplying by the factor of substitutability yields the time
spent for electricity-based leisure activity. However, an economic value has yet to be
assigned to leisure. The work of Becker (1965) provides an economic framework to de-
rive a monetary value for leisure time. In his model, Becker argues that households
gain utility from the consumption of goods and from leisure activities. The money for
consumption is earned by working. Furthermore, since the marginal utility of both con-
sumption and leisure activities decreases with each additional unit, there is an optimal
amount of working and non-working hours. Within this equilibrium, the household is
indifferent between an additional hour of work and an additional hour of leisure. That
is, the value of an additional hour of leisure is equal to the income from an additional
hour of work.71
However, Becker’s approach may not apply to people that are not employed, i.e., un-
employed, children, pensioners, sick or disabled persons, as their opportunity costs of
leisure are no longer equal to the hourly income. Since leisure time, in this case, is
less scarce than for employed people, valuing leisure by the hourly income may be an
overestimation. On the other hand, leisure time is still valuable. In order to capture the
different opportunity costs of leisure for employed and non-employed people, we assume
that an hour of leisure is worth half the hourly income to the group of non-employed.
This approach is in line with the methodology proposed by de Nooij et al. (2007, 2009)
and followed by Linares and Rey (2013). Once the economic value of leisure is ob-
tained, the VoLL of the residential sector can be calculated as the ratio of this value
70 In Section 5.4.4, we compute sensitivities on this and other parameters as household parameters
are most likely prone to uncertainty.
71 However, one has to keep in mind that this equilibrium holds only in a fully flexible labor market,
while frictions in this market may yield deviations from this optimum. Moreover, since data on marginal
wages is not available, we refer to average wages in the empirical part of the paper.
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and the electricity consumption. Since hourly wages and average working hours vary
significantly among federal states in Germany, the opportunity costs of leisure as well as
the amount of time that is available for leisure activities are expected to be regionally
heterogeneous. Hence, we specify the residential VoLL-calculations not on a nationally
aggregated level, but rather on a state-specific level, explicitly accounting for regional
labor market conditions.
The VoLL of the residential sector r in federal state f can be stated as
V oLLr,f =
V Lr,f
ECr,f
, (5.3)
where V Lr,f is the federal state’s (annual) economic value of leisure and ECr,f is the
federal state’s (annual) residential electricity consumption. Consequently, the time-
varying outage costs can be expressed as
OCr,f,t =
V Lr,f
ECr,f
× ECr,f,t = V Lr,f × lfr,t, (5.4)
where lfr,t denotes the load factor in hour t.
5.4 Empirical results
5.4.1 Value of Lost Load
The estimated VoLLs, i.e., the losses in output caused by one unit of electricity not sup-
plied, are presented in Table 5.1. The values are sectorally and regionally disaggregated
into 15 economic sectors and one residential sector and 16 federal states of Germany.
To calculate values, we collect data on electricity consumption from the energy balances
for both Germany entirely and each state individually. In a limited number of cases,
missing values are replaced by values from Eurostat’s energy statistics.72 The data on
gross value added is drawn from the regional economic accounts of the federal states
72 The accounting policies for the energy balances of the federal states are defined by the
La¨nderarbeitskreis Energiebilanzen in close cooperation with the Arbeitskreis Energiebilazen e.V., which
is responsible for the preparation of the overall energy balance of Germany.
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provided by the Statistical Office of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (2011). The reference year is
2007. A detailed overview on the utilized electricity consumption and gross value added
data is provided in the Appendix.
The gaps shown in Table 5.1 result from missing data on electricity consumption and/or
gross value added for some sectors in some states. For four states, namely Berlin (BE),
Brandenburg (BB), Saxony (SN), and Thuringia (TH), data for the manufacturing sector
was only available on an aggregate level. However, as none of these states are character-
ized by an exceptionally large or highly industrialized manufacturing sector, we consider
any bias that may be included in the aggregated manufacturing VoLL of these states as
negligible. Furthermore, for the agriculture and fishing as well as the construction and
services sectors, disaggregated data on electricity consumption was only available on
the federal level (D). However, the technological heterogeneity across regions for these
sectors can be assumed to be rather low. Hence, we do not consider the lack of regional
disaggregated VoLLs for these sectors as a problem. In fact, in order to include these
sectors in our regional outage cost calculations, we use the sectors’ federal VoLLs and
the sectors’ regional disaggregated data on gross value added to calculate the sectors’
regional disaggregated electricity consumption. By doing so, we are able to calculate
regional outage costs that, in terms of gross value added, account for at least 90% of all
economic sectors in the federal states.73
The data on electricity consumption for the household sector is taken from the same
sources as for the economic sectors. To calculate the value of leisure V Lr,f , we use data
on the labor market provided by the regional economic accounts of the federal states
and Eurostat, as well as time use data provided by the Federal Statistical Office of
Germany. The labor market data includes information on employed and unemployed
persons, number of actual hours worked per employee per year and labor costs per hour
on the regional level. A detailed overview on this data is provided in the Appendix. The
time use data of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany indicates that the average
German person spends around 11 hours per day on personal care such as sleeping,
eating, washing and dressing (Destatis, 2003).
73 As can be seen the Appendix, the data on gross valued added accounts for 90% of all economic
sectors in Rhineland-Palatinate (RP). For all other federal states, a higher percentage is given.
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The first step in determining our value of leisure requires the derivation of the employees’
net hourly income. Given that the employer’s average rate of social security contributions
amounts to approximately 22% of the labor costs per hour (Destatis, 2008) and that
the employees’ average rate of income tax and social security contributions amounts to
approximately 33% of the gross hourly income (OECD, 2012), we calculate a regional
net hourly income equal to around half of the respective regional labor cost per hour.74
Using the information described above, the annual value of leisure for all employed
persons in the federal state f can be calculated as
V Le,f = ((8760− 365× 11− hours workf )× net hourly incomef )
× number of employed personsf × 0.5,
(5.5)
where 0.5 reflects the assumed substitutability between electricity-based leisure and
non-electricity-based leisure as defined in Section 5.2. Similarly, assuming that the hour
of leisure for unemployed persons is worth half the net hourly income of that of the
employed (see Section 5.2), the annual value of leisure for all unemployed persons in the
federal state f is calculated as
V Lu,f = ((8760− 365× 11)× 0.5× net hourly incomef )
× number of unemployed personsf × 0.5,
(5.6)
Together, V Le,f and V Lu,f add up to the residential value of leisure in the federal state
f , V Lr,f . This value divided by the household’s electricity consumption in a given state
yields the residential VoLL in the federal state f , V oLLr,f .
As can be seen in Table 5.1, the VoLLs vary significantly between the sectors and the
federal states. First, with respect to sector level, the highest federal VoLL is observed
for the construction sector with 102.93e/kWh. This value is much higher than all other
74 Due to the lack of data on marginal wages, we rely on average wages in our empirical application.
The labor cost data used is provided in the Appendix.
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VoLLs, which results from a relatively higher gross value added than the level of elec-
tricity consumed in this sector. In other words, the construction sector is characterized
by an exceptionally low electricity intensity (kWh/e) compared to other sectors.75 At
the federal level, the construction sector accounts for approximately 4% of gross value
added but only for approximately 0.2% of total electricity consumption in all economic
sectors considered (see data provided in the Appendix).
The federal VoLLs for the service sector and for the households amount to 11.04e/kWh
and 11.92e/kWh, respectively. Both sectors are large electricity consumers and gen-
erate a large amount of output. At the federal level, the service sector accounts for
approximately 36% of total electricity consumption and generates approximately 69%
of gross value added in all economic sectors considered. In absolute numbers, electricity
consumption and value added of the households are even higher compared to those of
the service sector. Expressed in shares and taking households and all economic sectors
together, households account for approximately 27% of overall electricity consumption
and for approximately 43% of total value added (see data provided in the Appendix). In
contrast, the federal VoLLs of the agriculture and total manufacturing sectors are rela-
tively low (2.49e/kWh and 2.19e/kWh, respectively). Compared to the service sector,
the manufacturing sector consumes even more electricity – approximately 62% of total
electricity consumption in all economic sectors considered – but it creates only approxi-
mately 24% of gross value added. Finally, for the agricultural sector, both numbers are
low. At the federal level, the agricultural sector accounts for approximately 2% of total
electricity consumption in all economic sectors considered and generates approximately
1% of gross value added (see data provided in the Appendix).
Overall, our sector results are in line with the results from studies of other countries
(see, e.g., Bliem, 2005, de Nooij et al., 2007, Linares and Rey, 2013). All studies in-
dicate relatively low VoLLs for the agricultural and manufacturing sectors compared
to relatively high VoLLs for the construction, service and household sectors. On the
75 Although the result that the construction sector has the highest VoLL among all sectors is in line
with the results from other studies, the amount is rather high. For example, Bliem (2005) calculates a
value of 42.4e/kWh for Austria and Linares and Rey (2013) calculate a value of 33.37e/kWh for Spain.
In order to check whether our high VoLL for the construction sector is a result of a one-year effect in the
year 2007, we also calculated VoLLs for the construction sector in the years 2001 to 2009. In all years
considered, the VoLL remains quite stable around 100e/kWh.
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regional level, the VoLLs for the federal states indicate a large heterogeneity among
states. In particular, the city-states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen show VoLLs in some
sectors that differ significantly from the corresponding VoLLs of the other states. This
is due to the fact that in small states, one or just a couple firms with a specific VoLL
have a high sectoral impact. For example, the sector pulp, paper and print in Hamburg
consists mainly of printing and publishing firms rather than any huge pulp or paper pro-
duction plants. Since printing and publishing has significant lower electricity intensity
than pulp and paper production, Hamburg’s VoLL for this sector is much higher than
in other federal states with a different sectorial structure. Similar arguments can be
applied to other sectors such as the machinery and equipment sector and the electrical
and optical equipment sector. Overall, the heterogeneity in the regional VoLLs shows
that there exist large differences in the economic structures of the federal states and it is
therefore important to differentiate between regions in order to obtain credible estimates
of regional outage costs.
The derived VoLLs constitute a valuable framework to assess the relative economic ef-
ficiency of systematic marginal load shedding within different sectors and regions. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that, in case of a supply shortage, it is welfare-optimal to curtail
the customer with the lowest VoLL first since this minimizes the social costs caused by
the loss of one unit electricity. The potential welfare gains of such a rational rationing,
i.e., curtailing regions and sectors with low VoLL first compared to a random selection,
have been advocated by de Nooij et al. (2009). The authors use regionally disaggregated
VoLL values for the Netherlands (de Nooij et al., 2007) and find that an efficient regional
rationing can reduce social costs by 42 to 93% compared to a random rationing, i.e., a
rationing which does not take into account regional differences. However, one has to keep
in mind that rational load shedding requires technical feasibility, such as transmission
constraints, as well as social and political acceptance. The latter cannot be ignored in
particular for many public services such as hospitals. Hence, the sectoral VoLLs found
in our study could be used rather as indications of the sectors in which interruptible
electricity contracts are comparatively efficient as opposed to a strict sectoral ranking
for load shedding.
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5.4.2 Time-Varying Outage Costs
Since output generated by the sectors is not equally distributed over seasons, weeks,
and days, the outage costs vary significantly over time. Given the assumed linearity
among electricity input and generated output, we scale each sectoral output along the
standard load profile that most appropriately reflects the power consumption patterns of
the specific sector. For this purpose, we rely on the residential and commercial standard
load profiles for 2012, as specified by the German Association of Energy and Water
Industries and published by E.ON (2012).
For the residential sector, the choice of a suitable load profile is straightforward since
a standardized profile for households exists. The same holds true for the agricultural
sector.76 The identification of suitable profiles for the other economic sectors is more
challenging. For sectors that do not fit to one of the existing specific load profiles,
we choose the most general standard commercial load profile. However, if we assume
continuously producing enterprises to prevail within a certain sector, we can then assign
standard load profiles specifically designed for these kinds of firms to the respective
sector.77
Figure 5.1 displays the mean-, maximum-, and minimum-hourly total national outage
costs in eMio occurring each day throughout the year. The u-shaped curvature of av-
erage outage costs illustrates their seasonality, as the costs of interruptions are higher
during the winter compared to the summer months. Moreover, the intra-weekly fluctua-
tions are reflected in the weekly drops in average outage costs, stressing that the average
outage costs are higher on working days compared to weekends. Maximal national out-
age costs per hour amount to more than 750 eMio on a Monday in December between
1 p.m. and 2 p.m., while the lowest costs, around 168 eMio, arise on an early Sunday
morning between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. in September. On average, a nationwide one-hour
power interruption causes a welfare loss of more than 430 eMio.
76 There exist various standard load profiles for the agricultural sector, depending on the type of
agriculture. Since we do not have any detailed information on the agricultural structure in Germany,
we choose the most general standard load profile for agriculture, “L0”.
77 We assign profiles for continuously producing enterprises to the following sectors: Pulp, paper
and print, chemical and petrochemical, basis metals and fabricated metal products, machinery and
equipment and transport equipment.
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Figure 5.1: Total National Outage Costs (eMio/h)
Beyond the calculation of aggregated national outage costs, it seems promising to in-
vestigate the distribution of outage costs among the different sectors. Therefore, we
calculate hourly costs of power interruptions on a sectoral level. Table 5.2 contains min-
imum, maximum and average values of sector shares based on total hourly outage costs
as well as information on the moment when the extreme values of sector shares occur.78
Table 5.2: Time-Varying Shares of Sectoral Outage Costs
Residential Agriculture Manufacturinga
Commercial and
Public Services
Min Share 31% 0% 8% 18%
Time Sep/Sat/4 a.m. Jan/Sat/2 p.m. Jan/Sun/11 a.m. Jan/Sun/11 a.m.
Max Share 74% 2% 23% 53%
Time Dec/Sun/11 a.m. Nov/Thu/8 a.m. Jul/Sun/5 a.m. Nov/Fri/11 a.m.
Average Share 46% 1% 15% 39%
Median Share 43% 1% 14% 39%
aIncluding construction. Source: Own calculations
On average, the residential sector accounts for 46% of total hourly outage costs. The
service sector ranks second as it captures on average 39% of all hourly welfare losses
resulting from power interruptions. Aggregated hourly costs in the manufacturing sector
(including construction) represent on average 15% of total interruption costs, whereas the
78 The maximum and minimum values of the sector shares may occur several times throughout the
year. The information provided refers to the first time within the year that the respective value can
be observed. For the sake of simplicity, a brief notation is used in Table 5.2: For instance, “Sep/Sat/4
a.m.” indicates that the extreme value occurs on a Saturday in September from 4 a.m. to 5 a.m.
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welfare losses in the agricultural sector are comparatively small. However, a remarkable
feature of the national outage cost structure is that the sectoral shares based on total
outage costs vary over time: Approximately 74% of aggregate hourly outage costs can
be assigned to the residential sector on a Sunday at noon in December, whereas the
share decreases to 31% of total hourly costs during nights in September. Within the
commercial sectors, the cost share of the service sector varies between 18% and 53%.
Our finding of heavily time-dependent sectoral cost shares stresses the fact that without
knowing the exact moment of a power interruption, it cannot be known a priori which
sector bears the greatest welfare losses from the outage.
Our extensive data set allows for a more elaborate analysis of the costs arising from
an interruption in power supply within the manufacturing sector. We calculate time-
varying outage costs for a variety of manufacturing sectors using the standard load
profiles discussed above. Based on these sectoral cost estimates, we compute the sectoral
shares of total outage costs in the manufacturing sector as well as of total national
outage costs for each hour of the year. Descriptive statistics on these shares are shown
in Table 5.3. The majority of outage costs within the manufacturing sector can be
Table 5.3: Time-Varying Shares of Outage Costs in the Manufacturing Sector
Sector
Share in Manufacturing Costsa Share in Total National Costs
Average Min Max Average Min Max
Food, beverages and tobacco 6% 3% 7% 0.78% 0.37% 1.01%
Textile and leather 2% 1% 2% 0.23% 0.11% 0.32%
Wood and wood products 1% 0% 1% 0.11% 0.05% 0.12%
Pulp, paper and print 6% 4% 7% 0.82% 0.45% 1.57%
Chemical and petrochemical 9% 7% 11% 1.29% 0.71% 2.49%
Rubber and plastic 4% 2% 5% 0.57% 0.26% 0.78%
Non-metallic minerals 2% 2% 3% 0.35% 0.16% 0.47%
Basis metals and fabricated
metal products
13% 10% 16% 1.93% 1.07% 3.73%
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 16% 12% 20% 2.31% 1.28% 4.46%
Electrical and optical equipment 9% 6% 12% 1.32% 0.61% 1.80%
Transport equipment 16% 13% 21% 2.42% 1.34% 4.67%
Manufacturing n.e.c. and
recycling
1% 1% 2% 0.20% 0.09% 0.27%
Construction 16% 10% 21% 2.25% 1.04% 3.06%
aIncluding construction. Source: Own calculations
assigned to four sectors, namely transportation equipment, machinery and equipment,
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basic metals and fabricated metal products and construction. On average, these sectors
account for approximately 61% of total hourly outage costs within the manufacturing
sector. Their average cumulative share in national hourly costs is about 9%.
The outage cost estimates provided thus far assumed a total blackout on a national
level. However, since a complete breakdown of the electricity system represents an
extreme event, smaller supply shortages may be considered as more realistic in real life.
As a consequence, we focus on power outages for the case in which one GWh is not
supplied. The choice of magnitude seems appropriate as it is in line with the outage of
one large power plant that would be needed to satisfy electricity demand. In order to
assess outage costs induced by a missing GWh in electricity supply, we use the following
procedure. In a first step, we choose four typical hours that each represent a distinctive
load structure: The hour between noon and 1 p.m. on a working day (Monday) and
on the weekend (Sunday) during both winter (January) and Summer (July). We then
compute the sectoral structure of power consumption within these specific hours and
split the missing GWh proportionally between the affected sectors, ending up with the
amount of electricity not supplied to each respective sector. In the next step, the amount
of electricity not delivered to each respective sector is multiplied by its VoLL in order
to obtain the sectoral outage costs induced by a missing GWh on a national level. The
national outage costs for the case in which one GWh is not supplied are presented in
Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: National Outage Costs (One GWh Outage) in eMio
Outage
cost in
eMio/GWh
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Residential
Weekend Winter 8.98 1% 7% 20% 73%
Working Day Winter 6.65 0% 17% 50% 33%
Weekend Summer 8.23 1% 9% 27% 63%
Working Day Summer 6.68 0% 16% 49% 34%
Source: Own calculations
On average, national outage costs resulting from a missing GWh range from 6 eMio to
9 eMio. Interestingly, costs are higher on weekends compared to working days because
private households, with their comparatively high VoLL, represent a larger proportion
of the overall load. As a consequence, private households account for 63% and 73% of
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total national costs on weekends in the summer and winter, respectively. In contrast,
their share in total costs decreases to around 33% on working days. On working days,
the service sector is most affected by the GWh not supplied, with costs of around 3.3
eMio.
In addition to the presented sectoral heterogeneity, outage costs may also vary signif-
icantly across regions. Hence, a more regional, disaggregated analysis on the federal
state level is provided in the following section.
5.4.3 Regional Focus on Outage Costs
Descriptive statistics on the time-varying pattern of total hourly outage costs on the
federal state level are provided in Table 5.5. The numbers are calculated using the
detailed regional data described in Section 5.4.1 and according to the method from
Section 5.4.2. Again, we find significant seasonal, intra-weekly, as well as intra-daily
patterns of fluctuations in interruption costs.79
Overall, the descriptives emphasize the dominance of North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria
and Baden-Wu¨rttemberg on national outage costs as their average cumulative share in
national outage costs amounts to around 55% (equal to around 238 eMio per hour).
The eastern part of Germany and the federal state Saarland exhibit significantly lower
costs from power interruptions. The regional distribution of outage costs reflects the
relative economic strength and the population size of the aforementioned regions.
In line with our approach in Section 5.4.2, we also calculate the outage costs induced by
failing to supply one GWh on the regional level. The results are presented in Table 5.6.
First, the numbers emphasize that in federal states with relatively high electricity con-
sumption, a one GWh outage represents a relatively minor incident. For example, in
North Rhine-Westphalia, the loss of one GWh results on average in around 7 eMio
outage costs. This is less than 10% of the average costs of a total one hour breakdown
(see Table 5.5). In contrast, since electricity consumption in one hour in Bremen is on
average lower than one GWh, the calculated outage costs for one GWh not supplied in
79 The time-varying structure of regional outage costs are qualitatively similar to the structure of
national outage costs analyzed in Section 5.4.2.
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics on Regional Outage Costs (eMio/h)
Federal State Mean Median Min Max
Standard
Deviation
BW 64.8 66.0 26.3 111.1 23.7
BV 74.8 75.5 29.3 129.5 28.2
BE 15.8 16.2 5.6 28.2 6.3
BB 9.1 9.4 3.2 16.2 3.6
HB 4.3 4.3 1.7 7.5 1.7
HH 13.5 13.1 5.1 23.5 5.3
HE 39.0 39.3 14.9 68.0 15.0
MV 6.6 6.6 2.4 11.5 2.6
NI 38.1 39.0 14.6 66.3 14.4
NW 98.3 100.2 38.3 170.8 37.0
RP 19.4 20.1 7.3 34.1 7.4
SL 5.6 5.7 2.2 9.5 2.0
SN 15.0 15.3 5.3 26.6 5.9
ST 9.5 9.7 3.6 16.6 3.6
SH 13.2 13.5 5.0 23.2 5.1
TH 7.8 8.0 2.8 13.8 3.1
a The state codes are the same as in Table 5.1. Source: Own calculations
Bremen are on average even higher than the calculated outage cost for a one hour total
breakdown in Bremen. The same applies to the federal states Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
and Saarland. Not surprisingly, as private households represent a large proportion of
the overall load, the highest costs for one missing GWh are observed for states with
the highest VoLL values for the residential sector, namely Berlin, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
and Hesse. Nevertheless, the seasonal and daily patterns also show that the absolute
numbers vary significantly depending on the time of the interruption.
5.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Residential Sector
Several parameters that are relevant for the computation of residential outage costs are
subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Therefore, we conduct sensitivity analyses for
this sector by systematically varying the input parameters described in Section 5.3 and
Section 5.4.1. We thus create a robust range for the outage costs of private households,
explicitly accounting for the main uncertainties induced in the computation of residential
outage costs. The sensitivity analysis is carried out subject to the following parameters:
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Table 5.6: Regional Outage Costs (One GWh Outage) in eMio
Federal state Mean
Weekend
winter
Working day
winter
Weekend
summer
Working day
summer
BW 9.05 10.78 7.78 9.82 7.82
BV 8.89 10.43 7.76 9.58 7.80
BE 12.68 14.50 11.30 13.57 11.34
BB 6.87 8.53 5.66 7.59 5.69
HB 8.07 9.29 7.19 8.60 7.21
HH 8.86 9.82 8.15 9.29 8.17
HE 9.97 11.63 8.75 10.72 8.78
MV 8.98 10.06 8.17 9.47 8.21
NI 6.96 8.55 5.81 7.66 5.84
NW 6.92 8.70 5.64 7.67 5.67
RP 8.18 9.53 7.17 8.82 7.20
SL 6.99 8.76 5.72 7.74 5.75
SN 7.73 9.31 6.57 8.43 6.61
ST 5.69 7.16 4.62 6.31 4.65
SH 8.46 9.11 7.96 8.78 7.98
TH 6.43 7.47 5.66 6.91 5.68
a The state codes are the same as in Table 5.1. Source: Own calculations
• The substitutability between electricity-based leisure activities and leisure activ-
ities independent from the availability of electricity (i.e., the degree of electricity
dependence of residential leisure time).
• The valuation of leisure time for non-employed persons.
The impact of the parameter variations on average residential outage costs and average
total outage costs is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Increasing the dependency parameter
from 0.5 (the standard assumption) to 0.75 (0.95) implies a rise in the monetary value
of electricity-based leisure time and thus a higher VoLL of the residential sector. As a
consequence, the level of interruption costs for this sector is shifted upwards, while the
seasonal and intraday patterns of outage costs remain unaffected. Assuming a depen-
dency parameter of 0.75 (0.95), average outage costs of the residential sector amount
to 302 eMio/h (382 eMio/h) compared to 201 eMio/h in the standard setting. In
contrast, a reduction of the electricity dependency of leisure activities, reflected in a co-
efficient of 0.25 (0.05), induces a drop in average residential outage costs to 101 eMio/h
(20 eMio/h). Since the average outage costs in the other sectors are not affected by
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the parameter variation, average total outage costs increase (decrease) accordingly with
increasing (decreasing) electricity dependency of leisure.
An increase in the dependency parameter to 0.75 (0.95) implies a rise in the residential
share in total outage costs to 56% (62%) compared to 46% in the Reference Scenario.
Thus, our findings can be regarded as quite robust with regard to a moderate increase in
the dependency parameter, whereas a more extreme increase in this parameter signifi-
cantly alters our results. In contrast, a moderate decrease in the dependency parameter
to 0.25 causes a significant drop in the residential share in total outage costs to 30%
and the extreme scenario, i.e., a dependency parameter of 0.05, yields a share of only
8%. We therefore conclude that our findings are fairly robust with regard to increases
in the dependency parameter while moderate decreases in this parameter have a signif-
icant impact on our empirical results. However, keeping in mind the extensive usage of
electricity-based technology in private households, we regard a decrease in the depen-
dency parameter to 0.25 as a rather extreme and hence unlikely scenario.
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Figure 5.2: Average Residential Outage Costs (eMio/h)
We observe a similar impact on residential outage costs when the valuation of leisure
time for non-employed people is varied. Again, only the level of outage costs is shifted
while the characteristic patterns remain the same. Increasing the valuation of leisure
time for non-employed persons from 50% (the standard assumption) to 75% (95%) of the
average net wage of employed persons leads to a higher monetary value assigned to the
leisure time of private households (see Equation 5.6). Thus, the residential VoLL rises
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(see Equation 5.3), resulting in higher outage costs throughout the year (see Equation
5.4) and average hourly outage costs of 247 eMio/h (283 eMio/h). A decrease in the
valuation of leisure time for non-employed people to 25% (5%) of the average net wage
has the opposite effect on the residential VoLL and the outage costs of this sector. The
average hourly outage costs amount to 156 eMio/h (119 eMio/h). Again, average
outage costs in the other sectors are not affected by the parameter variation and hence
average total outage costs increase (decrease) accordingly with increasing (decreasing)
valuation of leisure time for non-employed persons. Analyzing the share of average
residential outage costs in total average outage costs, we see that our results are rather
robust to moderate variations in the valuation parameter as the share varies only between
40% and 51% for a valuation parameter of 0.25 and 0.75, respectively. A more extreme
variation in the valuation parameter, in turn, has a more pronounced effect on our
results. Assuming a valuation parameter of 0.05 (0.95) leads to a residential share in
total outage costs of 34% (55%). Overall, we conclude from the sensitivity analysis
that the assumptions made on electricity dependency are of higher relevance for the
computation of residential outage costs than the assumptions made with regard to leisure
time valuation of non-employed persons.
The impact of the parameter variations on average total outage costs in the case of a one
GWh outage is illustrated in Table 5.7. Increasing the electricity dependency of leisure,
as discussed above, leads to a higher VoLL in the residential sector and thus to higher
outage costs in this sector given a one GWh outage. In addition, with outage costs
in the other sectors remaining constant along the parameter variation, the residential
sector’s share in average total outage costs increases. The share increases from 54% in
the reference to 64% (69%) for a dependency parameter of 0.75 (0.95). Average total
outage costs increase from 7.63 eMio to 9.68 eMio (11.33 eMio). Decreasing the
electricity dependency reduces total average outage costs and the share of residential
outage costs in total average outage costs. Total average outage costs decrease to 5.57
eMio (3.93 eMio) in the case of a dependency parameter of 0.25 (0.05). The residential
sector’s share in average total outage costs in the case of a one GWh outage decreases
to 37% (10%).
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Table 5.7: Sensitivity Analysis: National Outage Costs (One GWh Outage) in eMio
Average
outage costs
of four type
days
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Residential
Reference 7.63 1% 12% 34% 54%
Leisure Time 5% 5.96 1% 15% 44% 41%
Leisure Time 25% 6.70 1% 13% 39% 47%
Leisure Time 75% 8.56 0% 10% 30% 59%
Leisure Time 95% 9.30 0% 10% 28% 62%
Dependency 5% 3.93 1% 23% 66% 10%
Dependency 25% 5.57 1% 16% 47% 37%
Dependency 75% 9.68 0% 9% 27% 64%
Dependency 95% 11.33 0% 8% 23% 69%
Source: Own calculations
Similar effects can be observed when the valuation of leisure time for non-employed
people is varied. Increasing the value of leisure time leads to a higher VoLL and hence
to higher outage costs for the residential sector in the case of a one GWh outage. This
in turn leads to higher average total outage costs and, as the other sectors are not
affected by the parameter variation, to a higher share of residential outage costs in total
outage costs. An increase in the parameter to 75% (95%) leads to a share of residential
outage costs in total outage costs equal to 59% (62%) and average total outage costs
of 8.56 eMio (9.30 eMio). In contrast, decreasing the value of leisure time leads to
lower average total outage costs in the case of a one GWh outage and a lower share of
residential outage costs in total outage costs. A reduction in the valuation parameter
to 25% (5%) leads to a residential share of 47% (41%) in total outage costs and average
total outage costs of 6.70 eMio (5.96 eMio).
5.5 Conclusions
In this study, we quantified the economic costs of power interruptions in Germany.
Drawing upon a macroeconomic approach, we derived the VoLLs and outage costs in
different German regions and sectors, accounting for regionally heterogeneous economic
structures and federal state-specific labor market conditions.
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On a national level, our empirical findings reveal average total German outage costs of
around 430 eMio per hour, peaking at 750 eMio per hour on a Monday in December
between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. A missing gigawatt hour creates average outage costs of
about 7.6 eMio. On average, national outage costs are approximately equally split
across commercial and residential electricity customers, although the sectoral shares in
total costs vary significantly over time. Sensitivity analyses for the VoLL and the outage
costs of residential customers generally support our findings. However, the sensitivity
analyses show that both VoLL and outage costs for Germany heavily depend on the
assumptions made on the way in which residential consumers use electricity in their
leisure time. Concerning the regional heterogeneity of outage costs within Germany, we
find that southern and western Germany face high welfare losses if these regions are
subject to a one hour interruption in electricity supply. If, however, electricity supply is
decreased by just one GWh, Berlin will suffer the highest losses of around 12.86 eMio
on average.
Our empirical results shed light on the economic efficiency of different approaches in
dealing with electricity supply shortages. Economic theory suggests that load shedding,
if necessary, should be applied to customers who suffer the lowest economic cost from
one unit of electricity not supplied. Thus, our estimates of disaggregated VoLLs can
be used to assess the economic efficiency of curtailing customers within different sec-
tors and regions. However, a pure economic rationing would be socially or politically
unacceptable. Nevertheless, our estimations can serve as a starting point to optimize
load shedding. After an evaluation of the first best solution from a social preferences
perspective, a system operator could shed load in a second best optimum. Although the
practical feasibility of such a concept should be considered carefully due to social and
political as well as technical restrictions, our findings of strictly heterogeneous VoLLs
across different sectors and regions provide an idea about how large the potential welfare
gains of an efficient power curtailment may be compared to the benchmark of random
load shedding.
The investigation of regional outage risks from a more technical perspective could be
a promising branch for further research within the area of welfare losses induced by
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electricity supply interruptions. A special emphasis should be put on transmission con-
straints. On the one hand, transmission constraints aggravate the problem of necessary
load shedding in certain areas. On the other hand, these constraints may influence the
technical feasibility of the merit order of optimal load shedding as shedding load up-
stream of constrained transmission lines may be technically and, by that, economically
without any effect. The results could then be combined with the disaggregated out-
age cost estimates of this work to derive reliable expected regional welfare losses from
electricity supply interruptions. Moreover, an investigation of one-off outage costs for
both industrial and residential customers could complement our research since this cost
component cannot be accounted for within the macroeconomic methodology used in this
study.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Temp- Supply Crude Coal LNG Storage Gas
erature Shortfall Price Price Price
Mean -1.383 0.031 64.412 76.265 0.000 0.000 19.985
Min -10.762 0.000 25.880 42.844 -1158.726 -0.060 7.320
Median -0.728 0.000 63.192 74.499 -172.721 0.001 22.006
Max 9.302 2.229 96.329 139.217 2438.632 0.050 31.510
Std Dev 3.124 0.200 17.130 21.433 753.823 0.016 5.835
t 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
Table A.2: Results of the Johansen Cointegration Test
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Critical Value (95%) p-Value
Coal - Crude Oil r=0 0.0298 7.9670 20.262 0.8270
Coal - Crude Oil r≤ 1 0.0053 1.1827 9.1645 0.9260
Coal - Natural Gas r=0 0.0665 19.8383 20.262 0.0571
Coal - Natural Gas r≤ 1 0.0196 4.4367 9.1645 0.3510
Crude Oil - Natural Gas r=0 0.0789 19.9140 20.262 0.0558
Crude Oil - Natural Gas r≤ 1 0.0067 1.5110 9.1645 0.8714
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Table A.3: Summary of Sources, Russian Supply Shortfall of February 2012
Source Publication
Date
Time Period Affected Location Supply Disrup-
tion
Original Source
DJ Tradenews 02/02/12 01/31/12 Europe 1.5% less Gazprom Employee
DJ Tradenews 02/03/12 E.ON Ruhrgas, Ger-
many
None Company
DJ Tradenews 02/03/12 Italy 11.6% less
DJ Tradenews 02/03/12 Italy, Poland, Slovakia 8% to 10% less Speaker of Gu¨nther
Oettinger, European
Commission
DJ Tradenews 02/03/12 Hungary, Czech Re-
public
Less
DJ Tradenews 02/03/12 RWE Supply & Trad-
ing, Germany
30% less Company
DJ Tradenews 02/03/12 Wingas, Germany Less Company
DJ Tradenews 02/03/12 OMV, Hub Baum-
garten, Austria
30% less ex-
pected
Company
DJ Tradenews 02/06/12 PGNiG, Poland 7% less Company
DJ Tradenews 02/06/12 E.ON Ruhrgas, Ger-
many
One third less Company
DJ Tradenews 02/06/12 02/02/12 Austria 30% less Speaker of Gu¨nther
Oettinger, European
Commission
DJ Tradenews 02/06/12 02/02/12 Italy 24% less Speaker of Gu¨nther
Oettinger, European
Commission
DJ Tradenews 02/06/12 02/02/12 Poland 8% less Speaker of Gu¨nther
Oettinger, European
Commission
DJ Tradenews 02/06/12 Currently Italy, Greece, Austria,
Poland, Slovakia, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia
Less Speaker of Gu¨nther
Oettinger, European
Commission
DJ Tradenews 02/07/12 Germany, Romania,
Italy
Less Speaker of Gu¨nther
Oettinger, European
Commission
DJ Tradenews 02/07/12 Bulgaria, Slovakia,
Hungary, Poland,
Austria, Greece
No disruptions Speaker of Gu¨nther
Oettinger, European
Commission
DJ Tradenews 02/08/12 Previous
week
Europe 15% less Alexander Medvedev,
Gazprom
DJ Tradenews 02/13/12 E.ON Ruhrgas, RWE
and Wingas, Germany
Less deliveries Company
ICIS Heren EGM 02/15/12 Europe About 10% be-
low contractual
levels
Gazprom
ICIS Heren EGM 02/15/12 Beginning
of February
GDF Suez, France 30% less Company
ICIS Heren EGM 02/15/12 02/06/12 GDF Suez, France 20% less Company
ICIS Heren EGM 02/15/12 01/31/12 Slovakia 8% to 10% less
ICIS Heren EGM 02/15/12 02/02/12 SPP, Slovakia 36% less Company
DJ Tradenews 02/21/12 Europe No disruptions
anymore
Alexander Medvedev,
Gazprom
Henderson and
Heather (2012)
April 2012 02/02/12 to
02/07/12
Italy 11% - 29% less Snam Rete Gas
Notes: DJ Tradenews refers to the Dow Jones TradeNews Energy publication available at http://www.dowjones.
com/commodities/TradeNews-Energy.asp. ICIS Heren EGM refers to the ICIS Heren European Gas Market report
available at http://www.icis.com/energy/gas/europe/.
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Figure A.1: Plots of the Time Series Used for the Analysis
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Figure A.2: Responses of LNG, Storage and the Natural Gas Price
Notes: The impulse responses (solid lines) are based on one standard deviation of the respective struc-
tural shock. The response of LNG is measured in million cubic meters (mcm), the response of deseason-
alized storage utilization is measured in percentage points and the response of the natural gas price is
measured in percent. Confidence intervals (dashed lines) are bootstrapped following Hall’s 95-percentage
bootstrap interval using 1000 draws.
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Table B.1: Results of the Unit Root Tests
t-Statistic ADF p-Value ADF t-Statistic PP p-Value PP
NCG Spot -1.5307 0.5178 -1.9745 0.2938
NCG m+1 -1.3782 0.5943 -1.3513 0.6073
NCG m+2 -1.8279 0.3671 -1.3083 0.6276
NCG m+3 -1.1575 0.6945 -1.2410 0.6585
TTF Spot -1.5473 0.5093 -2.1754 0.2156
TTF m+1 -1.3514 0.6072 -1.3401 0.6126
TTF m+2 -1.4541 0.5567 -1.2593 0.6502
TTF m+3 -1.1283 0.7065 -1.2117 0.6714
NBP Spot -1.6091 0.4776 -3.2456 0.0177
NBP m+1 -1.4889 0.5391 -1.6794 0.4415
NBP m+2 -1.5543 0.5057 -1.6491 0.4570
NBP m+3 -1.4122 0.5776 -1.4726 0.5474
∆NCG Spot -13.2306 0.0000 -40.8718 0.0000
∆NCG m+1 -12.7497 0.0000 -32.7785 0.0000
∆NCG m+2 -6.3319 0.0000 -33.9596 0.0000
∆NCG m+3 -5.0573 0.0000 -33.8859 0.0000
∆TTF Spot -13.1479 0.0000 -34.7274 0.0000
∆TTF m+1 -10.8880 0.0000 -34.3284 0.0000
∆TTF m+2 -9.9450 0.0000 -33.2840 0.0000
∆TTF m+3 -5.2044 0.0000 -32.7979 0.0000
∆NBP Spot -10.2739 0.0000 -62.3198 0.0001
∆NBP m+1 -20.7571 0.0000 -35.1039 0.0000
∆NBP m+2 -22.2504 0.0000 -34.8534 0.0000
∆NBP m+3 -21.9632 0.0000 -34.0489 0.0000
Notes: The unit root tests are specified with a constant but without a linear trend
as a time trend seemed inappropriate from the first investigation of the price series.
The optimization of the lag length included for the ADF test equation was conducted
with respect to the Akaike Information Criterion. The selection of the bandwidth
for the Phillips-Perron test was based on the Newey-West procedure using a Bartlett
kernel.
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Table B.2: Results of the Johansen Cointegration Test (Spot and m+2)
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Critical Value (95%) p-Value
NCG r=0 0.0256 33.6016 20.262 0.0004
NCG r≤ 1 0.0013 1.5655 9.1645 0.8615
TTF r=0 0.0227 29.6522 20.262 0.0019
TTF r≤ 1 0.0012 1.5023 9.1645 0.8730
NBP r=0 0.0226 31.4289 20.262 0.0010
NBP r≤ 1 0.0020 2.5516 9.1645 0.6673
Table B.3: Results of the Johansen Cointegration Test (Spot and m+3)
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Critical Value (95%) p-Value
NCG r=0 0.0167 22.0623 20.262 0.0280
NCG r≤ 1 0.0013 1.5672 9.1645 0.8612
TTF r=0 0.0149 19.8639 20.262 0.0566
TTF r≤ 1 0.0012 1.5087 9.1645 0.8718
NBP r=0 0.0226 31.4289 20.262 0.0010
NBP r≤ 1 0.0012 1.5087 9.1645 0.8718
Table B.4: Pairwise Linear Causality Tests for NCG Returns
Direction Chi-sq-Statistic
Raw Data NCG Spot on NCG m+2 0.0593
NCG m+2 on NCG Spot 12.974***
NCG Spot on NCG m+3 2.6556
NCG m+3 on NCG Spot 10.8730***
NCG m+1 on NCG m+2 3.6889
NCG m+2 on NCG m+1 0.0989
NCG m+1 on NCG m+3 3.7935
NCG m+3 on NCG m+1 1.1040
NCG m+2 on NCG m+3 3.2389
NCG m+3 on NCG m+2 2.2918
VECM-filtered Data NCG Spot on NCG m+1 0.0001
NCG m+1 on NCG Spot 0.0115
NCG Spot on NCG m+2 0.0010
NCG m+2 on NCG Spot 0.0273
NCG Spot on NCG m+3 0.0111
NCG m+3 on NCG Spot 0.0234
NCG m+1 on NCG m+2 0.0086
NCG m+2 on NCG m+1 0.0000
NCG m+1 on NCG m+3 0.0308
NCG m+3 on NCG m+1 0.0002
NCG m+2 on NCG m+3 0.0148
NCG m+3 on NCG m+2 0.0040
Notes: *** (**) Denotes significance at the 99 (95)%-level. For the
raw return series, Granger causality was investigated within the VECM
framework, explicitly taking into account the cointegration relationship.
For the VECM-filtered residuals, causality testing is based on a VAR-
model of the residuals, where the number of lags is optimized with
respect to the Schwarz information criterion, suggesting the inclusion
of one lag.
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Table B.5: Pairwise Linear Causality Tests for TTF Returns
Direction Chi-sq-Statistic
Raw Data TTF Spot on TTF m+2 5.1896
TTF m+2 on TTF Spot 347.91***
TTF Spot on TTF m+3 6.3281**
TTF m+3 on TTF Spot 349.45***
TTF m+1 on TTF m+2 0.0001
TTF m+2 on TTF m+1 0.8102
TTF m+1 on TTF m+3 0.2332
TTF m+3 on TTF m+1 0.9347
TTF m+2 on TTF m+3 0.4150
TTF m+3 on TTF m+2 4.1041**
VECM-filtered Data TTF Spot on TTF m+1 0.0294
TTF m+1 on TTF Spot 0.0381
TTF Spot on TTF m+2 0.0859
TTF m+2 on TTF Spot 0.0067
TTF Spot on TTF m+3 0.1358
TTF m+3 on TTF Spot 0.0116
TTF m+1 on TTF m+2 0.0025
TTF m+2 on TTF m+1 0.0002
TTF m+1 on TTF m+3 0.0020
TTF m+3 on TTF m+1 0.0063
TTF m+2 on TTF m+3 0.0233
TTF m+3 on TTF m+2 0.0118
Notes: *** (**) Denotes significance at the 99 (95)%-level. For the
raw return series, Granger causality was investigated within the VECM
framework, explicitly taking into account the cointegration relationship.
For the VECM-filtered residuals, causality testing is based on a VAR-
model of the residuals, where the number of lags is optimized with
respect to the Schwarz information criterion, suggesting the inclusion
of one lag.
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Table B.6: Pairwise Linear Causality Tests for NBP Returns
Direction Chi-sq-Statistic
Raw Data NBP Spot on NBP m+2 2.7163
NBP m+2 on NBP Spot 33.872***
NBP Spot on NBP m+3 3.2826
NBP m+3 on NBP Spot 38.780***
NBP m+1 on NBP m+2 162.84***
NBP m+2 on NBP m+1 0.1249
NBP m+1 on NBP m+3 23.098***
NBP m+3 on NBP m+1 0.8021
NBP m+2 on NBP m+3 0.4293
NBP m+3 on NBP m+2 0.9533
VECM-filtered Data NBP Spot on NBP m+1 0.0073
NBP m+1 on NBP Spot 0.0009
NBP Spot on NBP m+2 0.0016
NBP m+2 on NBP Spot 0.0218
NBP Spot on NBP m+3 0.0357
NBP m+3 on NBP Spot 0.0288
NBP m+1 on NBP m+2 0.0031
NBP m+2 on NBP m+1 0.0133
NBP m+1 on NBP m+3 0.0115
NBP m+3 on NBP m+1 0.0000
NBP m+2 on NBP m+3 0.0143
NBP m+3 on NBP m+2 0.0063
Notes: *** (**) Denotes significance at the 99 (95)%-level. For the
raw return series, Granger causality was investigated within the VECM
framework, explicitly taking into account the cointegration relationship.
For the VECM-filtered residuals, causality testing is based on a VAR-
model of the residuals, where the number of lags is optimized with
respect to the Schwarz information criterion, suggesting the inclusion
of one lag.
Table B.7: Cointegration Vectors and Error Correction Coefficients (Spot and m+2)
Parameter Standard Error t-Statistic
cNCG -0.0658 -0.0658 -0.3478
βNCG 0.9605 0.0621 15.4605***
αNCG,spot -0.0630 0.0114 -5.52501***
αNCG,m+2 -0.0052 0.0066 -0.7735
cTTF -0.0760 0.1925 -0.3949
βTTF 0.9571 0.0635 15.0659***
αTTF,spot -0.0486 0.0087 -5.6054***
αTTF,m+2 -0.0060 0.0063 -0.9532
cNBP -0.2412 0.3205 -0.7526
βNBP 0.9214 0.0819 11.2517***
αNBP,spot -0.0807 0.0137 -5.8978***
αNBP,m+2 -0.0059 0.0056 -1.0503
Notes: *** (**) Denotes significance at the 99 (95)%-
level. A lag length of 1 for the both VECMs is selected
based on the Schwarz Information Criterion for NCG and
TTF, while the same criterion suggests to include 2 lags
for NBP.
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Table B.8: Cointegration Vectors and Error Correction Coefficients (Spot and m+3)
Parameter Standard Error t-Statistic
cNCG -0.1865 0.3334 -0.5595
βNCG 0.9134 0.1086 -8.4090***
αNCG,spot -0.0377 0.0086 -4.4097***
αNCG,m+3 -0.0045 0.0046 -0.9814
cTTF -0.1852 0.3384 -0.5472
βTTF 0.9142 0.1108 8.2498***
αTTF,spot -0.0280 0.0066 -4.2222***
αTTF,m+3 -0.0040 0.0044 -0.9098
cNBP -0.5174 0.4971 -1.0408
βNBP 0.8448 0.1260 6.7045***
αNBP,spot -0.0531 0.0110 -4.8353***
αNBP,m+3 -0.0047 0.0041 -1.1493
Notes: *** (**) Denotes significance at the 99 (95)%-
level. A lag length of 1 for both VECMs is selected based
on the Schwarz Information Criterion for NCG and TTF,
while the same criterion suggests to include 2 lags for
NBP.
Table B.9: Results of the LR Test on the Cointegration Vector (Spot and m+2)
Chi-sq-Statistic p-Value
NCG 0.3727 0.5415
TTF 0.4178 0.5180
NBP 0.8239 0.3640
Notes: The test was applied to the cointegration
vector of the spot and the month-ahead futures
prices. The null hypothesis of the LR test is: β
=[-1;-1].
Table B.10: Results of the LR Test on the Cointegration Vector (Spot and m+3)
Chi-sq-Statistic p-Value
NCG 0.5498 0.4584
TTF 0.5187 0.4714
NBP 1.2812 0.2577
Notes: The test was applied to the cointegration
vector of the spot and the month-ahead futures
prices. The null hypothesis of the LR test is: β
=[-1;-1].
Table B.11: Results of the Wald Test for Linear Error Correction
Threshold Chi-sq-Statistic p-Value
NCG 0.5σ 0.6986 0.4033
NCG σ 0.0818 0.7752
TTF 0.5σ 0.2217 0.6377
TTF σ 0.0859 0.7695
NBP 0.5σ 3.1297 0.0769
NBP σ 9.1698 0.0025***
Notes: *** (*) Denotes significance at the 99%-
level. The test was applied to the TVECM spec-
ified in Equation (3.15). The null hypothesis of
the Wald test is: αh = αl.
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C.1 Parametric Approximation of the Firm-Specific Shadow
Values of Capital
The dynamic cost function in a quadratic functional form is given by
Wit = α0 + αQE QEit + αQC QCit + αK Kit + αw wit + αc cit
+
1
2
αQE,QE QEitQEit +
1
2
αQC,QC QCitQCit +
1
2
αK,K KitKit
+
1
2
αw,w witwit +
1
2
αc,c cit cit + αQE,QC QEitQCit + αQE,K QEitKit
+ αQE,wQEitwit + αQE,cQEit cit + αQC,K QCitKit + αQC,wQCitwit + αQC,cQCit cit
+ αK,wKitwit + αK,cKit cit + αw,cwit cit + αt tt +
1
2
αt,t t
2
t ,
(C.1)
where the subscripts i and t denote the firm and year, respectively; W represents long-
run costs; QE is the flow of electricity; QC is the number of customers; K is the capital
stock; t is a time trend; and c and w are the price of capital and the price of the variable
input, respectively.
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Representing the dynamic cost function by g(·), we estimate the parameters of Equa-
tion C.1 by solving the following minimization problem:
min
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
2it
s.t. Wit = g(·) + it ∀i, t, (i)
∂ g(·)/∂ QEit ≥ 0 ∀i, t, (ii)
∂ g(·)/∂ QCit ≥ 0 ∀i, t, (iii)
∂ g(·)/∂ wit ≥ 0 ∀i, t, (iv)
∂ g(·)/∂ cit ≥ 0 ∀i, t, (v)
∂ g(·)/∂ Kit ≤ 0 ∀i, t, (vi)
(C.2)
The problem minimizes the sum of the squared residuals of the quadratic dynamic cost
function subject to a set of inequality constraints that impose monotonicity required
by economic theory. The shadow value of capital is then approximated by the first
derivative of the cost function with respect to the capital stock:
∂ g(·)
∂ Kit
= αK + αK,K Kit + αQE,K QEit + αQC,K QCit + αK,w wit + αK,c cit. (C.3)
C.2 Data Sources
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Table C.1: Data Sources
Variable Source
Total Number of Customers (in millions)
= avg. no. customers per month
FERC Form No.1: 301 -
12 (g)
Total Flow of Electricity (MWh)
= sales of electricity
FERC Form No.1: 301 -
12 (d)
+ transfer of electricity received
FERC Form No.1: 329 -
TOTAL (i)
- transmission of electricity by others
FERC Form No.1: 332 -
TOTAL (d)
OPEX (in million 2002 US$)
= transmission expenses for electric operation and maintenance
FERC Form No.1: 321 -
112 (b)
+ distribution expenses for electric operation and maintenance
FERC Form No.1: 322 -
156 (b)
Capital Stock (in billion 2002 US$)
= transmission plant balance (begin of year)
FERC Form No.1: 206 -
58 (b)
+ distribution plant balance (begin of year)
FERC Form No.1:206 - 75
(b)
Gross Investments (in billion 2002 US$)
= gross investments in transmission
= transmission plant balance (end of year)
FERC Form No.1: 207 -
58 (g)
- transmission plant balance (begin of year)
FERC Form No.1: 206 -
58 (b)
+ transmission plant depreciation expenses
FERC Form No.1: 336 - 7
(b)
+ gross investments in distribution
= distribution plant balance (end of year)
FERC Form No.1: 207 -
75 (g)
- distribution plant balance (begin of year)
FERC Form No.1: 206 -
75 (b)
+ distribution plant depreciation expenses
FERC Form No.1: 336 - 8
(b)
Labor Cost Index Bureau of Labor Statistics
Producer Price Index Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Price Index Bureau of Labor Statistics
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